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Estonian Historical 
Journal 
Aadu Must 
Chief Editor of "Kleio" 
In the autumn of 1979 a seminar of young histo­
rians was arranged in Taevaskoja, a picturesque place in 
South Estonia. There a discussion arose on the present 
situation and future perspectives of Estonian historical 
sceince. The representatives of the younger generation 
criticized what had been done until then and dreamed 
of major research projects in which they could partici­
pate. And then it was discovered that historians needed 
their own journal. For me it was the first acquaintance 
with the idea of an Estonian historical journal. Elder col­
leagues only smiled and said that the dream had lasted 
as long as the Soviet occupation which suppressed the 
"Historical Journal" in 1940. 
In 1922-1940 the "Historical Journal", a scientific-
popular publication of the Academic Historical Society 
was published in Estonia. Altogether 74 volumes that 
contained approximately 300 articles, 400 short surveys 
and reviews were published. Besides scientific articles 
that mainly treated the history of Estonia and its neigh­
bouring countries it gave a good survey of scientific life: 
conferences, major foreign and local research work. In 
1940 the journal was suppressed and the historians of 
our generation needed a special permission to read it at 
the library's restricted collection. 
On May 13, 1987 historians held another discus­
sion at the House of Engineers in Tartu. The current 
stage of development and future perspectives were on 
the agenda. Thanks to the "perestroika" that was brea­
king up the Soviet empire, there was more freedom and 
people were enthusiastic as well. It was decided to re­
store the historical journal step by step. The initial name 
was "Kleio. A historical Almanac". It was not possible 
to found a journal — a respective decision of the Cent­
ral Committee of the CPSU was needed for that. So, 
formally "Kleio" was published as a book. 
The first numbers of Kleio" were the result of 
work of a group of enthusiasts. Besides the authors Ülle 
Liitoja (doctorant), Priit Pirsko (director of the Estonian 
Histoiy Archive) and Ülle Must (chief bibliographer of 
the Library of Tartu University) who inserted the texts 
in evening hours at the university's computer class, spent 
a lot of their free time. The undersigned was responsib­
le for editing. Margus Laidre (Estonian ambassador in 
Sweden) did the proofreading. The first "Kleio" that was 
printed on a matrix printer and a rotary press almost 
looked like an illegal publication. This volume is now 
a great rarity. 
But "Kleio's" situation improved year by year. In 
1991 we got a more powerful computer, advance copies 
made on a laser printer and English summaries. In the 
same year "Historical Journal" was added to the title. 
Until today 10 volumes of "Kleio" have been pub­
lished, plus a special number on the 1949 mass depor­
tation in Estonia. Approximately 100 scientific articles, 
surveys of major events and publications and reviews 
have been brought to the reader. It is not the aim of 
"Kleio" to imitate the "Historical Journal". However, they 
have much in common. They are both characterized by 
scientific-popular orientation. Estonia is not obviously 
rich enough to publish separate journals for purely aca­
demic and a wider range of readers. In the 1920s-1930s 
the history of towns, trading, peasantry, political and cul­
tural history of the period of the Swedish Rule (1583-
1710) were popular topics. In "Kleio" the most popular 
topics are Medieval Estonian culture, history of trading 
in the 17th century, problems of military history. The 
economic, scientific and cultural contacts between Esto­
nia and other countries are of great interest as well. Stu­
dies of 20th-century history make up about one third of 
the articles. This is characteristic of our time — in the 
period of the Soviet occupation the scientific study of 
this period was hindered most, a great number of arc­
hival sources were kept secret. 
Besides protessional historians "Kleio" provides pub­
lishing opportunities for talented students and postgraduate 
students as well. Some articles in the present number 
have been published earlier in "Kleio". Once a year 
"Kleio" will be published in English. We are planning 
to publish a common historical journal in co-operation 
with our neighbours, first of all with Latvian historians. 
This would constitute be a journal of Baltic history, of 
course. We are interested in responses, co-operation and 
exchange of our journal with historical journals in other 
countries. 
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A Glimpse of Our Past 
Historical Science at Tartu 
University 
Helmut Piirimäe 
The re-establishment of independent Baltic states, 
their diplomatic recognition, acceptance to the UN and 
participation in numerous international organizations have 
aroused interest in us. However, we often realize how 
little we are known. Answering the questions of tourists, 
among them colleagues, sometimes makes an impression 
as if we were in the Africa of Livingstone's or Stanley's 
times. This is not surprising - we have been forgotten 
for ca 50 years. We were forgotten already in Teheran, 
Yalta and Potsdam. Decades under Soviet occupation 
brought about ideological and national pressure. On the 
basis of the ideological and political ambitions of the 
occupying empire the Communist Party also exercised 
control over science, and particularly watchfully, of cour­
se, over historical science. We were completely cut off 
from the western science. Very seldom could an ordina­
ry scientist participate in international conferences, in fo­
reign languages were published mainly such historical 
studies that consisted of falsifications and marxist ten-
den tiousness. The results of our research were mainly 
published in Estonian or Russian and therefore remained 
unknown in the West. Several manuscripts were unpub­
lished. This was partly due to ideological (national his­
tory, even the so-called Swedish Rule in the 16th-17th 
centuries, was considered inappropriate), partly to econo­
mic reasons. 
Taking into account what has been said above, the 
present article aims to an English-speaking reader with 
the history and acquaint present situation of historical 
science at Tartu University. 
Roots and Traditions 
Estonian national historical science is relatively 
young. The first surveys were written by Carl Robert 
Jakobson ' and Jakob Hurt ^ in the middle of the last 
century. At the end of the 19th century the first monog­
raphs were published, for example, by theologists Vil-
lem Reiman and Martin Lipp. The first works by 
professional Estonian historians were published at the be­
ginning of the 20th century. Hans Oldekop who had stu­
died at the universities of Tartu, Munich, Leipzig and 
Vienna successfully defended his PhD thesis in history 
in 1909. 3 However, the roots and traditions of our his­
torical science are even longer. 
Already at the foundation of Tartu University in 
1632 it was planned to establish a professorship of his­
tory and antiquities. 4 The first professor was Friedrich 
Menius. He had studied at the universities of Vienna, 
Königsberg and Greifswald, and in Tartu his main field 
of research was the legal history of Old Livonia. F. 
Menius was also the initiator of studying local history 
and he intended to write a 2-volume Livonian History. 
The program of this work gives evidence that the pro­
fessor of history at Tartu did not want to confine him­
self only to political and legal history as it was common 
practice then, but also intended to write about agricul­
ture, maritime affairs, finances, church history, schools 
etc. At that time it would have been a monumental work, 
but F. Menius' good intention was not realized as he 
was arrested on a charge of bigamy. During the Swe­
dish Rule a number of highly qualified history profes­
sors worked at Tartu University, including Carl Schulten 
who wrote poetry in Estonian, Claus Hermelin etc. 
Historical science was at a particularly high level 
at Tartu University in the 19th century. In the years 1802 
1889 the language of instruction was German. Outs­
tanding German and Baltic German historians Richard 
Hausmann, Friedrich Krause, Gustaw Ewers, Carl Scir-
ren etc. worked at Tartu University.^ In 1828-1839 the 
Institute of Professors worked at the University which 
trained teachers for other universities of the Russian Em­
pire and mediated their practising in Germany. In the 
course of Russification in the Baltic countries Tartu Uni­
versity was changed into a Russian-language one by the 
Russian authorities. Scientific contacts only with the East 
dominated. However, a number of prominent Russian his­
torians (Vassiii Regel, Aleksander Vassiljev, Ivan Leppo, 
Jevgeni Tarle) worked at Tartu University at the end of 
the 19th — beginning of the 20th centuries. 
During the German occupation in 1918 a German 
Landesuniversität was established in Tartu. New protes-
sors were invited from Germany and so it was to be­
come a university of high standard. But the Estonian 
students decided to boycott it as on February 24, 1918 
the Republic of Estonia was proclaimed and this raised 
hopes for a national university. According to the armi­
stice of Compiegne German troops drew back from Es­
tonia and the university was taken over by Estonians. 
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Although Soviet Russia attacked the newly born Repub­
lic of Estonia and the Estonian War of Independence 
broke out, the organizers started to make preparations 
for opening the Estonian university. In fact this would 
have been a Russian-language and Russian-minded uni­
versity. In difficult times there were also such Estonians 
who did not believe in the prospects for Estonian uni­
versity in Tartu. The Estonian ambassador in Paris K. 
R. Pusta arranged with universities of France and Eng­
land to send 400 Estonian students there. He was of the 
opinion that it was not possible to get rid of German 
and Russian influence in Tartu. However, the young re­
public that was fighting for its existence did not have 
economic resources to put this grandiose plan into prac­
tice. Despite the complicated circumstances during the 
War of Independence, the preparations for opening a na­
tional university in Tartu made good progress. On De­
cember 1, 1919 the festive opening of the university 
took place, lectures had already started in October. 
The lack of suitable university teachers was the first 
greatest problem. This was especially acute in national 
sciences, incl. history, archeology and ethnology. Swe­
dish and Finnish scholars — historian A. R. Cederberg, 
ethnographer I. Manninen, archeologists Arne Mikael 
Tallgren and Birger Nerman, art historians Tor Helge 
Kjellin and Sten Karling — came to help. In Tartu they 
quickly learned the Estonian language so that they could 
teach in Estonian. Thanks to these men the young Es­
tonian historical science quickly reached European level. 
The first generation of Estonian top historians consisted 
of their^ students. Historians participated in international 
events. Especially good scientific contacts were estab­
lished with Nordic historians. A number of studies of 
high standard and the "Historical Journal" were publis­
hed. After Estonia was occupied by the Soviet Army on 
June 17, 1940, we have gone through three occupations. 
Already the first Soviet occupation caused serious dama­
ge to our national sciences. Mass deportations, arrests, 
dissolution of national scientific and cultural organiza­
tions etc. showed that rhetorical propaganda about "prog­
ressive Soviet science" was actually genocide. During the 
Nazi German occupation only part of Tartu University 
functioned. 
Before the second Soviet occupation in 1944 many 
intellectuals, incl. several top historians fled their native 
land. Historians Prof. E. Blumfeldt, A. Soom who had 
defended his PhD thesis in 1940, ethnologists G. Ränk, 
I. Talve etc. continued their work in exile. Prof. A. Loit,' 
H. Rebas, T. Raun, Dr. V. Helk etc. make up a new 
generation of exile historians. Despite restrictions and 
obstacles raised by occupation authorities a very good 
co-operation developed between Estonian historians in 
occupied Estonia and in exile. 
In late autumn 1944 after Estonia had again been 
occupied by the Soviet troops, Tartu University started 
its work once again in Estonian, but under ideological 
pressure and completely cut off from the western world 
and in danger of extermination. Professor of General His­
tory Peeter Tarvel and Professor of Ethnology , Direc­
tor of the Estonian National Museum Ferdinand Linnus 
were arrested and died in Siberia. The Chair of Esto­
nian History suffered another kind of loss. Productive 
and highly respected Prof. H. Kruus became a "red" po­
litician, foreign minister of the puppet government of the 
Estonian SSR. He gave up teaching at the university 
where his knowledge was urgently needed. Although an 
eager collaborationist, he was also accused of "bourgeois 
nationalism" and arrested. 
In the first half of the 1950s ideological pressure 
became especially strong. The 8th Plenum of the Esto­
nian Communist Party launched a campaign against the 
so-called bourgeois nationalists, i.e. everything national 
was persecuted. The chairs of Estonian history, archeo­
logy, ethnography and art history were liquidated at the 
Department of History. There remained only one teacher 
of each subject at the Chair of History of the Soviet 
Union. 
Russian Estonians played a political leading role in 
the post-war staff. Heads of the Chair Prof. H. Moos-
berg and Docent L. Roots introduced marxist dogmatism, 
primitivism of Russian so-called proletarian historical 
science and disdain tor nationalism and Western histori­
cal science. But they deserve credit for not staffing the 
department with Russians, as it was done, for instance, 
in the Department of Philosophy, but with young postg­
raduate historians, some of whom did not belong to the 
Communist Party, though party membership was consi­
dered extremely important. Now they form the older ge­
neration of historians at the university. Estonian lecturers 
who had not worked at the university before the war 
played an important part in training these scholars. They 
had been that kind of high school teachers, well-known 
authors ot textbooks J. Madisson and J. Konks, archi­
vist R. Kenkmann and art historian V. Vaga. 
In the post-Stalinist period Estonian historians did 
their best to do research that was possible in the Soviet 
empire. They established contacts with colleagues, wor­
ked at libraries and archives and attended All-Union con­
ferences where they could even possible to meet scientists 
from abroad. Thus Swedish, German, Russian and Fin­
nish historical concepts have influenced historical scien­
ce at Tartu University. The national school came into 
being in the Republic of Estonia, and it has been inf­
luenced by Estonia's location between the East and the 
West. 
Organization 
Tartu University is the only university in Estonia 
training historians. However, historians of Tartu Univer­
sity form only one and far not the most numerous part 
of Estonian historians. As a remain of the Soviet sys­
tem the Institute of History of the Estonian Academy of 
Sciences still exists in Tallinn, the staff of which is much 
bigger than that of the university. According to Soviet 
conceptions namely the Academy of Sciences was to be 
the place for dealing with research. The university's only 
task had to be teaching. We have refused to admit such 
approach. If a lecturer is not engaged in scientific re­
search, he does not have anything to say to students and 
postgraduates. After the restoration of the Republic of 
Estonia the Academy system was not liquidated like it 
was done in some other countries of the former Eastern 
block. Although the staff of the Institute of History has 
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been reduced, the university has not received any addi­
tional resources. 
In the years after World War II the Department of 
History was a structural unit of the Faculty of History 
and Languages. In 1974-1991 there existed an independent 
Faculty of History that consisted of Departments of His­
tory, Psychology, Special Education and Sociology. To­
day the Department of History is a part of the big 
Faculty of Philosophy which is divided into 13 depart­
ments. For a number of many years the Department of 
History was divided into 2 chairs: 1) History of the 
USSR and 2) General History. As occupied Estonia was 
incorporated into the Soviet Union, also Estonian histo­
ry belonged to the Chair of the History ot the USSR, 
and even formed the major part in training. Archeology, 
ethnography and art history have been treated as a part 
of historical science and training, i.e. specialization in 
these subjects is grounded on the basic history studies. 
Enrolment of students is common. 
In 1989 the Chair of Estonian History was resto­
red (Head of the Chair - Prof. Tiit Rosenberg). In the 
spring of 1991, even before the Republic of Estonia was 
officially restored, it was decided to reorganize the Chair 
of the History of the USSR into the Chair of Contem­
porary History (Head of the Chair — Prof. Jüri Ant). 
The field of research and teaching of the Chair of Ge­
neral History (Head of the Chair — Prof. Helmut Piiri­
mäe) was reduced in place of the Department of 
Contemporary History. In the course of reforming the 
university in 1992 departments were divided into chairs. 
There are now 7 chairs or full professorships at the De­
partment of History: 1) Estonian History (Prof. T. Ro­
senberg), 2) General History (Prof. H. Piirimäe), 3) 
Contemporary History (Prof. J. Ant), 4) Archeology (Prof. 
Emer. E. Tõnisson), 5) Ethnology (Prof. E. Vunder), 6) 
Art History (Prof. J. Kangilaski), 7) Archival Science 
(Acting Prof. A. Must). The Chair of History Didactics 
is also being formed. A number of historians true work 
at other structural units of the university. The most im­
portant of the latter is the Department of Rare Publica­
tions and Manuscripts of the University Library. There 
are altogether 25 posts of lecturers at the Department of 
History. Including part-time lecturers, 36 people belong 
to the staff. Besides, there are some teachers who get 
hourly wages. Those historians who work at some other 
research institutions are not included in the survey ot 
research at the university 
Main trends of scientific research 
Despite the fact that lecturers were scattered among 
various structural units a remarkable unity has been cha­
racteristic of scientific research at the Department of His­
tory. When the Soviet scientific bureucracy insisted on 
unifying scientific problems into major topics, we could 
easily write " The History of the Baltic Sea Area in 
our plans. Only those scholars who were dealing with 
the Antique World, Tibet and Indonesia were not inclu­
ded in this geographic restriction. This restriction reflects 
our smallness and poverty, but at the same time it is 
necessary for concentrating our forces. As Tartu Univer­
sity is the only Estonian university that gives higher edu­
cation in history, the studying of Estonian history has 
been our national mission. It was our special moral duty 
under the Soviet occupation when the occupants and their 
hodmen tried to suppress everything national, everything 
that could not be identified as Russian. The history of 
our own nation acquired a special role as a part of na­
tional consciousness. The fact that our historians had no 
opportunities to work at the archives of those countries 
that did not belong to the Soviet Union, also hindered 
studying world history. 
Thus the main emphasis of scientific research at 
the Chair of General History was laid on historical re­
lations with other countries. At the same time general 
history had to provide the basis of world history to avoid 
provincialism in studying and teaching the history ot a 
small country and nation. Prof. Emer. Sulev Vahtre (1926) 
has been the leading teacher and researcher of Estonian 
history, supervisor of many young scientists. He started 
his research analysing Baltic German chronicles as sour­
ces of Estonian history. He has given a detailed treat­
ment of the "Younger Livonian Rhyme Chronicle" written 
down by Bartholomäus Hoeneke the original of which 
has not survived. S. Vahtre made a skilful reconstruc­
tion of the Younger Livonian Rhyme Chronicle based 
upon other chronicles using Hoeneke's text, and also 
published a special study on this topic." His thorough 
investigations into older Estonian history have been pub­
lished in the form of monographs on the St. George's 
Night Uprising 1343-46 12 and Ancient Fight for Free­
dom.13 S. Vahtre defended his PhD thesis with the stu­
dy "Estonian Peasantry on the Basis of Census Data 
(1782-1858)" ,14 The author used as sources the mate­
rials of revisions carried out in the Russian Empire con­
cerning the population of the Estonian Province (North 
Estonia). Until then these source materials had been con­
sidered important for family history only. S. Vahtre made 
use of these data to make significant demographic ge­
neralizations. Prof. S. Vahtre's recent studies have dealt 
with church history, first of all the role of the church 
in cultural history. Since 1993 S. Vahtre has been Prof. 
Emeritus. 
Another lecturer of Estonian history Allan Liim 
(1929) has in the course of many years taught Modern 
Estonian History (from the 2nd half of the 19th centu­
ry) and has also trained history teachers in didactics ot 
history. He is also one of the main authors of the vo­
luminous "Estonian School History" published by the Es­
tonian Academy of Sciences . 
Tiit Rosenberg (1946) who belongs to the younger 
generation of Estonian historians has continued the stron­
gest trend in postwar Estonian historical science ag­
rarian and peasants' history. The patriarchs of this trend 
were Artur Vassar's school at the Institute of History (J. 
Kahk, H. Ligi, E. Tarvel). In 1980 T. Rosenberg defen­
ded his thesis on the situation of manor workers in South 
Estonia in the 19th — beginning of the 20th centuries. 
His PhD thesis is nearing completion. T. Rosenberg has 
lectured on historiography of Estonian history. In con­
nection with this he has done thorough research on the 
works of earlier Estonian historians and supervised cor­
responding student papers. In 1994 T. Rosenberg was 
elected ordinary Professor of Estonian History. 
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18th-century Estonian and East European history 
has been the field of research of Docent of Estonian 
History Mati Laur (1954). He has studied the reforms 
of Catherine II, but also the influence of the Enlighten­
ment on the Baltic countries in general.16 His treatment 
of the continuity of the Swedish legislation and judicial 
system in the Baltic region after it was united with the 
Russian empire in 1710 (Uusikaupunki peace treaty in 
1721) is also of great interest. His PhD thesis is nea-
ring completion. The research of Tõnis Lukas (1962) 
who works at the Chair as a part-time lecturer on the 
clergy of Tartu diocese (until the 16th century) is pro­
mising from the viewpoint of Estonia's earlier cultural 
relations. The earlier period of Estonian history has been 
the field of interest for our archeologists. Docent Vilma 
Trummal ( 1924) has taught archeology to all history stu­
dents of Tartu University from the beginning of her 
lecturer's career until retirement. Having started her re­
search with studies of the settlement of South East Es­
tonia, she has supervised archeological excavations in 
Tartu throughout her career, and also taken interest in 
the history of the earliest settlement in Tartu.18 The scien­
tific careei of Ain Mäesalu (1954), another archeologist 
working at Tartu University, has been somewhat analo­
gous. He started with studying the stronghold of Otepää 
that is well-known as a site of 13th-century struggles. 
A need for rescue excavations made the problems of 
Tartu more topical for him. A. Mäesalu is an internatio­
nally recognized specialist in the field of ancient arma­
ment. This was also the subject of his MA thesis. In 
his PhD thesis he is turning back to the stronghold of 
Otepää. In 1992 Tartu University once again got an or­
dinary professor ship in archeology after a long time. 
Evald Tõnisson (1928) who, besides working at the Aca­
demy of Sciences, had been for many years a part-time 
lecturer, was elected to this place. His main field of stu­
dy has been Ancient Estonian strongholds, but also ot­
her remains of Younger and Middle Iron Age.19 His 
major study of the Koiva River Livonians is of interna­
tional importance.20 Prof. E. Tõnisson is one of the main 
authors of the general survey "Estonian Prehistory".21 
Unfortunately E. Tõnisson has now resigned to Prof. 
Emer. because of age limit. 
The Cabinet of Archeology is a structural unit that 
also contributes to the training of students, organizes and 
preserves archeological finds. Besides these tasks, the ca­
binet also deals with scientific research. Head of the ca­
binet Heiki Valk defended his MA thesis on ancient 
Estonian burial customs. Ethnology (ethnography) suffe­
red greatly after leading specialists of folklife G. Ränk, 
I. Talve etc. had emigrated and F. Linnus had died in 
Siberia. This subject has been taught by Docent Arved 
Luts (1929) (Acting Prof, in 1992-94). He has studied 
sea fishing in Estonia. For a long time the present Di­
rector of the Museum of Classical Antiquities of Tartu 
University Jüri Linnus (1926) worked as a lecturer of 
ethnography as well. He has made investigations into the 
problems of forging and rural handicrafts in general.22 
In 1993 J. Linnus defended his PhD thesis on the ba­
sis of his published works. 
Candidate of History Elle Vunder (1939) has wor­
ked as a part-time lecturer of ethnology and was elec­
ted Professor of Ethnology in the spring of 1994. Her 
chief field of research is popular embroidery. 
The predecessor of the Chair of General History 
was the department of General History. For a long time 
Prof. Jaan Konks (1902-1988) who studied Estonian ag­
rarian history,23 was Head of the Department. He was 
followed as Head of Department by Prof. Herbert Ligi 
(1928-1990) who defended his PhD thesis on feudal du­
ties of Estonian peasantry 24 He initiated the studies of 
Estonian settlement that is also associated with the prob­
lems of population history. After Prof. Ligi's death in 
1990 the leading scientist of this trend is acting Profes­
sor of Archival Science Aadu Must (1951) whose 
Candidate's thesis touched upon industrial history,25 but 
who is completing his PhD thesis "Migration in Estonia 
in the 17th-20th centuries". Ülle Liitoja (1957) who wro­
te her thesis on the settlement and population of one 
Estonian Parish and Priit Pirsko (1964) whose MA the­
sis dealt with population history in North East Estonia, 
are engaged in analogical problems. 
Economic and cultural connections in the Baltic Sea 
area have become the main field of current research at 
the Chair of General History The present Head of the 
Chair prof. Helmut Piirimäe (1930) has, as a continua­
tion to Arnold Soom's dissertation of 1940 on trading 
in Narva 1636-56,26 studied trading in Narva in 1661-
1700. He has also studied the trade in other Estonian 
towns in the 17th century, laying main emphasis on the 
statistical analysis of archival sources. This work is re­
lated to the studies of Baltic Sea trading written by outs­
tanding scientists like Artur Altman in Sweden, Sven 
Erikström in Finland, Vassili Doroshenko in Latvia, Eli­
sabeth Harder-Gersdorff in Germany etc. One of the most 
recent results in Estonian trading history is Enn Küng's 
MA dissertstion that deals with the commercial contacts 
of Lübeck and England with Russia. In his PhD disser­
tation he deals with trading between Narva, Tallinn and 
the Neatherlands in the 17th century. Director of the Tal­
linn Town Archive Jüri Kivimäe (1947) who also works 
as a part-time lecturer at the university is a representative 
of the same research trend. J. Kivimäe is the leading 
lecturer of medieval history, supervisor of several young 
promising scientists. 
Prof. Extraordinary Olaf-Mihkel Klaassen (1929) has 
written his PhD dissertation about the consulates of the 
Republic of Estonia (1918-40) in Asia and Africa (1992). 
This work was also defended at the Chair of General 
History although it deals with more distant countries and 
a more contemporary period. Estonian-Swedish economic 
contacts have been studied by Prof. H. Piirimäe in his 
PhD dissertation Swedish State Economy in Estonia and 
Livonia in the 17th century" (1974). The trend of mili­
tary history with the main emphasis on everyday life in 
the army has developed on the basis of studies of in­
ternational relations of the Baltic states. Margus Laidre, 
the present ambassador of Estonia in Sweden, defended 
his Candidate s dissertation "Swedish Army in Estonia 
and Livonia", and Rein Helme defended his dissertation 
on acts of warfare in the Baltic countries in 1812.28 
Tõnu Tannberg (1961) treated the recruitment system and 
country militia in Estonia in the period of the Napoleo­
nic wars in his MA dissertation. The topic of his PhD 
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dissertation is recruitment system in Estonia in the 19th 
century. Docent Mart Tânava's Candidate's dissertation is 
an investigation into more distant problems in time and 
space — it deals with the army of Ancient Rome. 
The history of Tartu University has been the fra­
mework of cultural and scientific contacts. To mark the 
university's 350th anniversary a 3-volume history of the 
university was published (with 1 -volume summaries in 
English and Russian).29 Arvo Tering, researcher of the 
university's scientific library, wrote his Candidate's dis­
sertation about the students at the Swedish university. in 
the 17th — beginning of the 18th centuries and is soon 
going to defend his PhD thesis on the scientific contacts 
of Tartu University in the same period. 
We have regarded the investigation of cultural and 
scientific contacts with Germany, which also includes the 
spreading of the ideology of the Enlightenment and the 
history of Baltic Germans, very important as well. 
In recent years we have also attached special im­
portance to the development of Ancient and Medieval 
history. Our postgraduate students have used the possi­
bilities to study in England (Mait Kõiv, Tiit Aleksejev 
at Oxford) and Germany (especially Göttingen). 
The activities of the Laboratory of Orientalistics are 
closely connected with General History as well. Under 
the supervision of Linnart Mäll (1938) the studying of 
Tibetan history and culture has been the main trend of 
research. 
The Chair of Modern History is going to concent­
rate its research on the history of the Republic of Es­
tonia (1918-40) that under the Soviet occupation was 
falsified by the so-called party historians. Professor Jüri 
Ant (1939) has dealt with many topical problems of fo­
reign policy. His monograph "Estonia 1920..." treats the 
problems of the first year of the Republic of Estonia." 
Under his supervision Ago Pajur (1962) completed his 
MA thesis on the conclusion of the nonaggression pact 
between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Estonia. 
The study also touched upon the relations of these count­
ries after the Estonian War of Independence in general. 
Estonia's intenational relations have also been an 
important field of research. Docent Kaido Jaanson (1940) 
has supervised dissertations concerning the foreign rela­
tions of the Republic of Estonia. Eero Medijainen (1959) 
studied co-operation between the Baltic states in 1926-
34.31 
Professor Voldemar Vaga is the grand old man of 
art history who recently celebrated his 95th birthday. His-
"Art History" has been a manual for many generations. 
Tartu has been V. Vaga's special field of interest ." 
Tartu University has been publishing "The Scandi­
navian Symposium" - an interdisciplinary yearbook. The 
publishing of the yearbook was initiated at the time of 
N. Khrushtshev's "thaw' in co-operation with Moscow 
historians. Soon it became an all-Union publication whe­
re several foreign scientists have published their articles 
as well. Both orthodox communists and liberal historians 
who were not members of the Communist Party have 
belonged to the editorial staff. The first editors were Ly­
dia Roots from Tartu and W. Pohljobkin from Moscow. 
From the 4th number Prof. Hilda Moosberg was the edi­
tor and since 1977 the author of this article has been 
doing this work. 
A total of 34 yearbooks have been published. Sac­
rificing paper and space to some orthodox dogmatic ar­
ticles enabled to publish serious studies, surely more than 
it would have been possible in Moscow. It has been 
planned to reorganize the yearbook so that most of the 
articles would be in English or German. 
Other major serial issues of Tartu historians have 
been "Papers on History of the Estonian SSR" "" and 
"Studies of Baltic History" ,34 In 1988 the first issue of 
"Kleio" — journal of Tartu University historians — was 
published. With the present issue in English we step out 
from behind the "curtain" to introduce ourselves to the 
international reader. 
References 
1 Jakobson С. R. Kolm isamaakõnet. Peterburg, 1870. 
2 Hurt J. Pildid isamaa sündinud asjust. Tartu, 1879. 
3 Oldekop H. Die Anfänge der Katholischen Kirche bei der 
Ostseeprovinzen. Eine Untersuchung der religiösen 
Expansion im Mittelalter. Reval, 1912. 
4 Tartu Ülikooli ajaloo allikaid. I. Academia Gustaviana. a) 
ürikuid ja dokumente. Koostanud Juhan Vasar. (Quellen 
zur Geschichte der Universität Tartu (Dorpat). I Acade­
mia Gustaviana, a) Urkunden und Dokumente). Tartu, 
1932. Nr. 16. Lk. 30-31. 
5 Menius Fridericus. Historischer Prodromus des Liefflän-
dischen Rechtens und Regiments. Dörpt, /1633/. 
6 Menius Fridericus. Intrada und Vortrag der grossen Uni­
versal Lieffländischen Historischer Geschichten Besch­
reibung. Riga, 1630. 
7 Tartu Ülikooli ajalugu 1.1632-1798. Koostanud H. Piirimäe. 
Tallinn, 1982. Lk. 176, 194-195. History of Tartu Univer­
sity 1632-1982. Ed. by Karl Siilivask. Tallinn, 1983. 
8 Tartu Ülikooli ajalugu II. 1798-1918. Koostanud Karl Siili­
vask. Tartu, 1982. Lk. 158-163. 
9 Tamul V. Professorite Instituut Tartu Ülikooli juuresATartu 
Ülikooli ajaloo küsimusi VII. Tartu, 1979. 
10 Liber secularis. Tartu, 1938. 
11 Bartholomäus Hoeneke. Liivimaa noorem riimkroonika 
(1315-1348). Tallinn, 1970. Lk. 91-104. 
12 Vahtre S. Jüriöö. Tallinn, 1980. 
13 Vahtre S. Muinasaja loojang Eestis. Vabadusvõitlus 
1208-1227. Tallinn, 1990. 
14 Vahtre S. Eestimaa talurahvas hingeloenduste andmeil 
(1782-1858). Ajaloolis demograafiline uurimus. Tallinn, 
1973. 
15 Eesti kooli ajalugu. 1. köide. 13. sajandist 1860. aasta­
teni. Tallinn, 1989. 
16 Laur M. Upravlenie Pribaltiiskih gubernij v period "pros-
veshtshënnogo absoljutizma" (1762-1769). Avtoreferat 
KLEIO. Estonian Historical Journal 9 Helmut Piirimäe 
dissertatsii na soiskanie utsh. st. kand. ist. nauk. Tartu, 
1987. 
17 Trummal V. Slaavi-vene elemendid Kagu-Eesti mate­
riaalses kultuuris (kuni XIII sajandi alguseni). // Eesti 
NSV ajaloo küsimusi.I. TRÜ Toimetised. Nr. 87. Tartu, 
1960. 
18 Trummal V. Arheoloogilised kaevamised Tartu linnusel. // 
Eesti NSV ajaloo küsimusi.III. TRÜ Toimetised. Nr.161. 
Tartu, 1964. Arheoloogilised kaevamised Tartu vana­
linna territooriumil. // Eesti NSV ajaloo küsimusi.VI. TRÜ 
Toimetised. Nr. 258. Tartu, 1970. 
19 Tõnisson E. Linnamäed ja maalinnad. Tallinn, 1966; Iss-
leovanija gorodishtsha Lohu. // TA Toimetised, 1976, nr. 
1. Das jungeneisenzeitliche Gräberfeld Tammiku in 
Ostestland. // Muinasmuistohtedistyksen Aikakauskirja 
75. Helsinki, 1973. 
20 Tõnisson E. Die Gauja-Liven und ihre materielle Kultur 
(11 .Jhrh.-Anfang 13.Jhrh). Ein Beitrag zur baltischen 
Frühgeschichte. Tallinn, 1974. 
21 Jaanits L.,Saul S., Lõugas V., Tõnisson E. Eesti esiaja­
lugu. Tallinn, 1982. 
22 Linnus J. Maakäsitöölised Eestis 18. sajandil ja 19. 
sajandi algul. Tallinn, 1975. 
Konks J. Pärisorjusest kapitalismi läveni. Jooni Eestimaa 
minevikust. // Uurimusi Läänemeremaade ajaloost. I. 
Tartu, 1973. 
24 L'g' H- Talupoegade koormised Eestis 13. sajanist 
19.sajandi alguseni. Zusammenverfassung. Die feudal­
lasten der Bauern in Estland im 13. bis 19.Jahrhundert. 
Tallinn, 1968. 
25 Must A. Sindi linn ja 1.detsembri nimeline vabrik 1833-
1983. Tallinn, 1985. 
26 Soom A. Die Politik Schwedens bezüglich des russischen 
Transithandels über die estnische Städte in den Jahren 
1636-1656. // Õpetatud Eesti Seltsi Toimetised. / Ver­
handlungen der gelehrten Estnischen Gesellschaft 
XXXII. Tartu, 1940. 
27 Piirimäe H. Kaubanduse küsimused Vene-Rootsi suhe­
tes 1661-1700.a. / Handelsfragen in den Russisch-
Schwedischen Beziehungen von 1661-1700. // TRÜ 
Toimetised. Vihik 113. Tartu, 1961. 
28 Helme R. 1812. aasta Eestis ja Lätis. Tallinn, 1990. 
29 Tartu ülikooli ajalugu. I-Ill. Tallinn, 1982. History of Tartu 
University. Tallinn, 1982. Istorija Tartuskogo Universi-
teta. Tallinn, 1982. 
30 Ant J. Eesti 1920. Iseseisvuse esimene rahuaasta. Tal­
linn, 1990. 
31 Medijainen E. Eesti välispoliitika Balti suund 1926-1934. 
Tartu, 1991. 
32 Vaga V. Üldine kunstiajalugu. Tartu, 1937-38. Eesti 
kunst. Kunstide ajalugu Eestis keskajast meie päeva­
deni. 1.-7. Tartu, 1940-41. 
33 "Eesti NSV ajaloo küsimusi". Since 1989: "Eesti ajaloo 
küsimusi". There have been published 11 numbers in 
1960-89. 
34 "Uurimusi Läänemeremaade ajaloost", 7 numbers in 
1973-92. 
Sulev Vahtre 10 KLEIO. Estonian Historical Journal 
Some Thoughts about the 
Periodization of Estonian 
History 
Sulev Vahtre 
Among the long list of crimes committed by the 
Soviet Union the falsification and mutilation of the his­
tory of the peoples, united by force to the empire, in 
the spirit of Soviet and Great Russian chauvinism, oc­
cupies a significant place. This was called marxist his­
torical science and it had to perform the role of a very 
important ideological weapon. Under Russian Soviet oc­
cupation also Estonian history was rewritten attaching 
particular attention to certain periods like the time of the 
Estonian Republic. In general little survived of truely Es­
tonian history, it was first and foremost presented as an 
organic component of Russian history. 
However, this massive attack on the historical cons­
ciousness of the people did not give the results which 
its organizers would have wished. People remembered 
recent history too well. They preserved and read histo­
ry books of those times and transmitted according know­
ledge orally. Among historians who were meant to be 
the first in propagating Soviet conceptions there was a 
number of those who tried and also managed to remain 
true to serious historical science. The fact that students 
of history at Tartu University, on the strength of their 
historical knowledge, were a thorn in the side of the 
authorities with their liberal and regime critical views, 
is quite significant. 
From the middle of the 1980s history as an ideo­
logical weapon of the Soviet regime turned against the 
regime itself and contributed a great deal to the overth­
row of Soviet power. The national liberation movement, 
whose aim was to restore an independent Estonian sta­
te, pronouncedly rested upon history, especially in its 
initial phase 1987-1988. Publication and bringing Estonia's 
true history into consciousness again took place under 
public pressure and support and became one of the most 
topical questions. In such a favourable atmosphere the 
overturning of the Soviet historical conception proceeded 
quite rapidly and decisively. 
The occupation that lasted nearly half a century 
could not completely destroy national historical science, 
but still caused it great harm. During that time interna­
tional historical science had made great progress in its 
content, organization as well as in technical aspects. It 
is impossible to catch up with all this right away. Fi­
nancial difficulties set certain limits and restricted the 
opportunities of action. The uncertain future of several 
educational and scientific institutions makes it difficult 
to set goals for a longer period. Quite a number of ta­
lented historians are busy in political life that however 
leaves them little time for scientific research. 
There was an urgent need for a new comprehensi­
ve Estonian history for a wide range of readers, as well 
as for new school-textbooks. The primary needs have 
now been met. A new textbook for the 11th year of 
high school that meets all the demands of the new prog­
rams, can be set as a positive example. It is especially 
good to see that this textbook has been written by ta­
lented historians from the younger generation. 
In the course of writing new surveys and textbooks 
these days as well as in the future, there arises the ques­
tion of the periodization of Estonian history. There is 
not any sense or necessity to use the Soviet division 
into social-economic formations that up to the present 
has been the only true and, in fact, obligatory way of 
distinguishing historical periods. 
The inevitable practical need to systematize histo­
rical material is the first reason for periodization as it 
is impossible to present world history as well as the his­
tory of a single country without its inner analysis. Any­
how, it is the question of evaluation that reflects the 
author's conceptions. 
In 1989 a survey of Estonian history written by 
three young historians was published under the title "The 
Story of the Native Land"2 ("Kodu lugu") that, accor­
ding to my suggestion, and the authors'specifications, di­
vides the whole Estonian history into four major periods. 
In the book they are titled "Home and Hearth", "Ser­
vant in own Home", "Master in own Home" and "Un­
der Pressure" that in drier terms mark ancient history 
(the middle of the 8th millenium to 1227), the centuries 
of foreign power (1227-1917/18), the Republic of Esto­
nia (1917/18-1940) and the Estonian SSR (1940-...). Due 
to the situation at the time of writting, "The Story of 
the Native Land" is, as the general title already marks, 
pronouncedly and purposely Estonian-centred. The perio­
dization proceeds from the question how great the role 
of Estonians has been in ruling the country; whether 
they have been masters of their native land themselves 
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or have power and lordship belonged to foreign autho­
rities. Especially today when we are once again strugg­
ling against a foreign power, analyzing history from this 
point of view might be understandable and justified. 
The well-known comprehensive work by Toivo Raun3 
also divides Estonian history into four major periods: Es­
tonia before 1710, Estonia under Imperial Russia, Inde­
pendent Estonia, Soviet Estonia. The latter two parts 
coincide with ours, but the first ones are temporally and 
principally different. 
The following remarks explain the periodization used 
in The Story of the Native Land". Single subperiods 
are also analyzed to some extent, and this might be of 
some help while compiling new surveys. 
Treating ancient history (prehistory) as one of the 
main epochs in Estonian history is justified in every res­
pect not only because of its temporal length but first of 
all because of its essential significance for the whole de­
velopment that followed. The fact that our predecessors 
have inhabited this country for about 10,000 years, our 
direct ethnic ancestors for at least 5000 years, is not 
only a festive declaration. A firm foundation was laid to 
tillage that gave colour to the following development; 
the language, culture and mentality that was transmitted 
through the "historical times" and that has reached our 
time, were formed. 
During the millenniums of prehistory the society 
went through a very slow, but steady development from 
mesolithic kins of hunters and fishermen to the thres­
hold of statehood. It has proved most expedient to fol­
low this development according to the archeological 
periodization (the Stone Age, the Bronze Age, the Iron 
Age). This seems to be not quite enough as far as its 
final periods - Middle Iron Age (5-8th c-ies) and Youn­
ger Iron Age (9-13th c-ies) are concerned. In the second 
half of the first millennium economic and social deve­
lopment quickened noticeably, and Estonian tribes took 
more and more an active part in international commu­
nication. Yet, compared with Scandinavia and Russia the 
rate of development was slower, and when Christian sta­
tes arose in those countries, the latter started to reveal 
aspirations of conquest towards Estonia. Throughout se­
veral centuries such attacks were successfully repulsed 
that evidently proves the existence of a certain military 
and political organization. On the ground of written sour­
ces the beginning of such relations can be dated to the 
7th century. 
In the 11th century significant new developments 
can be noticed in economic, social and political life. The 
best-known and most characteristic political event was 
the attempt of Kiev Russia to join the Estonian region 
to the Kiev state. It started with Yaroslav the Wise's 
campaign to Tartu that was conquered in 1030. The cam­
paign, however, ended with a counter-attack by the Es­
tonians and the withdrawal of Russians from Estonia in 
1061. At the same time, middle of the 11th century, an 
important change also took place in relations with Scan­
dinavia. The Viking era of the Scandinavians ended, and 
the role of Estonians started to grow in the Baltic Sea 
area. The favourable situation in foreign policy was con­
nected with inner consolidation; foreigners started to con­
sider Estonia and the Estonians as a definite territorial 
and ethnical whole. 
The situation changed with the rise of the Germans 
in the Baltic Sea area from the middle of the 12th cen­
tury, that coincided with Denmark's growing activity. The 
activities of bishop Fulco as a representative of Denmark's 
policy, were the first serious marks of the beginning of 
aggression. Yet decisive success was achieved by Ger­
man crusaders. With Danish support, Estonia was chris­
tianized and subordinated to foreign powers. The year 
1227 when Saaremaa was the last district in Estonia to 
accept Christianity, is usually considered to be the final 
year of the ancient fight for freedom. 
This can also mark the end of the ancient history 
of Estonia, although it is a very conditional date. Some 
ten years the inhabitants of Saaremaa restored their in­
dependence for a brief period and after that they were 
successful several times. For some time the ancient or­
der of life was preserved besides the new system of po­
wer and partly within. As a matter of fact ancient history 
ends with a longer transition period that quite obvious­
ly lasted until the final episode of the ancient fight for 
freedom, the St. George's Night Uprising (1343-1345), 
partly even longer. 
The Estonians lost their Freedom for about 700 
years. This period has often been called a 700-year-sla-
very, that might be adequate only if we do not interp­
ret the word slavery in the sense of real ancient slavery 
or medieval serfdom, but as the word "orjus" signified 
in older Estonian language as a duty, a service. During 
this time Estonians were excluded from the governing 
of the country. For several centuries most of them were 
serfs of feudal landlords; the highest governmental po­
wer belonged to foreigners who alternated from time to 
time - the German (Livonian) Order and bishops, Den­
mark, Poland, Sweden, Russia. In three years time (1566-
1563) a part of Estonian territory also belonged to the 
Lithuanian Grand Duchy. 
With the conquest, Estonia was simultaneously con­
nected to the medieval European cultural area. It is pro­
bably appropriate to call the period from the ancient 
fight for freedom to the great wars that broke out in 
the middle of the 16th century and brought about great 
changes, the Medieval period in Estonian history. Prin­
cipally the same kinds of economic, political, social and 
cultural phenomena and relations as in Western Europe, 
developed in Estonia, with local specific features. In its 
appearance Estonia also became quite similar to the count­
ries of Northern and Western Europe (towns, castles, mo­
nasteries, churches). Following Germany's example, 
Estonia experienced Lutheran reformation after the mo­
nopoly of the Catholic church that had lasted for three 
hundred years. 
Medieval Old Livonia was politically splintered. The 
Estonian territory was divided between the Livonian Or­
der, the bishops of Tartu and Saare-Lääne, and Denmark 
(1238-1346). The latter was officially called the Duchy 
of Estonia although it covered only North-Estonia. Esto­
nia did not constitute one administrative unit, but the 
term Estonia in the sense of the whole Estonian territo­
ry was still used and acknowledged. At the beginning 
of his chronicle Balthasar Russow presents a remarkab­
le geographical-ethnical description of Livonia. According 
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to Russow Livonia was divided into three major provin­
ces, namely Estonia, Latvia, and Curonia, that in their 
turn were divided into different districts. The author com­
ments on the Estonian population and language as fol­
lows: "...the inhabitants of Estonian provinces and islands 
all speak Estonian. On some islets, however, Swedish is 
also spoken, which is evidence that the inhabitants ot 
these places must be of Swedish or Finnish origin. But 
German is common among the nobility and the citizens". 
4 
In 1558, under the leadership of Ivan the Terrible, 
Russia started a war against Old Livonia with the aim 
to reach the coasts of the Baltic Sea at a broad Iront. 
A great fight for the title of dominum maris Baltici star­
ted, and besides Russia also Poland, Lithuania, Denmark 
and Sweden took an active part. As far as Estonian his­
tory is concerned, this meant a period of great wars, 
confusion and frequent change of powers; that have been 
treated and valued in a different way in history books. 
In some sense this time tends to get lost between the 
quite stable Order period and the following period of 
the Swedish Rule. The fights for the inheritance of Old 
Livonia resulted in the ruin of the country, destruction 
of population that alongside with epidemics, lean har­
vests and famines led to a real demographic cataclysm. 
At the same time something new and progressive star­
ted to arise from this general downfall; the Middle Ages 
were replaced by the Early Modern way of life, in the 
rivalry between the Catholic and the Lutheran churches 
significant results were achieved in education. All this 
should probably deserve more attention than this period 
has been attached to since; it seems correct to treat it 
as an independent historical period. So much the more 
that there is quite a lot of various source material ava­
ilable. 
In quite a number of comprehensive surveys of Es­
tonian history this period has been analyzed in two sta­
ges - first of all the Livonian War (1558-1583), that is 
the fight of Russia with Old Livonia and, after the sta­
tes of the order and bishops were destroyed, with Po­
land and Sweden who finally drove out Russia. This was 
followed by a time when Estonia was divided between 
three states: Poland (1561-1629(or 1625)), Sweden (1561-
1629) and Denmark (1559-1645). 
From the viewpoint of the natives such division is 
not quite expedient. Fighting went on soon after the end 
of the Livonian War, and there was not much differen­
ce for the people, whether it was carried on by Russia 
or other states. The name Livonian War itself comes 
from Russian historical science and proceeds from Rus­
sian policy; as a matter of fact, it is questionable to re­
gard it as one period of Estonian history. It had to do 
with a number of wars that can also be grouped in some 
other way. In the years 1558-1561 a war was carried 
on between Russia and Old Livonia that ended with the 
latter's defeat and the liguidation of the state system that 
had existed so far. The year 1561 became decisive (last 
steps in the liquidation of the Order State were in 1562); 
this date marks the end of medieval Livonia, and can 
be regarded as one of the basic dates of Estonian his­
tory. Russia's wars with Lithuania and Poland followed, 
in the years 1563-1570 the Seven Years War of the 
Nordic Countries lasted with Sweden on one side and 
Denmark with its allies (Poland, Lübeck) on the other, 
that also touched Estonia. In 1570 another war between 
Sweden and Russia broke out that in Swedish historical 
literature is commonly known as the Twenty Five Years' 
War of the Nordic Countries, and which is considered 
to have ended with the Täyssina Peace Treaty in 1595 
(not with the Pljussa Armistice in 1593). 
The war between Sweden and Poland was a major 
political event for Estonia in the first decades of the 
17th century; the Kalmar War (1611-1613) also did not 
leave Estonia untouched. With short breaks the wars las­
ted until the Altmark Armistice between Sweden and Po­
land in the year 1629. Major military activities in the 
Estonian territory stopped in 1625, but the state of war 
lasted and minor campaigns took place until the armi­
stice. The Altmark armistice may be considered the end-
point of the period of wars that began in 1558. 
The years 1558-1629 might be called the Time of 
Great Wars in Estonian history, as one of the most re­
cognized researchers of older Estonian history Vilho Nii-
temaa has already written in his "Baltic History".' 
The following period of the Swedish rule is, by its 
name at least, the best known period of older Estonian 
history to the broad public. In folk tradition it someti­
mes even occurs as a synonym to older times in gene­
ral. Though Swedish rule was foreign like all the previous 
ones it was much more favourable from the Estonians'point 
of view in many aspects. This distinguishes the Swedish 
Time in Estonian history and gives it a particular pla­
ce. But as to the boundaries of the Swedish Time, we 
can not give simply two dates. Estonia passed to Swe­
den step by step: Tallinn, Harju, Viru and Järva districts 
in 1561; Läänemaa district in 1584, South-Estonia in 
1629, and Saaremaa in 1645. The second half of the 
1620s marks a significant change; at that time thorough 
reorganization started. The time preceding this date has 
been called Earlier, and the following period, Later Swe­
dish Rule. The reversion of manors in the 1680s in its 
turn marked a new stage, the Baltic landlords were su­
bordinated to the will of the central government. Promi­
sing perspectives arose in the economic, social and cultural 
development of the peasantry, the futher realization of 
which was cut off by the Nordic War. 
The end of the Swedish time has been dated in 
1710 when the whole of Estonia was de facto joined to 
Russia as well as with 1721 when the Uusikaupunki 
peace was concluded. The question which ot them is to 
be preferred as a major borderline is and probably re­
mains disputable. The first date seems to have more sup­
porters, but from the aspect of public law the significance 
of the other date should also be emphasized. 
The Swedish Time was followed by two centuries 
of Russian rule. From the broad perspective of Estonian 
history it seems rather tragicomical how the fact that Es­
tonia was a part of the Russian Empire is made use of 
in Great-Russian chauvinism and political speculation. 
The Nordic War and the victories of Peter the Great are 
set out as the beginning of Estonian history; it is clai­
med that Estonia has always belonged to Russia. At the 
same time the so-called Baltic Rule and Jurisdiction Sys-
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tern that guaranteed special status to the Baltic provin­
ces, as well as the fact that they continuously were a 
part of the West-European cultural area, are often de­
nied. 
The so-called Estonian National Awakening that 
made the Estonian nation one of Europe's modern na­
tions, also took place under Russian rule, in the second 
hall of the 19th century. The national movement mar­
ked the outset of an independent state, it meant a kind 
of preparatory work for the Republic of Estonia. It is 
quite logical to treat the National Awakening as the be­
ginning of a new major period in Estonian history. Whi­
le treating the National Awakening its direct presumptions 
in the first half of the previous century ought to be kept 
in mind as well as more distant ones starting with the 
times of ancient independence. 
The temporal borders of the independent Republic 
of Estonia are again somewhat vague and here we also 
have to do with transition periods. February 24, 1918 
when independence was officially promulgated, is gene­
rally acknowledged as the birthday of the Republic of 
Estonia, and so historians have no reason to object. Brea­
king away trom Russia and the gaining of independence 
was of course a longer process, in the course of which 
the first important steps were taken in 1917, but deci­
sive guarantees were the victorious War of Independen­
ce and the Tartu Peace Treaty on February 2, 1920. 
Estonia was occupied by the Soviet Union on June 
17, 1940, but principally it was already decided with the 
Nazi-Soviet Pact signed on August 23, 1939 and with 
the so-called Treaty of Bases on September 28, 1939 
that was forced upon Estonia. With the moving of Rus­
sian troops to the bases that started on October 18, 1939, 
the occupation of the country already began. So here 
again we have to do with a longer process the final 
point ot which was uniting Estonia formally to the So­
viet Union on August 6, 1940; and maybe it is not so 
important to look for the "main date" so eagerly. 
It is much more important to keep in mind that in 
1939-1940 the Soviet Union managed to occupy and an­
nex Estonia for one year only. The German occupation 
in 1941-1944 is related to the Republic of Estonia as 
the greater part of the people and leading politicians at 
that time reckoned upon and strove for the restoration 
of independence. In the name of this Estonian men fought 
in the German as well as in the Finnish armies. When 
Otto Tiefs government entered upon its duties on Sep­
tember 18, 1944, independence was finally restored and, 
although this act did not have practical significance, it 
had to do with a weighty decision that affirmed the con­
tinuity of the Republic of Estonia. 
We have reached the Soviet occupation. Which 
events and dates have been the most significant in this 
period has to be decided after some temporal, distance. 
The development of society is so complicated and 
many-sided that all the attempts to schematize it in a 
certain way, remain conditional and compromising. This 
is also valid about periodization. So the ideas introdu­
ced here should also be taken as one possible approach 
and one aspect. Other possibilities, that are of course 
numerous, were referred to above. Discussions in this 
field seem topical, especially at the present stage of our 
historical science. 
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Late Medieval Narva Between East and 
West: Trade and Politics 
In 1564 Caspar Hennenberger wrote in a leaflet 
dealing with events in Livonia that the German Nar\ a 
was "... ein sehr fest Stadt und schloss an der Reusisc­
hen grentz, der schlussel zum landt Twenty-two 
years later it is mentioned in a memorandum of the Re-
val Town Council dealing with trade policies that Nar­
va has always been the key to the Baltic Sea. Without 
doubt the opinion of the Prussian pastor from Miihau-
sen as well as that of the Re val Town Council twenty 
years later was influenced by the Livonian War which 
broke out in 1558. As it is well known, at the begin­
ning of the war Narva was seized by Russian troops 
and during the next two decades it developed into one 
of the most important North-East European markets, thus 
becoming "... das Hauptbindeglied zwischen Osten und 
Westen ..." as Walther Kirchner put it.' 
Many historians (N.E. Bang, A. Attman, W. Kirch­
ner, I. Andersson, I. Lubimenko, A. Dreyer, J. Denucé, 
P. Jeannin, K.F. Olechnowitz, T.S. Willan, A. Maczak, 
H. Zins, and recently M.-L. Pleus) have displayed a keen 
interest in Narva's commercial boom in the years 1558-
81. Critical analysis of three important works (A. Att­
man, S. Svensson, W. Kirchner) was given by Hans 
Kruus in 1959. However, the question arises whether the 
flourishing of Narva's trade was based only on the pur­
poseful commercial policy of Czar Ivan IV, a substan­
tial manifestation of which was the charter he granted 
to Narva in 1558, or whether Narva itself, prior to the 
conquest, already possessed a commercial potential the 
realisation of which was in every way promoted by the 
Russians. In other words, it is a question of the rela­
tion of subjective and objective factors in Narva s com­
mercial policy in the 16th century and, at the same time, 
of whether and in what sense Narva was "the key to 
the whole country" before the critical events of 1558. 
* 
The whole history of medieval Narva is a graphic 
example of the contradictoy and even paradoxical natu­
re, of urban development. 
On one hand it is evident that the rise of Narva 
as a town was due to trade, especially Hanseatic-Rus-
sian trade. Narva's location on trade routes to Novgorod 
was the main factor for the enhanced strategic and po­
litical importance of the Livonian border village called 
Narvia, first mentioned in the Liber Census Daniae. Se­
veral historians, relying on Narva s location at the junc­
tion of important roads connecting West with East and 
North with South, have attempted to prove that Narva's 
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growth as a town and a stronghold began immediately 
after the conquest of the Estonian territory. Yet it must 
be mentioned here that this statement is not confirmed 
by written records. The immediate effect ol the trade 
routes on the changes in the quality of Narva's settle­
ment dates to a later period and is linked with the dec­
line of trade on the Neva in the 1280s as well as with 
the privilege of Erik Menved of 1294, which granted 
merchants the right to use the overland route through 
the province of Viru to the River Narva and from the­
re to Novgorod.4 It was only in 1345, by the privilege 
given by Waldemar IV Atterdag and mediated by Stigot 
Anderson, that the Lübeck town rights were granted to 
Narva, or, to be more exact, its citizens were granted 
the same rights and freedoms enjoyed by the citizens of 
Reval. 
The above-mentioned fact supports the standpoint 
of A. Siivalepp, P. Johansen and W. Ebel that medieval 
Narva was a filial town of Reval; Narva's status has 
even been interpreted as that of a dependant. However, 
Narva's restricted right of appeal in the judicial system 
cannot be regarded as proof of real dependence. The 
fact that Narva's population was formed by migration 
from Reval or through Reval is typical in the history of 
Livonian towns. 
However, the fact that Narva, together with some 
other towns, belongs to the second wave of the forma­
tion of towns on Estonian territory, while Reval and Dor-
pat belong to the first, deserves special consideration. It 
gave Reval priority over Narva on the West-East trade 
route. The fall of Visby in 1361 created favourable con­
ditions for the economic and political emergence of Tal­
linn. 
Moreover, in 1346 Reval was granted the Right ot 
Staple in the Hanseatic-Russian trade. There is no rea­
son to regard it as a purposeful act of Reval aimed 
against Narva, as A. Siivalep maintains, since Narva, 
which had been only recently granted the town rights, 
was no competitor of Reval yet. Still, it was the gran­
ting of the Right of Staple to Reval that in later cen­
turies excluded Narva of commercial competition. Although 
the Swedish historian Eric Tiberg recently expressed doubt 
as to the real meaning of the respective provisions of 
the 1346 grant,6 one cannot disregard the whole late me­
dieval practice of trade and seafaring on the Gulf of 
Finland. 
Here we can cite as an example the explanation 
given to the Reval Town Council in 1586 by merchant 
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Jürgen Honeijeger pertaining to the organisation of tra­
de in Livonia in olden times, that is, before the Livo­
nian War, when Jürgen Honerjeger himself was active 
as merchant. He noted that not a single ship on the Bal­
tic was allowed to sail into a port that did not belong 
to the Hanseatic League, and it was forbidden "... by 
vorlust lyeff and gutt ..." to sail into the port of Narva 
so as to prevent the Russians from buying banned merc­
handise such as lead, copper, sulphur and gunpowder. 
All wares from western ships were to be unloaded in 
Tallinn and sold to the citizens of that town. Only the 
latter, and not the Dutch, the English or other non-Han-
seatics, could forward the wares from Tallinn to Narva 
on the small ships-schuten.7 
Jürgen Honerjeger's explanation is, of course, idea­
listic in character. Reval's Right of Staple was still vio­
lated and quite often ships passed Reval and sailed 
straight to Narva. However, Reval's maritime priority 
granted by the right of stample kept Narva for the en­
tire duration of Middle Ages in a secondary position in 
Livonian trade. 
Keeping in mind the above, there is no need for 
detailed proof of why Narva was not granted the rights 
of a Hanseatic town. Though Narva, having been gran­
ted the Lübeck town rights, was, in comparison with 
Reval or some overseas German town, an equally inde­
pendent town, the circumstance that it did not have the 
Hanseatic rights was one of the major obstacles to its 
development. The fact alone that the merchants of Nar­
va as non-Hanseatics did not have the right to form tra­
de organisations with the Hanseatic merchants or, for 
example, to use the Peterhof in Novgorod, was bound 
to limit the functions of Narva's trade to a minimum. 
In this way Narva would have served only the interests 
oi the Hanseatic-Russian trade, and the native merchants 
of Narva would have been dislodged from trade. 
The failure to observe regulations was a phenome­
non equally well known in the medieval society as it is 
today. Besides, a trade embargo which often happened 
because of frequent conflicts in the Hanseatic-Russian 
trade, usually brought in its way a boom in Narva's tra­
de, since Narva as a non-Hanseatic town was not com­
pelled to observe the Hanseatic restrictions. 
The trade pattern described above remained more 
or less stable in the eastern Baltic almost until the last 
decade of the 15th century when, due to a number of 
political shifts in this region, it began to disintegrate 
quickly. 
One of the major political shifts was the incorpo­
ration of Novgorod into the Grand Duchy of Muscovy 
in 1478. The impact of this event on the Hanseatic-Rus-
sian trade has received much attention in the more re­
cent Soviet research (N. Kazakova, A. Choroshkevich).8 
The building of Ivangorod on the River Narva in 
1492 and the closing down of the Hanseatic establishment 
in Novgorod in 1494 can be regarded as the logical se­
quel in the politics of Ivan III to the incorporation of 
Novgorod. 
The above-mentioned events, in my opinion, cons­
titute essential factors in the shaping of a new trade pat­
tern in the eastern Baltic. The situation created when the 
Hanseatic establishment in Novgorod was closed (1494-
1514) and by the trade embargo which lasted for near­
ly two decades was bound to give rise to the question 
of who was to become the mediator in the Livonian-
Russian (also Hanseatic-Russian) trade. In principle three 
towns, Ivangorod, Narva and Dorpat, could be conside­
red as potential trade emporia. 
When after the closing down of the Haseatic es­
tablishment in Novgorod it became in principle possib­
le to transfer the emporium of the Hanseatic-Russian 
trade from Novgorod to Narva (according to a comp­
laint of Reval, Narva did threaten to seize the entire tra­
de), this was prevented by the swift development of 
Ivangorod into a trade centre. After all, Ivangorod pos­
sessed the same prerequisites as Narva for becoming a 
port as well as a centre of Livonian-Russian and Han­
seatic-Russian trade. It became the basis of the rivalry 
between Narva and Ivangorod in the trade policies in 
the first half of the 16th century. 
Although the Hanseatic towns and authorities of the 
Order had tor years struggled for the reopening of the 
Hanseatic establishment in Novgorod na dem olden, it 
was impossible to restore the old pattern of trade. The 
first data of the partial opening of trade on the border 
(in Narva and Dorpat), probably resulting from separate 
diplomacy by Narva, is from 1506. In 1509 a peace 
treaty was concluded between Livonia and Russia, gran­
ting Russian merchants the right to free trade in Livo­
nian towns. It was only five years later, in 1514, that 
the Haseatic towns of Livonia, in the name of Hansea­
tic League, concluded the so-called kopmansfrede with 
Russia, on the basis of which the Hanseatic establishment 
in Novgorod was reopened.9 However, the Peterhof ne­
ver regained its former importance and commercial pros­
perity; it turned into an appendage in the trade policy 
of the leading Hanseatic towns in Livonia, Reval in par­
ticular. 
Trade with Russian merchants began to concentra­
te more and more in Livonian towns, or, in other words, 
the Russians began to pursue an active trade policy in 
Livonia. The last statement needs additional proof, but 
on the basis of materials now available this thesis in 
every respect explains the changes in the trade policy 
of Livonian towns in the first half of the 16th century. 
One might think that the restoration of the Livo­
nian-Russian trade would have normalised Narva's posi­
tion in the trade system. On the contrary, Narva's position 
deteriorated. The reopening of the Hanseatic establishment 
signified only the reduction to a minimum of Narva's 
prospects for obtaining the right of emporium of the 
Hanseatic-Russian trade. On the other hand, Narva's re­
lations with Ivangorod became more complicated: the 
merchants of the latter seem to have been oriented to­
wards in Livonia alone. 
The restoration of normal trade relations between 
Narva and Ivangorod met with considerable difficulties, 
the namestnik of Ivangorod demanded in 1512 that Rus­
sian merchandise should be weighed in Ivangorod only 
and German merchandise in Narva. The principle, which 
actually strove to establish equality, was not acceptable 
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to Narva, since the Russian wares had so far always 
been weighed in Narva. The merchandise brought to Nar­
va from the West was in its grearter part already weig­
hed and Narva had no right to re-weigh it; besides, it 
would have meant additional expense for the merchants. 
The struggle with the active trade policy of the namest-
niks of Ivangorod which continued for a number of years 
ended with the yielding of the Town Council of Narva: 
in 1516 Narva recognised the weight of Ivangorod. Alt­
hough the solution was formally just, from the point of 
view of the commercial rivalry of the two towns it meant 
the victory of Ivangorod's policy. 
An active party in the struggle for the extension 
of Narva's commercial rights was, at that time, the Li­
vonian Order. The precarious position of the Hanseatic 
establishment in Novgorod immediately after its reope­
ning obviously induced the Master of the Order Wolter 
von Plettenberg from 1515 on repeatedly to apply for 
the transfer of the Hanseatic establishment from Novgo­
rod to Narva. Plettenberg's proposal, which found no 
support in Livonia, was the subject of discussions at the 
Wendic and Hanseatic diets in 1516, 1517, 1518 and 
1521. The representatives of the Hanseatic towns usual­
ly found the proximity of Ivangorod to Narva, the pos­
sible location of the Hanseatic establishment, to be 
dangerous; also the transfer of the establishment to Nar­
va was felt to be determental to Reval's interests. 
Reval, which in every respect opposed Plettenberg's 
proposal, repeatedly stressed as one of the weightiest ob-
jectiöns the fact that, after the transfer of the Hanseatic 
establishment to Narva, the Peterhof in Novgorod would 
fall into the hands of the Lithuanians, the Swedes, the 
Danes or the Fuggers. Although at the Hanseatic diet of 
1521 the disscussion of this question ended in a comp­
romise - those who wished to support the Hanseatic es­
tablishment in Novgorod were allowed to do so, and at 
the same time it was allowed to trade with both Dor­
pat and Narva - what it actually meant was that 
Plattenberg's proposal had failed to find support. Those 
discussions show that even the modest backing which 
Narva's aims received in the Livonian trade policy was 
ineffective. 
An example of the consequences of Narva's inde­
pendent commercial policy is the town's prolonged strugg­
le against the Russians' trading journeys to Reval, 
especially those of the Ivangorod merchants. In a me­
morandum dated 1515 the Town Council ot Narva in­
formed the namestnik of Ivangorod that those Russian 
merchants who, following the ancient custom, arrived 
with their wares in Narva and wished to proceed from 
there to Riga, Dorpat or Reval, would be granted free 
passage, while those who wanted to by-pass Narva would 
not allowed to go on. The namestnik of Ivangorod set 
no store by such old customs, that is, coercive measu­
res, and let it be known that if the merchants of Nov­
gorod or Pskov wished to go straight to Reval they 
could by-pass Narva. Narva applied countermeasures and 
took steps to obstruct the travel of Russian merchants 
to Reval: a practice which in its turn caused a deterio­
ration in the relations between Narva and Reval. So, in 
1519, the Town Council of Reval, in a similar situation, 
forbade the merchants of Reval to send their wares to 
Narva: a move which would have meant the commer­
cial isolation of the latter. 
Although the Livonian Landtag decided in 1522 
that henceforth the merchants of Yamgorod and Ivango­
rod must trade in Narva only, and the merchants of 
Pskov and Novgorod in Reval, it is yet perplexing how 
the Livonian authorities proposed to compel the subjects 
of the Grand Duke to submit to the decision of the Li­
vonian Landtag, a decision which was, moreover, cont­
rary to the peace treaty. 
The fact that Reval indeed restricted for some time 
the trading journeys of the Ivangorod merchants was re­
garded in Ivangorod as a component of Narva's politics. 
The same situation recurred in 1537-38. And when the 
assembled Livonian towns in 1541 reached another ag­
reement which again contained the provision of banning 
the trading journeys of the Ivangorod merchants, the be­
haviour of the Reval Town Council towards Ivangorod 
and Yamgorod was openly provocative. 
Thus the attitude towards the trade with Ivangorod 
was one of the major reasons leading to an acute conf­
lict in questions of trade policy between Reval and Nar­
va in 1551-53. By the recess of 1553 the Town Council 
of Reval, for the sake of appearance, consented to pro­
hibit the trading journeys of the Ivangorod merchants, 
but only on the condition that the delegation of the Or­
der should manage to have a corresponding provision 
included in the peace treaty at the impending peace ne­
gotiations between Russia and Livonia. However, five 
years before the outbreak of the Livonian War such a 
proposal was Utopian. 
Thus Narva failed to restrain the overland trading 
journeys of Russia merchants to Reval. However, here 
the sea route from Reval to River Narva must be taken 
into account, as well as the fact that Ivangorod was the 
first Baltic port of the Russian empire. It must also be 
mentioned that in the first half of the 16th century the 
Russian state did not own a merchant fleet in the Bal­
tic or on the River Narva. It means, first, that Ivango­
rod was only a potential port for ships from the West. 
Data about their visits are relatively scarce: in 1500 Swe­
dish ships stopped in Ivangorod and in 1531 a ship from 
Amsterdam sailed into the port of Ivangorod. The sai­
ling of big western ships into the port of Ivangorod was 
obstucted by Reval's right of staple; besides, in 1541, 
by order of the Town Council of Reval, control over 
navigation had been considerably strengthened. 
This, of course, does not mean that Russian merc­
hants did not use the sea route. It seems that it was 
Narva's policy of obstructing the trading journeys of the 
Ivangorod merchants to Reval that forced the latter seek 
opportunities for travelling to Reval by sea which was 
not subject to control by the Town Council of Narva. 
On the other hand, freight expenses in overseas tra­
de judging by Livonian data, were smaller than in over 
land carriage. This statement is borne out by information 
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dating back to 1528 about two schulen skippered by Es­
tonians from Narva, returning to their home town. The 
ships brought from Riga to Ivangorod some Pskov merc­
hants bringing with them large quantities of wine and 
herring.11 
So far the attempts to find out whether the Ivan­
gorod merchants sailed to Reval (and perhaps also else­
where) on ships of their own have failed. From 1528 
on one comes more and more frequently across comp­
laints in Livonian sources about the Pskov and Ivango­
rod merchants sailing from Ivagorod to Reval and back 
on schuten skippered by Karelians. For example, in 1542 
the Ivangorod merchants hired eight or nine ships of the 
Karelians for journeys to Reval. This practice continued 
increasingly until 1555 when, because of the Russo-Swe-
dish war, the sea connection between Reval and Narva 
was severed. 
The commercial situation described above, which 
formed a part of the new pattern of trade relations, threa­
tened to place Narva's trade in isolation. It was the inc­
reasingly active trade policy of the Russians in Livonia 
that exacerebated the commercial antagonisms. The pro­
hibition of trading by the so-called visiting merchants 
(Gast handels verbot) brought serious consequences in 
the trade policy in its wake. The embargo was first int­
roduced in 1513 and was made more strict in 1539 by 
a decision of the diet of Livonian towns. Although the 
embargo deepened the antagonisms between the German 
and the Livonian Hanseatic towns (the Lübeck merchants 
also came to be regarded as visitors), it was an inevi­
table economic safeguard for the local merchants under 
the changed conditions. 
The detriment to the interests of the German Han­
seatic towns in Livonia and especially Reval's endea­
vours to monopolise trade in the entire region compelled 
the Lübeck merchants to seek opportunities for restoring 
their commercial position in Livonia and in trade with 
Russia. Obviously this explains Lübeck's growing inte­
rest in the state of affairs in Narva in the 1540s and 
1550s. Since 1541 the issue of admiting Narva into the 
Hanseatic League was discussed at several Hanseatic 
diets, probably on the initiative of the German Hansea­
tic towns. However, no positive conclusion was reached 
since, at the same time, the German Hanseatic towns 
were trying, although unsuccessfully, to restore the po­
sition of the Hanseatic establishment in Novgorod. The 
confidental report by one Reinhold Facke on the secre­
tary of the Lübeck Town Council Herman Boityn who 
allegedly was holding secret negotations with the Rus­
sians concerning the opening of a trading establishment 
in Ivangorod dates from the period between 1552 and 
1558. These first modest pieces of information bear 
witness to new shifts of interest in the trade pattern in 
the eastern Baltic, which was resolved by the Livonian 
War. The circumstance that, by order of Ivan IV, the 
emporium of Russian trade was transferred from Vyborg 
to Narva in 1559,'breaking Reval's monopoly in the 
eastern Baltic trade, was a logical solution to the deve­
lopments in the trade policies of this region in the first 
half of the 16th century. 
Although Narva's trade, on the basis of the above, 
was in a rather subjugated position, late medieval Nar­
va formed a politically important and inevitable link in 
the system of the Hanseatic-Russian and Livonian-Rus-
sian trade, thus fully justifying its being regarded as a 
town in a key position. 
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Trading Conditions of the 
English in Narva in the 
Second Half of the 17th 
Century 
In the middle of the 17th century a significant chan­
ge took place in the Baltic Sea trade of the English. Up 
to then English merchants received Russian and Polish 
raw materials mainly through Danzig, Königsberg and 
Elbing, then from the 1650s they first ot all communi­
cated with Stockholm, Göteborg, Riga and Narva. By 
the medium of the first two towns also iron reached the 
English market besides forestry products (pitch, tar, coal, 
timber). Riga and Narva turned into the shipping ports 
of Russian timber, flax and hemp.' All the towns men­
tioned were interested in the activities of English merc­
hants, but only in Narva their role in foreign trade 
became especially great compared with other foreigners. 
In Narva's export the English occupied a ^firm second 
place after Lübeck merchants (see table 1). 
Table 1 
Year In Export In Import 
1662 14,9 -
1668 6,0 4,9 
1671 18,2 2,9 
1675 5,1 5,3 
1677 33,8 47,1 
1679 28,4 21,2 
1696 20,4 24,3 
The proportion of English merchants in Nar­
va 1662-92 (%)" 
One of Narva's peculiarities was that a great part 
of English merchants and shipowners not only actively 
communicated with Russia via Narva, but settled down 
there. 
Herman von Bruiningk was the first to point out 
the particular role of the English in Narva in the second 
half of the 17th century.3 Finnish-Swedish historian Sven-
Erik Äström who has studied English-Swedish relations 
in the last quarter of the 17th century has in connec­
tion with this also observed the interest of the English 
in trading in Narva4 A German researcher Dirk Erpen­
beck has written an interesting survey on the reasons for 
English merchants to come to Narva plus a number of 
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biographies.5 But none of these works has touched upon 
the trading conditions and activities of the English in 
Narva in the second half of the 17th century and the 
problems that arose in connection with that, in a more 
detailed manner. The present article aims to fill in this 
gap to some extent. Thereby resolutions of Swedish kings, 
records and posters of the town council, as well as the 
letters of the Commercial Council, the Great Guild and 
the merchants, supplicates and other materials found in 
the fund of the Narva municipal authorities in the Es­
tonian Archives of History (Tartu) have been used as 
source material.6 
Alongside with the gradual perishing of the monop­
olistic position of the Hanseatic League the interest of 
English merchants in the Russian market arose. One of 
its expressions was the use of a new trade route over 
the Arctic Ocean to Russia and the Moscow Company 
that was founded in 1553. Besides the harbors ol the 
White Sea Narva became its other chief area of activi­
ties from 15597 But when the latter was united with 
the Swedish state in 1582, obstacles were put in the 
way of English merchants (and other foreigners) and they 
were forced to communicate with Russia mainly via Arc­
hangelsk.8 The interest of the English in Narva was res­
tored in the middle of the 17th century. On one hand, 
it was connected with the fact of being overcome by 
the Dutch in Archangelsk, on the other hand the Eng­
lish had lost their direct contacts with Russia in 1649 
when czar Aleksei Michailovitsh cancelled their extensi­
ve privileges after the execution of Charles I. England 
needed new opportunities to procure Russian raw mate­
rials as the raw material recources of its North Ameri­
can colonies could not replace the goods coming trom 
the Baltic Sea.10 
The final opening of Narva trade to foreigners also 
falls in the 1640s, that also enabled the English to make 
direct contacts with Narva merchants. The 1660s with 
Sweden's and England's rapprochment were especially 
favourable. In 1661 a Friendship and Trade Treaty was 
concluded,11 that was soon replaced by a Treaty ot 
Friendship, Defence, Trade and Navigation that was conc­
luded on March 1 (March 11 according to the old ca­
lender) 1665. Although the latter mainly touched upon 
the activities of the contacting states in case one of them 
would go to war, it also included important commercial 
regulations. As for the present subject article No. 23 that 
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When the Swedish-English alliance was renewed in 
1672, the freedoms of the English were once again af­
firmed in Narva as well as elsewhere in the Swedish 
state. " And although Swedish-English political relations 
in the following period up to the Nordic War depended 
on the political situation in the whole Baltic Sea area, 
the English preserved their interest in Narva up to the 
end of the 17th century. This is also proved by the num­
ber of English ships that started for Western Europe over 
Öresund. In the years 1661-1674 less than 10 ships went 
through this customs examination point, but from 1679 
the number of ships was over 20-30 already; The years 
1683 and 1700 set a record with accoringly 51 and 71 
ships. In 1701 only 2 English ships from Narva passed 
through Öresund, after that a longer pause followed.14 
Thereby the activities of English merchants in Nar­
va purely juridically rested on the treaties between Eng­
land and Sweden concluded in 1661, 1665 and 1672. 
But did the subjects of the English crown get any com­
mercial privileges with these treaties? S.-E. Äström has 
claimed that as a result of the treaties the English merc­
hants gained a free transit to Russia in spite of the op­
position of the town council.15 But in this case there 
would have arisen a conflict between the rights of the 
English and the privileges guaranteed to the merchants 
of Narva by the Swedish state. Up to now only Tallinn 
merchants had some advantages in salt and herring tra­
de on the ground of old Hanseatic rigts, and, thanks to 
agreements made between the Swedish state and the Lü­
beck town council, the Lübeck merchants had the same 
advantages. But all through the 17th century the Narva 
town council fought for the cancelling of these privile­
ges.16 
To answer the question raised we have to make 
ourselves familiar with the composition of export and 
import of the English in Narva. Tobacco occupied the 
first place in English import to Narva. From 1677 the 
absolute majority of tobacco was brought to Narva by 
the English who left their chief rivals — the Lübeck 
merchants and the Dutch — far behind.17 At the same 
time tobacco was among the few articles for which the 
Swedish authorities had given local merchants the sole 
right of selling. When, in the middle of the century, to­
bacco trade was the monopoly of the Swedish state; on 
May 14, 1666 the tutelary government of Karl XI allo­
wed the Narva merchants to trade with tobacco en gros)8 
On May 26, 1669 the tutelary government set tobacco 
trade free for everybody.19 But as tobacco was a prohi­
bited good in Russia and its import strictly punishable, 
Karl XI decided to give the sole right of selling it to 
the Narva merchants only on October 14, 1675. All the 
foreigners who had arrived in Narva, had to sell the to­
bacco they^had brought with them immediatly to local 
merchants. But when it became clear that the Narva 
merchants were not able to buy up tobacco quickly, the 
trade poster of the town council of September 17, 1678 
foresaw the consignment of tobacco in the cellar of the 
town council after it was weighed from where the for­
eigner could offer it within two months time.21 This kind 
of system remained in force in Narva up to the end of 
the period under discussion" and caused confusion among 
several foreigners, including the English. 
Even before selling tobacco in Narva was announced 
the sole right of local merchants in 1675, the Narva 
people tried to make the English sell the tobacco with 
them to locals immediately. But this was not permitted 
in a resolution given to the town by Karl XI on Sep­
tember 8, 1673 as the government was of the opinion 
that the English had promoted Narva's foreign trade and 
increased the town's commodity circulation.23 Judging 
the role of the English, this is quite a vivid statement. 
Only after the tobacco privilege of 1675 the Nar­
va town council extended this law also to the English. 
In October 1677 three English merchants working in 
Narva (W. Kettle well, A. Gilbert, R. Bacon) sent a writ­
ten complaint against the Narva town council to Jakob 
Johan Taube, the governor general of Ingrianland. In their 
opinion the town council ignored the agreement between 
England and Sweden. The merchants claimed that, on 
the basis of the agreement, they have the right to sell 
all the goods on the spot and to export them where they 
want. But the Narva town council had forbidden them 
to send a parcel of tobacco to Nyen and confiscated it 
despite customs certificates that they had shown.24 
On October 22, 1677 Albert Tretzel, the portorium 
and licence inspector of Narva, reported the case to J.J. 
Taube. According to his information W. Kettle well wan­
ted to take 12 barrels of tobacco to Nyen by barges af­
ter he had paid the customs duties on October 20, and 
applied for a marine passport. But the Narva castle count, 
Bürgermeisters and town council banned the issuing of 
the passport and on the next day had all the tobacco 
taken away from the barge.25 
As a result of the complaint brought forward by 
the English merchants, on October 25 the question whet­
her the subjects of the English crown could carry the 
tobacco brought to the town onward to Nyen or anyw­
here else. Almost the whole town council found that 
they had the right to ban it. Town councillor J. C. 
Schwartz alone was of the opinion that the English ought 
to be allowed to transport tobacco from Narva to Nyen, 
however, under the pretence of the danger that commer­
cial relations between the two towns might break off. 
At the end of the discussion the Narva town council de­
cided to remain firmly true to the demand that foreign­
ers are to sell their tobacco in a scheduled time after 
their arrival in Narva.26 
The English, of course, were not satisfied with the 
decision of the town council and in next March a new 
application of the English to get permission for carrying 
goods, first of all tobacco, over Narva to the neighbou­
ring towns and in tact also to Russia, was considered 
in the Narva town council. The town council remained 
tirm to its previous decision and the English were again 
obliged to offer the wine, herring and tobacco they had 
brought with them to local people from the cellar of the 
town council in two months time.27 
In this way the town council of Narva tried to hin­
der the English merchants from trading with tobacco in 
neighbouring towns and in Russia. It can be asserted 
that in 1680s-1690s the town council and local merc­
hants succeeded in forcing their claims about tobacco 
trading upon the English. So it was at least until the 
autumn of 1698 when, czar Peter I set tobacco import 
to Russia free for English merchants and first parcels 
were sent off through Narva.28 But the permission of 
the Swedish state must have been behind this opportu­
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nity as well. In 1675 the Swedish state changed the or­
der of tobacco trading trying to increase the customs in­
comes per transit. The main aim was to gain Swedish 
subjects the same kind of rights as the English had. 
In archive sources connected with the English, the 
tobacco problem also arises in 1698. In August-Septem-
ber the Englishman Thomas Meux claimed that the 13 
barrels of tobacco that he had sent to Tallinn via Nar­
va, actually belonged to A. Gibert and, as the latter had 
already become a citizen of Narva, such trade was al­
lowed for him.30 On September 5, 1698 the proposal of 
the castle count C. von Kochen that the council should 
deposit the keys of the stores where the English kept 
their tobacco to prevent misunderstandings with goods 
that were to be sent onward to Russia, was discussed 
in the town council.31 On September 9 the town coun­
cil continued the discussion whereby aldermen A. Ek-
holm and N. Hiseing took an interest in whether His 
Royal Majesty had given the English the permission to 
carry tobacco to Russia through Narva. They probably 
got a positive answer as further discussion concerned the 
purely technical question whether the tobacco should be 
kept in the cellar of the town council or in the storage 
rooms of the English. The decision was made on favour 
of the latter.32 
On October 10 of the same year Stepan Ilgin, a 
journeyman merchant from Moscow applied to the Nar­
va town council with a supplicate. Namely, an English 
merchant S. Blande from Novgorod had accused him of 
taking 10 barrels of tobacco through Narva to Russia 
and in this way offending the privileges of the English 
company. Since the Russian claimed that he was inno­
cent, he asked to look up in the books ot weighhouse 
that no tobacco has been weighed in his name. He as­
ked to put the same question to bargemen and other 
, 33 persons concerned. 
So we can state that until the autumn of 1698 the 
English could not carry tobacco over Narva. According 
to the valid trading order they had to sell it to local 
people. The change that followed came as a surprise to 
at least one part of the town council members. Unfor­
tunately no orders of the Royal Commercial College or 
any other legislative institution that might explain the 
conditions of the tobacco trade of the English in detail 
have been preserved in the fund of the Narva town coun­
cil. It was different with the merchants of Tallinn and 
Lübeck as their rights and privileges in Narva were exact­
ly prescribed to the town. On the basis of the materials 
of the Royal Commercial College kept in Swedish Sta­
te Archives it can be surely claimed that the people of 
Narva considered the abolition of tobacco monopoly a 
great blow to their trading activities." 
As for import of other West-European goods to 
Narva England's role was insignificant. In salt, cloth, 
wine and paper it was firmly beaten by the Lübeck 
merchants, by the Dutch, the French, but also by Tal­
linners. No herring arrived to Narva by the medium of 
the English.35 Thereby salt and herring trade had been 
made the sole right of Narva merchants already on Sep­
tember 5, 1587 and on December 22, 1675 (i.e. in the 
same year as tobacco) wine was also entered on the list 
of so-called monopolized articles.37 And when the Swe­
dish government was forced to yield advantages to Tal­
linn and Lübeck merchants about salt and herring in or­
der to increase commodity circulation in Narva, the Eng­
lish were not mentioned, and this field of trading remained 
forbidden to them until the end of the 17th century. 
Neither were any compliances made in wine trading. So, 
in the spring of 1678 the Narva town council suspected 
a group of English merchants of reselling various wines 
to Russia. In the course of examination it however be­
came evident through local merchants H. Ranie and H. 
Wiens who were accused of participsting in the deal, 
that before sending to Russia the English had ^managed 
to sell the suspect wines to citizens of Narva." 
The role of English merchants in import to Narva 
could be made clear better if we had exact data on the 
loads of their ships on their arrival to the town availab­
le. It is interesting to note that for instance in 1689 80 
per cent of ships of English origin were empty when 
they arrived in Riga.39 This fact clearly reflects the in­
terest of the English in Russian raw materials. On the 
basis of numerical data the English merchants held a 
leading position in the export of linen, hemp, potash and 
tar from Narva from the 1670s. A great amount of Rus­
sian and local boards also went out of Narva by their 
medium.40 As for Russian goods neither the English nor 
any other foreigners were set any restrictions already for 
the reason that the merchants of Narva were not capab­
le of taking those goods to West-European markets. Alt­
hough the number of ships that travelled under the flag 
of Narva was some twenty or thirty in the middle of 
the 1690s,41 they could not compete with West-Euro­
peans. 
As for the other principles of foreign trade in Nar­
va, the subjects of the English crown were not made 
any compliances either. They were not allowed to make 
direct contacts with other foreigners who had arrived the­
re, with noblemen and peasants living nearby and with 
Russian borderlands. Only local merchants could be used 
as mediators. Commercial contacts with the subjects of 
the czar who had arrived from Novgorod, Pskov and ot­
her Russian towns could only be made in the presence 
of a broker named by the town council in the Russian 
trade yard. Until 1688 there were also temporary rest­
rictions valid for the English - they were allowed to 
stay in Narva altogether for 2 months in a year, later 
they could stay there all year round. ~ Like other for­
eigners, the English were only allowed to deal with who­
lesale trade that meant that retail trade was not allowed. 
According to the order of Karl XI of October 14, 1679, 
foreigners were not allowed to buy linen, hemp and iron 
less than 10 ship pounds. As for other Russian goods 
the sum might not be less than 150 special state tha-
1 43 lers. 
To illustrate what was mentioned above the minu­
tes of a session of Narva Commercial College from 
August 25, 1698 that deals with a complaint of the town 
fiscal Z. Falck on the prohibited activities of a group 
of English merchants (T. Meux, R. Knipe, A. Hoyl and 
Blaumont), are reported on briefly. The fiscal had been 
informed that T. Meux had sent various Russian goods 
in the name of other foreigners, namely Tallinners, from 
Narva to Amsterdam, and had before that also made con­
tacts with borderland Russians. Blaumont in his turn was 
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Table 2 
Englishmen who became citizens of Narva in 1680-90 
Date Name Occupation Arrived from 
07.11.1681 Joh. Langerwod rope spinner Nottingham 
24.09.1683 William Kettlewell merchant England 
27.01.1687 Thomas Loftus merchant England 
23.09.1689 Alexander Gilbert merchant England 
07.05.1682 Joh. Küssell skipper England 
18.06.1692 Johan Noting skipper Newcastle 
18.06.1692 Philip Wuddus skipper Hull 
15.08.1692 Georg Bourges skipper Hull 
20.11.1693 William Wal Icker merchant near York 
accused of keeping various goods at home and selling 
them in small amounts.44 
In the course of the discussion the opinions of both 
the English merchants and the College were given. The 
English denied direct contacts with the peasants of Rus­
sian borderland but claimed that in connection with that 
they were allowed their "own religion" in Narva His 
Royal Majesty had allowed them "contact with whoe­
ver and make business wherever they wanted". This way 
first of all associated with the wish to make direct con­
tacts with other foreigners.45 The Commercial College, 
however, was convinced that the English had to take 
into consideration the Order of Foreign Trade in force, 
first of all the last trade poster of the town council of 
July 4, 1694. It was particularly stressed that, although 
the Swedish crown had allowed the English to enjoy 
their own religion" in Narva, this did not mean privi­
leges in trading 46 
Turning back to the beginning of the present artic­
le where the author has referred to the significant role 
of the English among the citizens of Narva, we can ask 
the question why was it useful for the English to be ci­
tizens of Narva? In the author's mind the English sett­
led down in Narva due to the fact that despite their 
intensive commodity circulation they did not have the 
possibility of free transit to Russia unlike the Tallinn 
and Lübeck merchants. As they made their business in 
Narva as "foreigners", all the restrictions concerning for­
eigners touched them as well. As citizens they were gua­
ranteed the rights and freedoms of Swedish subjects, for 
instance exemption from duty in Öresund 47 The English 
citizens of Narva formed a "bridge" for sending Russian 
goods to England and the other way round. Being citi­
zens of Narva they managed to compete successfully 
with other, generally poorer inhabitants of Narva. Besi­
des merchants and a few handicraftsmen, a number of 
skippers also entered the citizenship of Narva. Several 
Narva Englishmen (like W. Kettlewell and T. Loftus) 
were themselves shipowners or joint owners. 
The Swedish powers and the town council who 
were interested in Narva's development and the increa­
se of commodity circulation yielded advantages to all 
rich resettlers. D. Erpenbeck has good reasons to mark 
that attitude towards resettlers in Narva was better than 
anywhere else; the English colony was obliged in all 
respects. In a strictly Lutheran state the English were 
from 1684 allowed to "enjoy their own religion". The 
first Anglican priest Charles Thirlby was commissioned 
by the bishop of London 49 In order to get a better con­
tact with the English community and to bind them with 
the town, the Englishman Thomas Loftus was named 
Governor General (on April 30, 1688).50 The English 
also had language advantages. For instance when Johan 
Küsell, a skipper from England became a citizen in 1692, 
he gave the oath in English.51 Besides citizens there was 
also a big group of so-called English agents in Narva 
(see table 2). 
To sum up it can be stated once again that the 
Agreement of Friendship and Trade made between Eng­
land and Sweden in 1661, 1665 and 1672 brought the 
English to Narva, but did not guarantee them any spe­
cial trading privileges that would have enabled free tra­
ding with Russia over Narva. This was first of all due 
to the opposition of the Narva town council and merc­
hants. As for the export of Russian goods no restrictions 
were made to the English merchants. The problem of 
the English in Narva changed at the outbreak of the 
Northern War, when Petersburg became a new trading 
centre in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea. 
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The View of Narva in the 17th Century 
by Adam Olearius 
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defender j Jniycnimiifai icûfc/îcnjcLtim. anžufcfon. 
Des Welt-beruhmten Adami Olearii colligirte und viel vermehrte Reise Beschreibungen ... Hamburg, 1696 
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Infant and Child Mortality 
Geography in Estonia in the 
18th - 19th Centuries 
Herbert Ligi 
Today infant mortality (IM) in developed countries 
is not so much a demographic as it is a medical prob­
lem. Indeed, if out of 1000 babies born alive only 5 -
10 die in their first year of life, we may say that it 
cannot considerably affect the marital fertility and the 
general demographic development of the country or dist­
rict. It is possible that is why the problem of infant 
mortality has not been thoroughly dealt with in histori­
cal demography. In the Soviet Union and in the Baltic 
States, practically nothing has been published about it. 
In Western Europe researchers have tried to make 
clear the connection between mortality and marital fer­
tility (legitimate fertility)1 or breast-feeding.2 IM has also 
been studied in some limited area during shorter pe­
riods.3 In the present paper, the problem of IM has been 
dealt with on quite a different, so to say, geographical 
level. The problem cropped up for me about ten years 
ago while studying the dynamics of the peasant popula­
tion. Namely it turned out that, after the Great Northern 
War (1700-21) in the 18th and 19th centuries, the num­
ber of peasants increased in Western Estonia, especially 
on the islands, much more rapidly than Eastern Estonia, 
and in Northern Estonia in its turn more rapidly than in 
Southern Estonia. It also turned out that the relation be­
tween births and deaths (sometimes it is called Pokrovsky's 
index) was quite different in different areas: in Western 
Estonia it was considerably bigger than in Eastern Es­
tonia (See map 1). Meanwhile it became evident that al-
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Map 1. Pokrovsky's index 
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Estonia it was considerably bigger than in Eastern Es­
tonia (See map 1). Meanwhile it became evident that al­
ready at the beginning of the Livonian War (1558-83), 
during the early Swedish rule and even in the 13th cen­
tury some inhabitants of Saaremaa had now and then 
moved to the mainland and settled there. A closer stu­
dy of migration proved that as a rule it proceeded in 
the west-east and north-south directions. The devilation 
from it may have been caused by a demographic catac­
lysm such as the plague of 1711. 
Then the question arose: what caused such diffe­
rences? One might think that the marital fertility rate in 
Western Estonia was higher than in Eastern Estonia. But 
factual material does not corroborate this supposition. 
There is a lot of documentary evidence for investigating 
this problem. One might even say that there is too much 
material. I have already exerted myself with this theme 
for several years, but I cannot say it is ready yet. The 
main sources have been Lutheran parish registers where 
births, deaths and marriages were recorded by the priests 
of each parish. The age of the dead has been shown in 
several cases as early as 1720, but this custom became 
more or less common in the third quarter of the 18th 
century. That is why it proved suitable to start the re­
search of the geography of IM from the 1770s. In the 
present table the mortality rates have been given for the 
period of 80 years (1770-1850). 
Before proceeding to the subject itself, we should 
make a terminological and at the same time essential 
specification. At present, demography and medicine are 
interested only in infant mortality; it is being carefully 
registered and recorded. Unfortunately, one cannot say 
the same about the mortality of children over infant age. 
Probably that is why one often does not differentiate ter-
minologically between infants under or over one year of 
age in historical demography. Thus in German literature 
by "Kindersterblichkeit" they mean the mortality of ba­
bies less than one year old (the exact equivalent is "Säug­
lingssterblichkeit"). The same is true for the Russian 
word "detckaja smertnost" (correct: "mladentceskaja smert-
nost") and in Estonia "laste suremus" (should be "imi­
kute suremus" = "mortality of sucklings"). In English 
literature it is usually correct - "infant mortality" and 
"child mortality" are used in their exact meanings. As a 
rule, the English make a difference between the two 
words: "infant mortality" (aged 0-1) and "child mortali­
ty" (aged over 1). 
From our table we can see that in Estonia avera­
ge IMR (infant mortality rate) for a decade was 110 -
130 in West Estonia, especially on islands, and 200 -230 
in South-East Estonia. In comparison with today, it is 
certainly very high; such indexes are now observed in 
some extremely backward corners of Africa. In Estonia 
it has been a little less than 15 in recent years, conse­
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Map 2. Infant mortality rate 1770-1850 (%„) 
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quently about ten times smaller than two or one and a 
half centuries ago. But it is useless to compare today's 
rate to that of those days. 
When comparing the rates of Estonia with those of 
other countries, a surprising fact becomes evident: IM 
was strikingly low in Estonia. So in France it was 185 
at the beginning of the 19th century (1805-20), although 
it had decreased a little by the end of the 19th centu­
ry (1880-1900), it was still 165. In Sweden and Finland 
the average IMR was 200 as late as in the middle of 
the 19th century. This means that, at the most, two in­
fants out of ten died before the age of one year.4 Out 
of the 50 provinces of Russia only 15 (all western ones) 
had an IMR below 200. At that time it was the lowest 
in the province of Estland (North Estonia) and Vilnius 
(152 and 143 % respectively). In as many as 20 pro­
vinces the IMR rose above 300; in the Perm province 
it was even 420. Such extreme cases occurred for a 
shorter period in some other places, too. The rate was 
even 980 in the Ümeä parish of Finland in 1809. The 
obvious reason for that was a severe epidemic of dy-
sentry raging there and elswhere. 
Departing from the present subject matter, however, 
it is much more important to analyse the IMRs in dif­
ferent areas of Estonia. As can be seen in the table, 
they very considerably and have a very definite tenden­
cy. 
At the end of the 18th century the IMR in Wes­
tern Estonia, especially on the island of Saaremaa, was 
often twice as low as in South-Eastern Estonia, especial­
ly in the district of Võrumaa. The lowest IMR was on 
the island of Muhumaa (101), the highest in the sout­
heastern border parishes of Estonia. Neither of the rates, 
however, was an exception - the rates of the neighbou­
ring parishes do not considerably differ from them. One 
cannot help drawing the conclusion that these extreme 
figures were determined by factors that influenced a much 
larger territory than one parish. It is worth mentioning 
that IM is not considerably affected by any common 
epidemics, infantile diseases included. But IMR can be 
a useful indicator of living conditions in the past. First 
af all it reflects the situation of public health and sani­
tation, the general level of culture and also the socio­
economic situation. The higher the people's standard of 
living and the cultural level, the lower the mortality of 
infants (age-group 0-1 year), and vice versa. For instan­
ce, the Russians living in the neighboring areas had a 
considerably higher IMR. In the Pskov province the IM 
coefficient was 300 as late as the end of the 19th cen­
tury, and in the Novgorod province it was even 329. 
The Russians living in Estonia in the coastal regions of 
Lake Peipsi also had a much higher IMR than Esto­
nians. In the Roodova (Pankavitsa) parish, for instance, 
IMR was 265. 
Map 3. Child (aged 1-15) mortality rate 1770-1850 (%<>) 
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Table 
Child Mortality Rate in Estonia 1770-1849 
District, parish 
Infant mortality rate (%0) Children mortality rate (%c) 
1770-1799 1800-1819 1820-1849 1770-1799 1800-1819 1820-1849 
Võrumaa 
Vastseliina 
Põlva 
Kanepi 
Karula 
Hargla 
Urvaste 
Rõuge 
212 
226 
215 
213 
239 
188 
244 
241 
233 
203 
187 
245 
214 
255 
228 
199 
240 
230 
256 
208 
506 
524 
563 
492 
544 
486 
466 
507 
465 
479 
407 
501 
485 
495 
447 
397 
471 
430 
472 
442 
Tartumaa 
Võnnu 
Kambja 
Tartu-Maarja 
Nõo 
Otepää 
Sangaste 
Rõngu 
Rannu 
Puhja 
Kursi 
Äksi 
Palamuse 
Torma 
Laiuse 
Maarja-MagdaleenaR 
213 
191 
218 
180 
231 
141 
161 
*202 
163 
171 
158 
125 
151 
225 
199 
273 
186 
202 
216 
162 
181 
209 
142 
171 
170 
152 
133 
161 
231 
189 
213 
187 
203 
210 
148 
205 
172 
150 
152 
172 
155 
160 
175 
491 
525 
562 
585 
560 
488 
460 
520 
416 
418 
446 
388 
436 
500 
460 
558 
447 
488 
488 
464 
472 
563 
330 
360 
442 
390 
418 
426 
470 
449 
459 
382 
432 
432 
428 
476 
447 
390 
392 
413 
386 
394 
402 
Viljandimaa 
Tarvastu 
Paistu 
Viljandi 
Suure-Jaani 
Koiga-Jaani 
Põltsamaa 
163 
180 
155 
170 
177 
129 
168 
144 
139 
158 
160 
148 
148 
140 
133 
137 
512 
475 
387 
381 
444 
374 
379 
311 
300 
398 
430 
401 
361 
319 
310 
378 
Pärnumaa 
Karksi 
Halliste 
Pärnu 
Pärnu-Jaagupi 
Mihkli 
Audru 
Tõstamaa 
Kihnu 
159 
199 
121 
155 
128 
149 
123 
176 
180 
192 
106 
174 
133 
131 
91 
168 
170 
186 
134 
170 
114 
150 
123 
401 
517 
334 
370 
355 
348 
340 
348 
392 
430 
300 
348 
342 
287 
239 
329 
360 
401 
308 
341 
328 
230 
Saaremaa 
Muhu 
Pöide 
Jaani 
Valjala 
Püha 
Kaarma 
Kärla 
Mustjala 
Kihelkonna 
Anseküla 
Ruhnu 
101 
135 
156 
130 
134 
122 
102 
98 
121 
159 
146 
158 
130 
101 
128 
126 
106 
134 
154 
155 
136 
139 
164 
146 
111 
129 
130 
236 
329 
389 
340 
317 
307 
233 
270 
320 
326 
340 
346 
346 
279 
299 
318 
205 
282 
367 
330 
407 
350 
336 
336 
318 
307 
302 
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District, parish 
Infant mortality rate (%o) Children mortality rate (%c) 
1770-1799 1800-1819 1820-1849 1770-1799 1800-1819 1820-1849 
Harjumaa 
380 352 Kuusalu 170 168 
Jüri 196 191 169 467 425 414 
Kose 145 160 165 398 388 400 
Juuru 138 154 160 358 370 362 
Nissi 160 159 359 370 
Keila 150 166 178 340 362 352 
Virumaa 
Haljala 130 127 140 339 348 380 
Rakvere 189 190 165 450 440 392 
Viru-Jaagupi 124 130 143 355 334 360 
Viru-Nigula 157 138 150 406 370 340 
Lüganuse 139 137 127 369 359 348 
Jõhvi 148 165 150 408 425 358 
Vaivara 183 223 469 501 
Väike-Maarja 146 151 159 374 378 390 
Läänemaa 
Vormsi 147 128 394 374 
Hanila 164 182 189 403 400 394 
Märjamaa 181 169 145 333 342 362 
Ridala 142 181 178 376 349 329 
The map of distribution demonstrates the range of 
differences in IM (See map 2). As an extreme examp­
le one might look at Muhu where the average IMR over 
decades was between 90 and 120. Estonia's southeastern-
most parish Vastseliina is quite an antipode to it as its 
mortality rate during the same period of time averaged 
between 210 and 250. 
What caused such great and, at the same time per­
manent differences in IM on such a small territory as 
Estonia (less than 50 000 sq. km)? One should not for­
get that ethnically Estonia (at least rural Estonia) was 
fairly homogenous. As for Estonians' way of life and 
cultural traditions, no notable differences between its dif­
ferent parts have been observed. 
Of course, local habits of infant nutrition are of 
special importance. In the 18th century and the first half 
of the 19th century, there were whole areas in Sweden 
and Finland5 (for instance the coastal areas of Väster-
botten and Norbotten), where women did not breast-feed 
their babies. In Ostrobotnia it was common to feed in­
fants artificially in the 19th century. They used a horn 
from a cow as a bottle with pieces of cloth or washed 
leather as the nipple. In many areas there was also a 
custom to give infants supplementary food that was un­
suitable considering their age. Porridge, pork, bread and 
even liquor were given to babies who were only a lew 
months old. This custom was certainly even more harm­
ful than malnutrition. In northern regions as many as 
nine out of ten infants suffered from riset (rickets); ac­
cording to local physicians it was the result ot artificial 
feeding. At that time children in Estonia villages were 
breast-fed everywhere for one two years or sometimes 
even longer. 
From the point of view of our theme, however, not 
only the mortality of infants (aged 0-1) but also that of 
children from one to fifteen years of age is important. 
The table with parallel figures and map 3 show that 
their death rate was not lower, and in many parishes it 
was even higher than that of sucklings. Map 3 also pro­
ves that figures here vary in the same way as was the 
case with infants less than one year old. Again we must 
ask: what was the reason for these great differences in 
the mortality of children over infant age? The death of 
older children was often caused by infectious diseases 
such as smallpox, the measles, scarlet fever, dysentry, 
etc.6 Conditions were favourable for the spread of infec­
tious diseases in places where the population was den­
ser and communication livelier. When studying the spread 
of epidemics,7 it is evident that the fatalities first star­
ted in the southeastern parishes of Estonia. On these 
grounds we may state that epidemics at that time spread 
from south to north and from east to west. A lot of epi­
demics subsided because of a change in weather before 
reaching Western or Northern Estonia or were stopped 
at the waterfront before the Great Strait (Suur Väin). 
The spread of several illnesses presupposes a direct con­
tact between children. In this respect islands are in an 
advantageous position: contacts of the children of islands 
with the inhabitants of the mainland were naturally not 
numerous. In early spring, during the period of the most 
KLEIO. Estonian Historical Journal 29 Herbert Ligi 
intensive spread of infectious diseases, the ice conditions 
at sea made contacts with the continent impossible even 
for grown-ups. 
During the second half of the 19th century diffe­
rences in IM were less conspicous: in East Estonia mor­
tality decreased, but on the islands it even increased in 
some places. This phenomenon may partially be expla-
ned by relative overpopulation and probably by livelier 
intercommunication, by men looking for work on the 
continent, etc. But the west-east migration still persist­
ed. 
On these grounds one may say that these fairly 
considerable differences in IM were the reasons for east-
west and north-south migration in this period and pro­
bably in previous centuries too. 
It is well known that migrants are the carriers of 
cultural influence. So we must belive that cultural inf­
luence was of west-east direction during the feudal sys­
tem. We must also take into consideration that long-distance 
migration was relatively rare at that time. One could sel­
dom meet men from Muhu in the vicinity of Vastselii­
na. Short-distance migration was dominant: people from 
Saaremaa and Hiiumaa moved to the districts (counties) 
of Harjumaa, Läänemaa and Pärnumaa; inhabitants of 
Pärnumaa went to Viljandimaa; peasants from Viljandi­
maa in their turn went across Lake Võrtsjärv and the 
River Väike-Emajõgi. A lot of people from Tartumaa and 
Võrumaa (districts) went to Russia. 
In conclusion, it is clear that a further study in the 
geography of IM would be of some interest not only 
for historical demography but it might help to solve 
some problems of ethnology and the history of culture 
as well. 
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The Crimean War and Estonia 
Tõnu Tannberg 
In the middle of the 19th century, Russia did not 
succeed in settling the so-called eastern issue concerning 
supremacy in the Middle East in the course of a "small 
war" unleashed against Turkey in 1853. The fact that 
England and France sent their fleets to the Black Sea 
at the end of 1853 implied that these states had de fac­
to entered the war on the side of Turkey. Then, in Feb­
ruary, 1854, Russia declared war on the Allies. The latter, 
in their turn, also declared war and, thus, a war between 
the Great Powers of Europe had de jure begun as well. 
We know this war as the Crimean War. 
Although the main battlefield was in the Crimea, 
the participation of the Allies carried the war into the 
area of the Baltic Sea as well. While the 1854-1855 
Baltic Sea campaign in the northern part of the Gulf of 
Finland (events associated with Finland) have fairly tho­
roughly been dealt with by historians, considerably less 
attention has been paid to the events taking place on 
the coast of Estonia and Latvia, i.e. in the southern part 
of the Gulf of Finland and in the area of the Riga Bay. 
Ian R. Stone's article "Naval operations on the Estonian 
coast" (1990) has been based only on British sources 
and the author has been unaware of Edgar Anderson's 
article "The Crimean War in the Baltic areas" (1974) 
which so far constitutes the most throrough study of the 
Allies' military operations on the coast of Estonia and 
Latvia.1 Edgar Anderson has, as much as possible, made 
use of the sources of both parties and of the Baltic-Ger-
man press of that time (primarily Inland). In addition to 
the military aspect, the author gives a competent survey 
of the diplomatic activities of the Great Powers partici­
pating in the Crimean War as well as of the plans of 
these states for the Baltic area. 
The following problems associated with the Cri­
mean War and bearing relation to Estonia are dealt with 
in the present article: 1) the strategic role of Estonia 
(more broadly, of the Baltic Provinces) in Russia's de­
fence plans; 2) the size of the Russian contingent sta­
tioned in Estonia and Livonia during the war; 3) the 
number of men recruited to the Russian army from Es­
tonia during the Crimean War; 4) the Riga naval mili­
tia during the Crimean War. 
The defence of the Baltic Sea area 
When considering the organizing of the defence of 
the Baltic Sea area we shall proceed from the following 
three levels — the state, provincial and local levels. 
The state level of the defence of the Baltic area 
included all the measures taken by the Russian govern­
ment to repel the Allies on the sea (i.e., deploying the 
Russian Baltic Fleet and raising its fighting efficiency) 
as well as the measures taken to neutralize possible lan­
ding operations on the coast. It would have been pos­
sible to cope with that task only if there had been 
sufficient numbers of regular troops present in the Bal­
tic Provinces, the environs of St. Petersburg and in Fin­
land. 
At the beginning of the Crimean War, the bulk of 
the Russian navy was made up of sailing vessels, and 
partly of steamboaft. Taking into consideration the pe­
culiarities of the coastline (coves, etc.), gunboats were 
of considerable significance on the Baltic Sea as well. 
The Russian navy with its outdated equipment was not 
able to rival the advanced European naval forces. Whi­
le at the beginning of the Crimean War Britain had 10 
and France 3 modern (with a screw propeller) line-of-
battle ships, Russia at that time did not possess a sing­
le contemporary warship. The inequality of military forces 
was clearly evident on the Baltic Sea as well. At the 
beginning of the war, the Baltic Sea was defended by 
the Russian Baltic Fleet with its 217 warships, including 
26 line-of-battle ships, 9 sailing frigates, 9 steam friga­
tes, a total of 8 corvettes and brigantines, 12 small steam­
boats and also 153 small boats and transport vessels with 
a total of 3,652 guns and 43,000 men. In addition to 
these vessels, in the spring of 1854, the building of 76 
rowing gunboats began in dockyards of St. Petersburg 
(32), Finland (28) and Riga (16). In April-May, 1854, 
supplementary coast-guard units — the St. Petersburg 
and Riga naval militia — were set up on the basis of 
these rowing gunboats. The bases of the Baltic Fleet 
were Kronstadt (the 1st and 2nd naval divisions) and 
Sveaborg (since 1918, Suomenlinna) (the 3rd division). 
The deployment of the navy began at the beginning of 
1854 and was mainly completed during the month of 
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April.2 However, no more than 26 line-of-battle ships 
and 18 sailing and steam frigates could be used in mi­
litary operations; by the estimates of the Baltic Commit­
tee, only 11 warships were ready for battle.3 On the 
Baltic Sea, the Allies' joint fleet was definitely superior 
in numbers; the British fleet (49 ships, 2,344 guns, 22,000 
men) was under the command of Vice-Admiral Charles 
Napier and Vice-Admiral Alexandre Fernand Parseval-
Dechênes was in command of the French fleet (30 ships, 
1,308 guns, 8,300 men and a landing unit of over 12,000 
men).4 Because of such inequality in forces, the Baltic 
Fleet could not carry out active military operations on 
the sea as it was necessary to concentrate forces on the 
defence of the harbours and the coastal areas. At the 
same time, the Russian government had to be ready to 
repulse the enemy's landing-parties in the area of the 
Baltic Sea. Stategically, the area of the Baltic Sea could 
be divided into three separate theatres of war: 1) the en­
virons of St. Petersburg between Narva and Vyborg, 2) 
the coast of Finland from Vyborg, and 3) the coast of 
Estonia and Latvia from Narva. A letter sent to Count 
F. W. R. Berg, Tallinn Military Governor, in the midd­
le of April 1854, contains information that the tsarist go­
vernment considered it possible that in the forthcoming 
campaign against the coast of Estonia and Latvia the Al­
lies would use a landing force 20,000 strong who would 
be able to 
— occupy the islands of Saaremaa and Hiiumaa 
(the Russian government believed that the Allies would 
likely stay on these islands); 
— seize Tallinn and Riga; 
— land at Virtsu and later take Pärnu; 
— send troops to Liepaja and from there to go 
through Lithuania and invade Poland in order to incite 
an anti-Russian uprising there; 
— carry out simultaneous raids on the Baltic coast 
to keep the troops stationed in the Baltic Provinces on 
the alert.5 
The Russian government acknowledged that it could 
not defend the islands and Virtsu, but it hoped to offer 
some resistance in the other areas. By that time martial 
law had already been imposed in Estonia and Livonia 
and the regular troops were under the command of the 
Military Governor F. W. R. Berg and the Baltic Gover-
nor-General Prince A.A. Suvorov-Rymniksky respective­
ly. The strongholds of Tallinn and Daugavgriva were in 
a state of siege from March 20. In the spring of 1854, 
the following troops were stationed in the area of the 
Baltic Sea: 179 infantry battalions, 116 1/2 cavalry squad­
rons, 18 Cossack sotnias (a total of about 142,000 men), 
and 384 guns, whereas approximately two-thirds of the 
troops (122 1/4 battalions, 90 1/2 squadrons, and 272 
guns) were stationed in the environs of St. Petersburg. 
Of all the military units present in the three Baltic Pro­
vinces (32 1/4 battalions, 20 squadrons, 12 Cossack sot­
nias, 76 guns), more than a half (18 1/4 battalions, 14 
squadrons, 6 Cossack sotnias, 32 guns) were stationed 
in the Province of Estonia.6 Later the number of men 
in the area of the Baltic Sea reached a total of 165,000 
(209 battalions, 114 squadrons, 4 Cossack regiments, 412 
guns). In the summer of 1854, the following troops de­
fended the Baltic Provinces: 
— in Estonia — 20,000 men (24 1/4 battalions, 
12 squadrons, 12 Cossack sotnias, 40 guns); 
— in Livonia — 10,000 men (9 battalions, 2 Cos­
sack sotnias, 28 guns); 
— in Courland — 12,000 men (9 battalions, 16 
squadrons, 6 Cossack sotnias, 32 guns). 
Thus, 42 1/4 battalions, 28 squadrons, 12 Cossack 
sotnias, 100 guns and a total of 42,000 men were sta­
tioned in the three provinces. These troops would not 
have been able to defend the coast of Estonia and Lat­
via against major attacks by the Allies. However, the 
1854 campaign in the southern part of the Gulf of Fin­
land and in the Riga Bay turned out to be weaker than 
it had been expected and the Allies did not make an at­
tempt to plant their feet firmly on the coast of Estonia 
and Latvia. 
At the end of October, 1854, Dmitri Miljutin, then 
Major-General, later Field-Marshal and Russia's Minister 
of War, sent the tsar a memorandum entitled "Conside­
rations about the defence of the coast of the Baltic Sea". 
On November 2, Nicholas I read the memorandum, ma­
king notes in the margins. D. Miljutin's memorandum 
summarizes the results of the 1854 campaign on the Bal­
tic Sea and lays down guiding principles for action in 
the year 1855; most of these principles were actually 
put into practice.7 Namely, as early as on November 3, 
Nicholas I set up a special committee which was to 
work out measures to defend the coast of the Baltic Sea. 
The principles presented by the Committee at the end 
of November coincided in substance with those formu­
lated by D. Miljutin.8 
D. Miljutin was firmly convinced that the troops 
stationed in the area of the Baltic Sea in the summer 
of 1854 (165,000 men) would not have been able to de­
fend the coast in case of the Allies' landing. In 1855, 
he considered it possible that a landing party 70,000-
80,000 strong would come to the Baltic Sea and, in case 
of Sweden's joining the operation, the troops would num­
ber 100,000-120,000. In order to repulse those troops an 
army of about 400,000 men should have been concent­
rated in the area of the Baltic Sea, i.e. 80,000 men per 
500 versts. Since so numerous regular troops could not 
be raised, it would have been necessary, in 1855, "to 
give up the direct defending of the whole of the coas­
tal area and to reduce to a minimum the number of tho­
se strongholds that had to be defended all the time". 
Nicholas I was of the same opinion (the tsar's note "Na­
turally") and referred to "only three such strongholds -
Sveaborg with Helsingfors, Kronstadt with St. Petersburg, 
and Riga . D. Miljutin thought that it was not necessa­
ry to defend even Riga because "in the Baltic Provin­
ces fortunately we do not have any strongholds, the 
seizure of which by the enemy would be dangerous and 
which we would have to defend to the very last". He 
held the view that the main troops had to be concent­
rated in Finland and in the environs of St. Petersburg. 
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At the end of 1854, the regular troops in the area 
of the Baltic Sea totalled 186,000 men (189 3/4 batta­
lions, 68 squadrons, 18 Cossack sotnias, 332 guns), whi­
le the troops in the Baltic Provinces were as follows: 
— in Estonia — 37,500 men (41 1/4 battalions, 
12 squadrons, 4 Cossack sotnias, 40 guns); 
— in Livonia — 8,300 men (9 battalions, 2 Cos­
sack sotnias, 24 guns); 
— in Courland — 11,200 men (9 battalions, 16 
squadrons, 6 Cossack sotnias, 32 guns). 
According to the initial plan (drawn up on Octo­
ber 31), the number of troops in the area of the Baltic 
Sea had to be increased up to 302,785 men by the spring 
of 1855, but later this number was reduced to 271,500 
men (256 3/4 battalions, 118 squadrons, 42 sotnias, 428 
guns) — thus, 85,500 men more than in the previous 
year.9 It was planned to concentrate 61,500 men, 64,000 
if including those at Narva, to defend the Baltic Provin­
ces. The disposition of the troops in the provinces was 
to be different from that in the previous year - most of 
the troops (40,500 men) were to be stationed in Livo­
nia and in Courland to defend Riga. As for the Provin­
ce of Estonia, a so-called observation corps was considered 
to be sufficient and it was to retreat towards Narva or 
Riga in case of enemy's landing. This meant that the 
Russian government was ready to surrender the Provin­
ce of Estonia to the enemy and D. Miljutin was of the 
opinion that Tallinn's fortifications should be blown up. 
However, F. W. R. Berg, Commander-in-Chief of the mi­
litary forces stationed in Estonia, did not agree with the 
latter idea and considered the demolition of the fortifi­
cations inexpedient because the local population, who 
had made great sacrifices in order to get those fortifi­
cations ready for action, would disapprove of such con­
duct. F. W. R. Berg referred to how a seaside suburb 
(Köismäe) had been burnt down by his own order. 
Tallinn's fortifications were in use for one more year 
and it was not until the year 1857 that Tallinn was exc­
luded from the list of fortified towns. At the same time, 
F. W. R. Berg made a suggestion that a separate army 
should be formed of the forces stationed in Estonia, Li­
vonia and Courland whose impressive name, the Baltic 
Army, would frighten the enemy and would make him 
watch his step on the coast of Estonia and Latvia. 
Thus, at the end of 1854, Nicholas I formed the so-cal-
led Baltic Corps, merging only the troops stationed in 
Livonia and Courland. V. Sivers, a cavalry general, was 
put in command of the Corps. There were also changes 
in the general staff of the troops in Estonia: F. W. R. 
Berg, who had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of 
the troops in Finland, was replaced by General P. Grab-
be.11 
By the beginning of the new campaign in the spring 
of 1855, a total of about 220,000 men — 222 1/2 bat­
talions, 94 3/4 squadrons, 40 Cossack sotnias, 322 guns 
— had been concentrated in the area of the Baltic Sea. 
The disposition of the troops in the three Baltic provin­
ces was as follows: 
— in Estonia — about 22,500 men (19 1/4 batta­
lions, 12 squadrons, 10 Cossack sotnias, 10 guns); 
— in Livonia and in Courland (Baltic Corps) — 
about 40,500 men (35 1/4 battalions, 32 squadrons, 12 
Cossack sotnias, 88 guns). 
In addition, home guard units from Tver and Nov­
gorod came in summer.12. The British fleet (99 ships, 
3,138 guns, 24,000 men) under the command of Richard 
Sounders Dundase arrived in the Gulf of Finland in Ap­
ril and in the second half of May joined forces with a 
small French fleet (24 ships, 357 guns) led by Admiral 
Charles Penaud. The island of Naissaar was again cho­
sen as the base for the united fleet. The hostilities bro­
ke out on June 6 and culminated in bombing Sveaborg 
at the end of July and at the beginning of August. 
Regardless of their more active military operations 
and a more powerful fleet than in 1854, the Allies did 
not achieve any success in 1855 either and they had to 
withdraw their fleet from the Baltic Sea. But they im­
mediately started to outline new plans for the year 1856. 
According to these plans, Swedish and Danish troops 
(20,000-30,000 men) were to occupy the Aland Islands 
in June, 1856, while French and British troops were to 
invade the Estonian archipelago. At the same time, the 
British and French fleet were to neutralize the Russian 
Baltic Fleet in the Gulf of Finland and in the Riga Bay. 
Then, the British, French and Danish troops were to land 
in Northern Latvia and in Southern Estonia, while the 
Swedes were to occupy Finland.13 The Russian govern­
ment also held the view that the Allies could succeed 
in the Baltic Sea area only when supported by Sweden 
and Denmark. It was considered that a total of 95,000 
men could be sent to the Baltic Sea area — 50,000 men 
from France, 10,000 from England and about 35,000 
from Sweden and Denmark. The planned defence mea­
sures as well as the dislocation of the troops were ba­
sically similar to those in 1855.14 At the beginning of 
1856, before the prospective new campaign, 257 batta­
lions, 94 squadrons, 66 Cossack sotnias, 376 guns and 
31 home guard units were stationed in the area of the 
Baltic Sea, including those in the Baltic provinces: 
— in Estonia (19 1/4 battalions, 32 squadrons, 14 
Cossack sotnias, 40 guns); 
—in Livonia and Courland (40 1/2 battalions, 32 
squadrons, 14 Cossack sotnias, 80 guns) and, additional­
ly, 18 Novgorod and Tver home guard units. 
At that time, approximately 22,500 men were sta­
tioned in Estonia and the Baltic Corps numbered about 
52,000 men. The preparations for the war, however, tur­
ned out to be in vain as by the beginning of 1856 Rus­
sia had been exhausted and the Paris peace treaty was 
concluded in March of the same year. However, the Bal­
tic Corps, which had been raised to defend Livonia and 
Courland, was not disbanded until August, 1956. In the 
post-war years, the number of regular troops in the Bal­
tic provinces considerably decreased; e. g., in the year 
1868, 14,861 men were stationed in the three provin­
ces.15 
The provincial level in organizing the defence of 
the southern coast of the Baltic Sea was primarily rep­
resented by setting up a network of so-called observa-
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tion posts on the coast of Estonia and Latvia. In the 
Province of Estonia, the observation posts were located 
between Riigi manor in the environs of Narva and the 
Vaiste manor in the Läänemaa County; the border be­
tween Estonia and Livonia was Kastna. The preparatory 
work for setting up the observation posts started as ear­
ly as in March, 1854, while special coast defence com­
mittees were established in April. The landlords, whose 
manors were located in the coastal areas, undertook to 
set up a coast guard service and observation posts, ci­
vil servants (chiefs of police, etc.) were responsible as 
well. In 1854, 63 noblemen of the Province of Estonia 
volunteered to participate in coast guard activities. The 
landlords followed a special instruction according to which 
it was necessary, first of all, to find out and compile a 
list of the peasants who were competent in maritime af­
fairs. Those peasants had to be warned that collabora­
tion with the enemy was punishable because there was 
a strong possibility that the Allies could use those pea­
sants as pilots. The peasants were also ordered to drive 
their cattle inland as soon as the enemy appeared. On 
several occasions, F. W. R. Berg, Commander-in-Chief 
of the troops in the Province of Estonia, emphasized the 
need for observing the above-mentioned instruction. Day 
and night those "loyal men" picked out by the landlords 
patrolled the coast, acting in accordance with "The laws 
for those whose duty is to guard the coast" drawn up 
specially for them by the landlords. 
In both years, the coast guards did their duty un­
til the Allies left the Baltic Sea. Thus, in 1854, the coast 
guard service was liquidated in the area between Riigi 
manor and the Juminda peninsula on November 15, and 
on the whole coast of the Province of Estonia on De­
cember 1. 
Hence, the observation posts on the coast of Esto­
nia and Latvia had been set up rather for obtaining ac­
curate and timely information than for the direct defence 
of the coast. The coast guards were at the first oppor­
tunity to inform the military authorities, i.e. Comman­
der-in-Chief in Estonia, of enemy's arrival.16 
During the Crimean War efforts were made to or­
ganize defence at a local level as well, i. e. on people's 
own initiative, particularly on the islands, the defence of 
which had been neglected by the Russian government. 
Thus, in 1854, Evald von Ungern-Sternberg, a landlord 
on the island of Hiiumaa, made an attempt to raise a 
local home guard. As early as in mid-February, 1854, 
E. von Ungern-Sternberg had applied to the Civil Go­
vernor of Estonia for a permission of raising a home 
guard 1,000 strong on the island of Hiiumaa.17 The ba­
ron based his proposal on the fact that the island of 
Hiiumaa was not defended by the regular troops. He 
also pointed out in his letter that the aim was not only 
to repulse enemy attacks, but to maintain law and order 
on the island as well. E. von Ungern-Sternberg agreed 
to bear the maintenance and armament (including fire 
arms) expenses of the home guard. Estonia's Civil Go­
vernor forwarded the proposal to Governor-General A. 
A. Suvorov-Rymniksky for approval, but there was no 
positive answer. At the end of February, E. von Ungern-
Sternberg sent another letter to the Civil Governor as­
king that the customs inspection station or at least part 
of its personnel could remain on the island. But two 
days before the baron wrote his letter, on February 22, 
the Governor-General had issued a secret order to trans­
fer the customs inspection station from the island of 
Hiiumaa. The customs personnel (the commander and his 
two assistants, 70 privates, 9 servants with families) left 
the island at the beginning of March. 
In 1854 a home guard was not set up on the is­
land of Hiiumaa because the Russian government did 
not approve of its subjects' initiative.18 E. von Ungern-
Sternberg's efforts to raise a home guard were natural­
ly not motivated by his great loyalty to state authority, 
but by his personal interest in protecting his property19 
(cloth-factory, etc.)."0 E. von Ungern-Sternberg's initati-
ve, however, was rewarded; in March, 1854, he was ap­
pointed chief of the Hiiumaa rural police court.21 The 
baron held office, which gave him absolute power on 
the island during the war, until June 1856 and the pro­
vincial authorities were completely satisfied with his 
work.22 
There was no need to organize local defence sin­
ce, particularly after the local inhabitants had met the 
Allies, it was evident that the latter were not going to 
plunder the local people, etc. On the contrary, in most 
cases they paid for the requisitioned cattle, water, etc. 
Ian R. Stone s standpoint, based on British sources, that 
relations with local people were good and even friend­
ly, despite the fact that military activities were taking 
place at the same time,23 completely coincides with our 
archival data. 
Recruitments 
During the Crimean War, the Russian government 
had to call up large numbers of men to ensure the figh­
ting efficiency of its army. The six recruitments of the 
years 1853-1855 produced 878,000 men.24 There were 
four recruitments in Estonia. 
The first call-up — the 11th partial one in the wes­
tern region25 — took place in March-April, 1854 (offi-
cal time-limit March 1 — April 15), the quota being 9 
men per 1,000 male inhabitants. According to a plan 
drawn up by the Ministry of War, 1,207 men were to 
be recruited from the Province of Estonia and 3,292 
from Livonia — a total of 4,499 men from the two pro­
vinces. In actual fact, however, 1,184 men were called 
up from Estonia"6 and 21 men were exempted from mi­
litary service on the basis of the so-called recruit re­
ceipts. Two thousand seven hundred and seventy-five 
men were called up from Livonia; in addition, 33 re­
ceipts were submitted and 394 Livonian peasants paid 
rouk'es each to get free from military servi­
ce. The second recruitment of 1854 — the 12th par­
tial recruitment in the western region — was carried out 
in November and December (November 1 — December 
15), the quota being 10 men per 1,000 male inhabitants. 
In the course of that recruitment, 1,337 men from the 
Province of Estonia and 3,559 men from Livonia were 
to be enlisted — thus, a total of 4,896 men from the 
two provinces. During the scheduled recruitment period, 
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1,323 men from Estonia and 2,973 men from Livonia 
were enlisted; 24 receipts were submitted and 536 pea­
sants were freed from military service by paying for it." 
The next call-up — the 13th partial recruitment 
from the western region — was carried out in June, 
1855 (June 1 - July 1) with a quota of 12 men per 
1,000 male inhabitants. It had been planned to enlist 
1,606 men from Estonia and 4,263 men from Livonia; 
in addition, the Ministry of War consented to accept 14 
and 255 recruit receipts respectively. As that recruitment 
campaign at Saaremaa was put off because of war, the 
actual number for the Province of Livonia turned out to 
be 3,993 men. By July 1855, 1,597 men had been en­
listed and 9 recruit receipts had been presented from the 
Province of Estonia. The corresponding numbers for Li­
vonia were 3,352 recruits, 23 accepted receipts and 612 
men had bought themselves free. The general recruit­
ment, the last one during the Crimean War, was carried 
out in November-December, 1855 (November 15 - De­
cember 15), the quota being 10 men per 1,000 male in­
habitants. The Province of Estonia was to enlist 1,337 
men. In total, 3,686 men were to be called up from Li­
vonia, whereas men were to be recruited from Saaremaa 
in compensation for the recruitment which was not car­
ried out in June, though in that case the number of rec­
ruits from Saaremaa was reduced by half. Thus, the quota 
for Saaremaa was 16 men per 1,000 male inhabitants. 
In actual fact, however, during the recruitment, 1,327 
men were enlisted from Estonia and 3,101 from Livo­
nia and 10 receipts were accepted in either province; in 
addition, 324 men bought themselves free in Livonia.31 
In the years 1854-1855, the Ministry of War was 
initially going to call up 20,017 men from Estonia and 
Livonia. In actual fact, judging by the recruitment re­
ports and enrolment lists, 17,632 men were called up, 
130 recruit receipts were accepted and 1,866 Livonians 
bought themselves free. Since the receipts and purcha­
sing free (the state treasury received 559,800 silver roub­
les as a result of that) were also taken into account, the 
actual call-up during the recruitment periods was only 
below 2 per cent — 389 men — smaller than it had 
been scheduled. However, it must be pointed out that 
the number of recruits from Estonia and Livonia in the 
years 1854-1855 was bigger than the above-given figu­
re (17,632) because 1) in case during the scheduled rec­
ruitment period sufficient number of men could not be 
enlisted, the call-up of the following months was cor­
respondingly bigger; 2) men were also enlisted beyond 
official recruitment periods (from the quota of the forth­
coming recruitments, etc.). 
Thus, according to the data presented by F. Wey-
marn, 5,992 men were enlisted from Livonia in 1854 
and 6,653 men in 1855,32 i.e. nearly 400 more men than 
in the recruitment reports. 
Thus, as a rough estimate, we can say that a to­
tal of 12,300 men were recruited from the Province of 
Estonia and from the Estonian part of the Province of 
Livonia, i.e. Estonia — 5,800 men in 1854 and 6,500 
men in 1855. This signified an approximately 3.5 per 
cent loss to the taxable male population. The recruit­
ments during the Crimean War can be compared only 
with those carried out in the years 1812-1813. In ac­
cordance with the recruitment laws, during the period of 
conscription (1797-1874), 396.4 men per 1,000 male in­
habitants were to be enlisted from the Province of Es­
tonia33 and 363.4 men from the Province of Livonia, 
while the respective quota per 1,000 male inhabitants 
was 41 men in 1854-1855 and 40 men in 1812-1813.34 
In the years 1797-1874, 60 recruitments were carried out 
in Estonia. At a rough estimate, each recruitment produ­
ced, on an average, 1,580 men (or 1,230 men per year). 
Consequently, the number of men enlisted during the 
Crimean Was was nearly twice as high as the average 
number. Approximately 12 per cent of all the men en­
listed in the years 1797-1874 were recruited during the 
Crimean War. 
The Riga naval militia 
In order to make the defence of the coast of the 
Baltic Sea more effective 76 rowing gunboats were built 
in a short period of time in 1854. Since there were not 
enough regulars to man those boats, the Russian govern­
ment settled the issue in a somewhat unexpected man­
ner: the April 2, 1854 ukase ordered a nationwide 
recruitment of volunteers to a rowing gunboat flotilla or 
the St. Petersburg naval militia. The initial deadline was 
May 20, but as so many men volunteered, the St. Pe­
tersburg militia had been recruited as early as by the 
beginning of May. The flotilla included 4,528 men, about 
two-thirds of whom were commissioned officers and sea­
men. The duty of the St. Petersburg naval militia was 
to defend the coast of Finland: 1st brigade (2,216 men) 
between Vilburg and Sveaborg, 2nd brigade (2,312 men) 
between Sveaborg and Turku. According to the tsar's 
ukase of April 22, preparatory work began for setting 
up a separate gunboat (16) battalion or the Riga naval 
militia to defend the Riga Bay, in particular the estua­
ry of the Daugava River (Daugavagriva stronghold, Riga) 
on the basis of the principles laid down in the April 2 
ukase: 
— members of all social classes could join the na­
val militia on a voluntary basis, the only exception were 
private peasants who had to obtain their landlord's per­
mission before joining the naval militia; 
— those serving in the naval militia got 8 silver 
roubles a month as well as provisions and other essen­
tials in compliance with the rations for seamen in the 
navy; 
— service in the naval militia was temporary and 
lasted only during the navigation season (i. e. until No­
vember 1); 
— awarding decorations, hospital treatment, etc. 
were in accordance with the regulations in force in the 
army and in the navy.35 
The cadre of the Riga naval militia was formed 
from the crew of the corvette Navarino headed by Lieu­
tenant-Commander Pavel Istomin, the voluntary rank and 
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file — 900 — came mostly from the Baltic Provinces 
(including 623 from Livonia, 103 from Courland, 8 men 
from Estonia) and partly from Russia — a total of 166 
volunteers from 19 Russian provinces. The volunteers 
could conditionally be divided into three social groups: 
the so-called military rank - 6.4 per cent, the towns­
people — 42 per cent, and the peasantry - 51.6 per 
cent. We have no data on the ethnical structure of the 
Riga naval militia, but the 900 men came from the fol­
lowing areas: from the area of Estonia (the Province of 
Estonia and the northern part of the Province of Livo­
nia) -254 men (28.2 per cent), from the area of Latvia 
(Courland and the southern part of the Province of Li­
vonia) — 480 men (53.5 per cent) and from Russia — 
166 men (18.5 per cent).36 Thus, we can assume that 
about 50 per cent of the Riga naval militiamen were 
Latvians, 25 per cent Estonians and the remaining part 
were Russians, Germans, Finns, etc. 
Both the St. Petersburg and the Riga naval militia 
were disbanded in November, 1854. The St. Petersburg 
naval militia did not resume its activities, but the Riga 
naval militia was re-formed in 1855 according to new 
underlying principles: 
— the principle of compulsory recruitment was app­
lied instead of voluntary joining the militia; 
— the rank and file were recruited exclusively from 
among the taxable population of the Baltic Provinces 
(20-45 years of age, not below 151 sm tall); 
the taxpayers had to bear all the maintenance 
costs of the naval militia.37 
In 1855, the length of service and the cadre of the 
naval militia were the same as they had been in 1854. 
The province of Estonia had to give 160 men, Courland 
260 men and Livonia 380 men to the naval militia ser­
vice.38 
In both years, the Riga naval militia were statio­
ned and drilled on the Milgravis (Mühlgrabe) manor, on 
the right bank of the Daugava River (about 13 versts 
from Riga) and in the winter harbour of the Daugavg-
riva stronghold. Under the supervision of commissioned 
officers and seamen the naval militiamen were drilled in 
rowing, fencing, hand-to-hand combat, and in the use of 
arms. The gunboat crews lived in tents and boats, later 
in barracks. Estonian and Latvian militiamen mastered 
the required skills quickly, though the language barrier 
caused some difficulty.39 
In the year 1855, the Riga naval militia also par­
ticipated in military operations. The most important sea 
fight for the Riga naval militia was in the estuary of 
the Daugava River on July 29 when 12 militia gunboats 
repulsed an attack carried out by two British warships 
under the command of Captain Erasmus Ommaney. The 
Daugava naval battle was one of the few successful mi­
litary operations of the Russian Baltic Fleet during the 
whole of the 1854-1855 campaign; the battle, however, 
was one of the major sea fights on the Baltic Sea du­
ring the Crimean War. Among the militiamen decorated 
for valor with the Order of Merit was Ado Busch, a 
peasant from the Haeska manor, Läänemaa County, Es­
tonia. Besides the Daugava naval battle, the Riga naval 
militia had some minor clashes with the enemy's wars­
hips as well.40 
The Riga naval militia was disbanded in Novem­
ber, 1855. By the end of the year, the rank and file of 
the naval militia had been demobilized, though over 20 
per cent of them had died, mainly of cholera, by that 
time. It was planned to re-form the Riga naval mili­
tia in 1856, but there was no more need for it after the 
conclusion of the Paris treaty. The Riga naval militia 
was completely disbanded by Governor General A. A. 
Suvorov-Rymniksky's order on March 29, 185642 
Though the major events of the Crimean War took 
place on the Black Sea, the area of the Baltic Sea was 
also an important theatre of war in the years 1854-1855. 
In the defence of the area of the Baltic Sea the Rus­
sian government paid most attention to St. Petersburg 
and Finland, and the Baltic Provinces were in the backg­
round. The troops stationed in Estonia, Livonia and Cour­
land would not have been able to repulse any substantial 
landing operations by the enemy. According to the 1855 
defence plans, the Russian government gave up defen­
ding the Estonian area. The Allies focussed their atten­
tion on other regions, primarily on the coast of Finland. 
Though the Allies did not achieve any marked military 
success in the area of the Baltic Sea during the 1854-
1855 campaign, there were at least two significant re­
sults: 1) they managed to block completely the harbours 
and the coast and, by doing that, to bring trade on the 
Baltic Sea almost to a halt. If, for example, in 1854, 
161 ships entered and 156 ships left the Riga harbour, 
then in 1855 the figures were 15 and 25 respectively.43 
The inhabitants of the islands suffered from the blocka­
de most. 2) the Russian government was made to keep 
a large army contingent in the area of the Baltic Sea, 
while there was a continuous shortage of troops in the 
Crimea, the main theatre of war. The percentage of the 
whole of the tsarist army (including the reserves) statio­
ned in the area of the Baltic Sea in the spring of 1854 
and at the beginning of 1856: 
battalions (infantry) 25.0%26.9% 
squadrons (cavalry) 27.6% 14.5% 
Cossack sotnias 3.4% 9.4% 
home guard units -15.6% 
guns 22.6%15.2% 
If we took into account only the troops on the 
front, the percentage would be much higher.44 
Though Estonia did not suffer much from direct 
military activities in the years 1854-1855, the war had 
a considerable impact on all spheres of life. Recruit­
ments, accommodating and provisioning the army, pro­
viding horses for transport and other war-time obligations 
became a heavy burden on the population during the 
Crimean War. One-fifth of the men serving in the naval 
militia did not return home either. "A 200-year time of 
peace had again revealed its true nature. 
Tõnu Tannberg 36 KLEIO. Estonian Historical Journal 
References 
1 Borodkin M. Vojna 1854-56 gg. na finskom poberezh'e: 
"Istoricheskij ocherk". Sanktpeterburg, 1904. Eisen M.J. 
Sõda Läänemerel. // Kaim. Tallinn, 1905. Lk. 203-289. 
Peterson A. Krimmi sõda: Mida pajatavad arhiivid. // 
"Tallinna Post", 1931. Nr. 29-31. Stokeby R. Baltimere 
blokaad a.a. 1854-1855. // "Sõdur", 1933. Nr. 43. Lk. 
1201-1205. Stone lan. Mereväeoperatsioonid Eesti ran­
nikul aastail 1854-1855. // "Akadeemia", 1990. Nr. 10. 
Lk. 2152-2162. Anderson E..The Crimean War in the 
Baltic areas. // "Journal of Baltic studies", 1974. Vol. 5, 
no. 4, pp. 339-361. 
2 Shevyrëv A. Russkij flot posle Krymskoj voiny: Liberal'na-
jabjurokratija i morskije reformy. Moskva, 1990. S. 15. 
Stranicy boevogo proshlogo. Moskva, 1968. S. 260. 
Anderson, op. cit., pp. 340. Istomin K. Baltijskij flot 50 
let nazad, v kampaniju 1854-1855. // "Morskoj sbornik", 
1904. T. CCCXX, n. 2 (Neoficial'nyi otdel), s. 3-6. 
3 Beskrovnyj L. Russkaja armija i floty v XIX veke. Moskva, 
1973. S. 500. Shevrëv, op. cit., s. 15. 
4 Anderson, op. cit., pp. 341-351. 
5 History Archives of Estonia (=HAE), Stock 1874, Series 1, 
item 388, p. 88-89. 
6 Putilov N. Sbornik izvestij otnosjashtshihsja do nasto-
jashtshej voiny. Kn. XIII, odt. II. Sankt Peterburg, 1855. 
S. 5-6, 14, 35. Istoricheskij ocherk dejatel'nosti voen-
nogo upravlenija v Rosii v pervoe dvatcatipjatiletij blago-
paluchnogo carstvovanija gosudarja Imperatora 
Aleksandra Nikolajevicha (1855-1880). T. 1. S.-Peter-
burg, 1879. 
7 See, copy of the memorandum: HAE, Stock 1874, Series 
1, Item 399. p. 1-35. 
8 Borodkin, op. cit., s. 229, 233. 
9 HAE, Stock 1874, Series 1, Item 399, p. 4,12,16, 27-29. 
10 HAE, Stock 1874, Series 1, Item 401, p. 17-21. 
11 Anderson, op. cit., pp. 347. 
12 
"Istoricheskij ocherk", s. 379-380. "Voenno-statisticheskij 
sbornik". Vyp. IV, ch.II. S.-Peterburg, 1871. "Inland", 
1855. Nr. 37. 
13 Anderson, op. cit., pp. 348-352. 
14 HAE, Stock 1874, Series 1, Item 429, p. 1-10. 
15 
"Istoricheskij ocherk". S. 379-380. "Voenno-statistic­
heskij sbornik", s. 124. Anderson, op. cit., pp. 354. 
16 HAE, Stock 29, Series 3, Item 3035, p. 4-6, 28; Stock 29, 
Series 3, Item 3054, p. 26; Stock 854, Series 2, Item 
2019, p. 3-26; Stock 854, Series 2, Item 2020, p. 2. 
17 According to the tenth census, the population of Hiiumaa 
was 13,995 — among them 6,397 men. Vahtre S. Eesti­
maa talurahvas hingeloenduste andmeil (1782 -1858). 
Tallinn, 1973. Lk. 123. 
18 There had been ideas of setting up a home guard at Hiiu­
maa in October 1854 when the British fleet was carrying 
out active military operations on the Baltic Sea during 
the Russian-English War. At that time the government 
did not approve of the idea either. HAE, Stock 29, Series 
1, Item 418, p. 1-6. 
19 Besides the manor Ungern-Sternberg was the owner of 
Hiiu-Kärdla cloth factory - one of the oldest big industrial 
plants in Estonia. 
20 In October, 1854, Major-General D. Miljutin presented the 
tsar a proposal to raise, within the bounds of possibility, 
supplementary military units, something like a home 
guard, in Tallinn, Nan/a, Riga and other places. Nicholas 
I, however, wrote in the margin of the memorandum "Not 
allowed!" HAE, Stock 1874, Series 1, Item 399, p. 22. 
21 HAE, Stock 29, Series 3, Item 3019, p. 1, 3, 5-10, 39-40. 
22 Essen, Nikolai von. Nachrichten über das Geschlecht 
Ungern-Sternberg. Nachtrag IV. Tartu, 1939, S. 571. 
23 Stone, op. cit., pp. 2158-2159. 
24 Beskrovnyj, op. cit., s. 78-79. 
25 In 1839, Russia had been divided into eastern and wes­
tern recruitment regions. Recruitments were carried out 
in alternate years: as a rule, one year men were called 
up from the eastern region, the other year from the wes­
tern region; though sometimes there were recruitments 
from the two regions. The latter case was the so-called 
general recruitment. 
26 Here and below the numbers of recruits (unless referred 
otherwise) indicate those enlisted during the scheduled 
recruitment periods. 
27 The recruit receipts could be either the so-called registra­
tion receipts (were given to the landlords for the pea­
sants to be enlisted later, etc.) or redemption receipts (a 
limited number of receipts issued and sold by the 
government, particularly in the reign of Nicholas I). See, 
Aarma L. Kirjaoskus Eestis 18. sajandi lõpust 1880. 
aastani (nekrutinimekirjade andmeil). Tallinn, 1990. Lk. 
56-57. 
28 In the 19th century bot silver and paper currency (assig­
nâtes) were current in Russia. In 1842 1 silver rouble 
was equalized with 3.5 assignâtes (editor's commen­
tary). 
29 The Livonian peasants gained the right of redemption 
under the peasant law in 1819, while the Province of 
Estonia received this right only under the 1861 recruit­
ment law of the Baltic Provinces. See, Tannberg T. 
1861. a. Balti kubermangude nekrutiseadus. // "Kleio", 
1988. Lk. 50-54. Those peasants were freed from mili­
tary service for life. 
30 HAE, Stock 296, Series 1, Item 25, p. 41-42, 44-45; Stock 
29, Series 3, Item 3334, p. 102-104. Aarma, op. cit., Ik. 
258. 
31 HAE, Stock 29, Series 3, Item 3891, p. 126-128, 348-350; 
Stock 296, Series 1, Item 27, p. 19-20. Jordan, Paul. 
Beiträge zur Statistik des Gouvernements Ehstland. 
Bd.l. Reval, 1867. S. 43. 
32 Weimarn F. Lifljandskaja gubernija. // "Materjaly dlja 
geografij i statistiki Rossii". Sanktpeterburg, 1864, S. 
302-303. 
33 In the years 1797-1831, the basis of recruitment was 500 
male inhabitants (with the exception of the year 1799 
when the basis was 350); later the basis was 1,000 men. 
In the present paper we have calculated the data for 
1,000 male inhabitants. 
KLEIO. Estonian Historical Journal 37 Tõnu Tannberg 
34 'n the years 1812-1813, part of the scheduled quota could 
not be fulfilled. Helme R. 1812. aasta Eestis ja Lätis. 
Tallinn, 1990. Lk. 120. 
Livchak, Boris. Narodnoe opolchenie v vooruzhennyh 
silah Rossii 1806-1855 gg. // "Uchenie zapiski Sverd-
lovskogo Juridicheskogo instituta". Serija "Istorija gosu-
darstva i prava". T.IV. Sverdlovsk, 1961. S. 207-208. 
Patent of the Livonian provincial authorities; April 28, 
1854. 
36 Calculated on the basis of the data from "Zhurnal Minis-
terstva Vnutrennyh Del". T. VII, otd. IV, s. 54-56. 
37 HAE, Stock 995, Series 1, Item 3750, p. 6; Stock 29, 
Series 3, Item 3510, p. 36-37. 
38 HAE, Stock 29, Series 3, Item 3510, p. 4-5, 32-32; Stock 
995, Series 1, Item 3750, p. 1. Latvian History Archives, 
Stock 640, Series 1, Item 1873, p. 3. 
39 Brylkin, Vladimir. Mil'graben'i kanonerskie lodki na 
Zapadnoj Dvine, V 1855 godu. // "Morskoj sbornik". T. 
XIII. Nr. 7, otd. IV, s. 63-68. 
40 Anderson, op. cit., pp. 348-351. HAE, Stock 29, Series 3, 
Item 3513, p. 100-101. 
41 HAE, Stock 29, Series 3, Item 3511, p. 7-17; Stock 29, 
Series 3, Item 3512, p. 16-28; Stock 29, Series 3, Item 
3513, p. 2-9; Stock 29, Series 3, Item 3514, p. 47-61; 
Stock 29, Series 3, Item 3971, p. 91-94; Stock 991, 
Series 1, Item 2713, p. 18-22; Stock 952, Series 1, Item 
961, p. 83-86. 
42 HAE, Stock 29, Series 3, Item 3971, p. 114. 
43 HAE, Stock 296, Series 1, Item 25, p. 16-17; Stock 296, 
Series 1, Item 27. p. 7-8. Cf: in 1853, 2,113 ships ente­
red the Riga harbour. Anderson, op. cit., pp. 345. 
Calculated from the data in:"Istoricheskij ocherk", s. 
357, 379-380. 
Tiit Rosenberg 38 
There is every reason to deal with the history of 
manorial economy on account of the fact that for the 
second time in the 20th century the process of replacing 
a large-scale agriculture by a small-scale one is taking 
place in Estonia now. We shall not deal with the socio­
political aspect of the problem, but we are attempting 
to find an answer to the question whether and to what 
extent the manner and speed of the almost complete and 
unselective demolition of manorial economy in the Re­
public of Estonia during its first years of independence 
contributed to the further development of the economy. 
To answer this question we should estimate the actual 
state of manorial economy before the reform as well as 
its profitableness (particularly in comparison with farms). 
It is to be regretted that we have neither a complete 
survey of the manorial and farm economy at the end of 
the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century nor 
thorough and differentiated studies of various manage­
ment types, regions and branches of agriculture. 
We have only a vague idea of the production le­
vel and profitableness of the manorial economy so far 
and even diametrically opposed opinions have been exp­
ressed. Thus, it has been asserted that before World War 
I the production of the Baltic large-scale agriculture was 
at a very low level and that the manors made their pro­
fit only from the forests and from renting farmland. It 
was said that the land reform only antedated the una­
voidable ruin and parcelling out of most of the manors. 
It is true that there were a number of manors ex­
periencing economic difficulties. According to the book­
keeping data of 99 North Estonian manors, 24 of them 
were loss-making ones in the 1912/1913 economic year. 
On the other hand, the few studies of the given 
period prove that the overwhelming majority of the Bal­
tic manors were viable and making a profit. Both agri­
cultural and industrial production were profitable and the 
profitableness of manors increased considerably in the 
pre-war years.3 
By the beginning of the 20th century, the profitab­
leness of the manorial economy had become an impor­
tant problem for landlords which had to be studied. In 
order to collect and generalize information on the eco­
nomic activity of the manors economic advice service 
(Wirtschaftsberatung) and manorial bookkeeping circles 
(Buchstelle) affiliated to the Livonian Nonprofit Econo­
mic Society in Tartu and the Estonian Agricultural So­
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ciety in Tallinn were established a few years before the 
war. Although the above-mentioned establishments did 
not manage to do much, their archives as well as tho­
se of a number of manors (a few dozens in our archi­
ves) constitute a solid foundation for studying in detail 
the economic history of individual manors as well as of 
manor complexes. The present article is an attempt in 
this field. 
Unique archival data on the Tammistu manor have 
been preserved. Gustav von Rathlef, the last owner of 
the estate, gathered and partly analysed accounting data 
for 40 years (1880-1920). He published his material al­
ready in 1914,4 and later extended it until the year 1920. 
Thus, his work resulted in a 34-page typed review supp­
lemented by a map of the manor and two detailed tab­
les.5 There are also very carefully filled answer sheets 
to the questionnaire sent by the Livonian Nonprofit Eco­
nomic Society in 1908 6 Hence, there are relatively nu­
merous data compensating for the absence of the archival 
records of the manor. The present study has mainly been 
based on the above-given materials. 
Gustav von Rathlef 
Besides the history of the manor, the personality of 
its owner is of considerable sociological interest as well. 
Gustav von Rathlef -was an educated landlord of bour­
geois origin who, besides managing his own manor, also 
devoted much attention to the promotion of agricuture 
in general. 
The founder of the Rathlef family in Livonia was 
Georg Ludwig Rathlef (1753-1814), Gustav von Rathlef's 
grandfather, descending from a family of literati in Han­
nover. After his adventures as a sailor and soldier in the 
service of England in India, he read law at Jena Uni­
versity in 1778-1779. In 1780, he came to Livonia, 
bought an estate at Viljandi and entered the service of 
the Russian state. For nearly 22 years he worked as a 
lawyer and a county and town fiscal official at Viljan­
di. He had a son and four daughters from his first mar­
riage to Anna von Hofmann and three sons (one of 
whom died as a baby) and five daughters from his se­
cond marriage to Johanna Andrea (née Andresen). That 
was the beginning of the Rathlef lineage which gave to 
Livonia and Estonia in the course of a century about a 
dozen educated people - statesmen, scholars, lawyers, 
doctors, clergymen, teachers and farmers. According to 
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the data from "Album Academicum", 13 members of the 
Rathlef family had studied at Tartu University in the 
years 1818-1908.8 The fact that Ewert von Dellingshau­
sen, a Baltic German scholar, has published in Lüneburg 
a monograph on the Rathlef family also proves the 
family's outstanding role. Four of the Rathlefs have been 
included in the Baltic German Biographic Lexicon (G. 
von Rathlef, his father and his brother - the historians, 
and his son - a specialist in agriculture). 
Since his grandfather and father had personally been 
raised to the Russian nobility, G. von Rathlef applied 
for the hereditary title and got it in 1895. In 1896, the 
Landtag enrolled him as a member of the Livonian no­
bility and his name was included in the peerage book 
as that of a landowner and to acknowledge his service 
in local elective self-government bodies. From that time 
there was a title before G. von Rathlefs and his 
sons'names. 
Gustav von Rathlef was born in Tallinn on Novem­
ber 11, 1847 and was the second son of Carl Albert 
Rathlef (1810-1895), a senior teacher of history and geog­
raphy at a provincial secondary school, later a professor 
of history at Tartu University (1854-1866). There were 
also three daughters in the family. The Fowelins, on 
mother's side, were also educated people - grandfather 
and uncle were doctors. The elder brother Georg Carlos 
(1846-1916) followed his father's example and was a se­
condary-school teacher and a prominent historian at Tar­
tu. Gustav's choice of profession was influenced by his 
uncle Ludwig Rathlef (1799-1873), an inspector of sta­
te property of the Viljandi-Pärnu region. Ludwig Rath­
lef was a tenant of the Vastsemõisa state manor and a 
well-known specialist in agriculture. In the years 1850-
1863, he was the president of the Pärnu-Viljandi Agri­
cultural Society and, from 1853, an honorary member of 
the Livonian Nonprofit Economic Society.9 He also ow­
ned the small Lahmuse manor in the Suure-Jaani parish 
bought for 40,000 silver roubles in 1852.10 There he be­
gan his work as a farmer. After finishing a secondary 
school in Tartu, he studied econommics at Tartu Univer­
sity in the years 1867-1869 and then, for one year, was 
a trainee under Academician A. von Middendorff's su­
pervision on the Hellenurme manor. 
In the years 1870-1885, G. von Rathlef lived on 
the Lahmuse manor. First he was a manager on his 
uncle's manor, but after his uncle's death the tenant of 
the manor which became the joint property of the wi­
dow and her daughter. During the Lahmuse period, he 
also rented for some time the Vana-Vändra manor ow­
ned by von Dilmar and acted as a trustee and a mana­
ger for several other landlords. The fact that G. von 
Rathlef was elected the warden of the Vändra parish in 
1877 and on three occasions a deputy judge of the Pär­
nu 2nd parochial court in the years 1874-1884 indicates 
that he was a man of boundless energy and great aut­
hority among other landlords. Later, while being the ow­
ner of the Tammistu manor, he held different elective 
posts as well. In the years 1885-1889, he was a secu­
lar school inspector of the Tartu county, the warden of 
the Tartu-Maarja and later of the Kodavere parish and 
the deputy churchwarden of the Tartu county; he was 
also a member of the Livonian Mutual Fire-insurance 
Company. Besides his activities on his own manor, he 
participated actively in the work of the Livonian Nonp­
rofit Economic Society and its branch, the Livonian So­
ciety for the Promotion of Agriculture and Handicraft. 
For some time he was the president of the latter socie­
ty. 
In 1877, G. von Rathlef married Marta von Schultz, 
doctor Woldemar von Schultz's daughter. They had three 
sons - Harald (1878-1944), Kurt (1881-1921) and Alfred 
(1883-1980). The eldest son became a naturalist and a 
plant breeder. Harald von Rathlef read chemistry and ag­
ronomy at Tartu University in 1897-1903 and later wor­
ked at the Baltic Seed Cultivation Society. In 1908, he 
founded a plant breeding station on the Nõmmiku farm, 
near Tartu, on the initiative and support of the Baltic 
Seed Cultivation Society and sponsored by the Russian 
Ministry of Agriculture. He headed the centre until it 
ceased its activities in 1917. Later he was in the emp­
loy of the Saxon agricultural chamber at Halle and con­
tinued his work in the field of grain breeding and hayseed 
growing. For a short period of time he was an owner 
of an estate - a few years before World War I he bought 
the Klein-Wrangelshot manor in the Val mi era county. 
The younger sons became farmers as well. Kurt 
von Rathlef read law and agronomy at Tartu University 
in 1900-1906 and then took over from his father the 
post of the manager of the Kokora manor in the Koda­
vere parish. The Kokora manor had been owned by the 
Schultzes, but in 1900 it was transferred as an inheri­
tance to G. von Rathlefs wife.11 Alfred von Rathlef in­
herited the Kaarli manor from his father in 1913. 
The major result of G. von Rathlef's life's work 
as a farmer was that the Tammistu manor was among 
the best manors in Livonia. He was probably efficient 
as a tenant as well. In April 1880, he bought for 150,000 
silver roubles from E. von Walter's legal successors the 
Tammistu and Kaarli manors in the Tartu-Maaija parish 
and finally moved there in 1855. He lived at Tammis­
tu until Christmas 1917 when the bolshevik parish com­
mittee took over his manors and forced the owner to 
leave. When the Germans came at the end of February 
1918, he returned to his manor, but, because of the bols­
hevik invasion at the end of 1918, he had to flee to 
Riga. He spent seven months in Riga, living in fear all 
the time, and then, like numerous other Livonian land­
owners, fled to Germany. After a year-long stay in Meck­
lenburg, G. von Rathlef returned to the Republic of 
Estonia. In June 1920, he arrived at Tammistu where he 
found a battery of the Estonian army with its 128 hor­
ses and 110 men living in the manor-house. The batte­
ry was quartered on the manor for 5 months.12 The 
manor, devastated by war and the absence of the ow­
ner, had been alienated under the agrarian reform law 
and G. von Rathlef rented the manor from the state for 
the time when parcelling out of the land into small hol­
dings was being carried out. By the spring of 1923, the 
epoch of manors was past and Gustav von Rathlef spent 
the last five years of his life in Tartu where he died on 
May 11, 1928. In 1926, in Tartu he wrote his memoirs, 
the manuscript of which is in his family's possession.' 
The author of the present publication has not read tho­
se memoirs. 
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Tammistu 
Tammistu, a manor of medium size, was situated 
17 km to the north-east of Tartu. The Andressaare dai­
ry-estate, lying about 5 km to the north-east of Tammis­
tu, and the Kaarli (Karlsberg) auxiliary manor, having 
the rights of an independent manor and lying 5 km to 
the north of Tammistu, were also attached to the Tam­
mistu manor. The lands of the Taabri state manor sepa­
rated them from the Tammistu main manor. The Tammistu 
manor also had a bottom-land meadow of 78 ha at Lake 
Koosa, not far form Lake Peipsi, lying at a distance ot 
15 km from a bird's-eye view from Tammistu. 
The Tammistu manor and the Andressaare dairy-es-
tate had 1,329 hectares of manorial land and 573 hec­
tares of peasants farmland and the Kaarli manor had 300 
and 74 hectares respectively.14 
There were 13 peasant farms at Tammistu and 3 
farms at Kaarli. The former owners had sold two farms 
at Tammistu and one farm at Kaarli to the peasants for 
perpetuity. In the years 1883-1884, G. von Rathlef sold 
the other Tammistu farms and, in 1884 and in 1889, the 
farms at Kaarli - for a total sum of 50,060 roubles. The 
price of the farms was comparable to the average price 
of farms in Livonia. The buyers had to pay two or three 
hundred roubles as a deposit and the rest of the sum 
was to be paid at 6 per cent interest rate periodically 
on definite dates by the year 1898. Since G. von Rath­
lef wanted to get a loan from the Livonian Credit Union, 
part of the sum that the farmers still owed was cancel­
led in the early 1890s by transferring the encumbrance 
(24,300 roubles) from the manor to the buyers of the 
farms. That meant the extension of the time of payment 
for the latter because a loan from the Credit Union had 
to be repaid, as a rule, during 36 years. The farms at 
Tammistu and Kaarli were rather poor and, therefore, 
most of the buyers could not pay their debts in time. 
Under the terms of the contract, the debt had to be re­
paid by 1898, but only 5 farms managed to do that. 
The debt of the others to the manor totalled 11,385 roub­
les in 1900 and there was the additional debt to the 
Credit Union.15 Thus, in the years 1883-1900, G. von 
Rathlef's income from the sale of farms totalled aproxi-
mately 28,000 roubles in cash (including interest), i.e. 
1,600-1,700 roubles per year. 
Since the Kaarli and Andressaare estates were se­
parate from the main household, Rathlef has not dealt 
much with them in his history of the Tammistu manor. 
Data on those estates, however, can be found in other 
sources. On the basis of that information it is possible 
to get an idea of the typical features of the management 
of auxiliary manors and dairy-estates of the Baltic ma­
nors. Since different sources contain conflicting data on 
the size and the distribution of arable land between main 
manors and dairy-estates, part of the figures given be­
low have been calculated and made round. 
The lands of the Andressaare dairy-estate were wed­
ged into the lands of the Taabri, Kavas tu and Luunja 
manors. Of the total of 740 hectares, barren marshland 
occupied 185 hectares. The wooded area, lying in the 
southern part of the estate, was almost of the same size 
and was in charge of the Andressaare forest-keeper. The 
household of the dairy-estate (140 ha, incl. 50 ha of 
arable land) was located in the extreme northern part of 
the estate. Seven small tenant farms, using a total of 
210 ha of land, out of which 82 ha was arable land, 
were scattered between the dairy-estate and the wooded 
area. The dairy-estate was leased in 1907-1908 and the 
tenant paid Rathlef a rent of 500 roubles in cash a 
year, while the small tenant farmers paid part of the rent 
in cash (a total of 553 roubles) and part of the rent by 
doing work for the Tammistu manor (calculated in cash 
- about 550-750 roubles).16 
There are no data on Rathlef's income from the 
forests of the manor which were mainly located on the 
territory of the Andressaare dairy-estate. As Rathlef him­
self pointed out, it was only after the selling of farm­
lands that the forests of the Livonian manors were 
regarded and managed as separate economic units. G. 
von Rathlef did not consider himself an expert in fo­
restry and it seems unlikely that the Tammistu forests 
were a considerable source of income. The forests pro­
vided the manor with firewood and timber. To some ex­
tent, however, forests were sold to local farmers and 
from 1903 as firewood to townspeople. 
In the 1907/1908 economic year, the net profit of 
the Andressaare dairy-estate and the tenant farms, after 
making the deductions for land, fire-insurance and local 
taxes, and amortization and management costs, was near­
ly 900 roubles, i.e. about 7.5 roubles per one hectare of 
arable land. 
The Kaarli dairy-estate (300 ha, including 270 ha 
of arable land, the remainder-forests), however, yielded 
bigger profits. The Kaarli estate was also managed by 
renting out land. The soils of the Kaarli estate were bet­
ter than those of the Andressaare estate as a result of 
soil improvement and that the Tammistu manor exerci­
sed strict supervision over the Kaarli estate. The tenant 
of the Kaarli estate had to pay part of the rent (1,400 
roubles) in cash, the remaining part (ca 700-800 roub­
les) was to be paid with work for the Tammistu manor. 
On the territory of the Kaarli estate there were also a 
watermill and three small tenant farms that paid direct­
ly to Rathlef a total of 225 roubles in cash and appro­
ximately 700 roubles by doing piecework, mainly making 
about 6000 poods (1 pood = 16.38 kg) of hay for the 
Tammistu cattle from a large Kaarli marshy meadow (31 
ha). According to Rathlef's calculations, the net profit of 
the Kaarli estate was 2,000 roubles (about 18 roubles 
per one hectare of arable land). 
The Tammistu main manor constituted a compact 
household, the farthest point of which was only 1.5 km 
from the centre of the manor (see the chart). In the first 
year, the household was run by a manager, while Rath­
lef frequently came from Lahmuse to inspect his work. 
In the later years G. von Rathlet himself managed the 
manor. 
The Tammistu soils were loamy and marshy. Hay 
was made in marshy meadows. The soil was heavy and 
there had to be strong ploughs and the lands needed 
draining. Nevertheless, the harvests were not bad in com­
parison with the neighbouring estates, but the land was 
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not used rationally. Harvesting as much straw as possib­
le was considered most important in farming and in some 
years even additional quantities of straw and clover were 
bought. At the same time, some of the impoverished ma­
norial fields used to be rented to farmers for flax gro­
wing. 
Spirit distilling was one of the most important com­
mercial branches of agriculture on the Baltic manors. Be­
fore the amelioration of the soils, there had been neither 
favourable conditions for the cultivation of potatoes as 
a necessary raw material for distillation of spirits nor 
distillery. Therefore, even before Rathlef, cattle-breeding 
had been dominant, although the herd of cattle had not 
been big - only 40 cows, 8 heifers and 8 calves. 
Rathlef carried out a number of radical reforms on 
his manor. He increased the number of cattle, gave up 
the practice of buying fodder and renting land for flax 
growing. A number of new buildings were erected and 
several old ones were reconstructed on the manor as 
well as on the rented land during the first years. Later, 
one of the most important new buildings was a big 
cowshed completed in 1897/1898 enabling to increase 
the number of cattle. It was only in 1907/1908, when 
his income had grown, that G. von Rathlef began the 
reconstruction of the manor house and built an exten­
sion to it.19 
After becoming acquainted with and consulting P. 
Rosenstand-Wöldike, a Danish amelioration engineer wor­
king in Livonia, Rathlef began extensive soil-improve-
ment work at Tammistu in 1885, resulting in a considerable 
change in the use of manorial lands during the follo­
wing 15-20 years (see Table 1). 
First, the ditches that had been completely neglec­
ted were cleared of bushes and levelled. In the early 
1890s, after general levelling, extensive work began un­
der the supervision of P. Rosenstand-Wöldike. The so-
Table 1 
The land use on the Tammistu main manor 
(ha) 20 
called economical drainage was used, in the course of 
which the poorest and the soggiest plots of land and the 
Jürisoo meadow were drained with large open ditches. 
Since the contours of nearly all the fields and meadows 
had changed, the lands were surveyed once again in 
1889. Rathlef had a large number of working charts to 
a considerably reduced scale made and data on crop ro­
tation, quantities of fertilizers, soil improvement and har­
vests for each year were put down on those charts. 
In the years 1890-1895, a decisive step in growing 
fodder crops was made: the former rotation system of 
16 crops was replaced by an 18-crop rotation system in 
1890. The area of fodder crops was increased by so­
wing fallows with vetch. Relatively more potatoes for 
fodder were grown. The draining of the lands of the 
Kaarli estate, primarily of the extensive grassland lying 
apart, also began. In 1895, engineer C. Holm drew up 
a completely new plan for soil improvement and the 
building of the so-called systematic drainage began, drain 
pipes in individual fields and plots of grassland were 
laid. These activities lasted until the year 1905. A total 
of 19,000 roubles had been spent on soil improvement 
at Tammistu during the 18 years. Later the work was 
continued on a smaller scale. In the years 1907-1914, a 
total of approximately 3,000 roubles was spent on drai­
ning meadows and pastures as well as on a field rec­
laimed from the Lõõtsa forest. 
In 1914, Rathlef made an attempt to evaluate the 
profit derived from the soil improvement and, not de­
nying the role of other factors, he concluded that soil 
improvement had contributed to the rise in the gross in­
come to the greatest extent (in his calculations he did 
not take into account the price fluctuations). He pointed 
out that in the years 1880-1887, i.e. before soil impro­
vement work, the annual gross profit of the manor ave­
raged 15,000 roubles, while in the years 1887-1895, i.e. 
when 12,000 roubles had been spent on soil improve­
ment, the average gross profit grew to more than 24,000 
roubles and during the following decade even to more 
than 26,000 roubles.21 
A more extensive and skilful use of mineral ferti­
lizers also contributed to the growth in the harvests. 
Thus, in the 1880s, the average yearly sum spent on 
buying mineral fertilizers was 372 roubles, in the 1890s 
it was 718 roubles, in the first decade of the 20th cen­
tury 1,303 roubles and in the years 1911-1915 as much 
as 2,837 roubles were spent every year on fertilizers. 
During the war practically no mineral fertilizers were 
used. As the number of cattle increased, the quantity of 
manure grew as well. The productiveness of the fields 
went up as a result of better agrotechnics and fertilizing. 
Table 2 illustrates the progress in farming.22 
There was a sharp increase in the harvests in the 
1890s, though during the following decade the harvests 
decreased a little because smaller quantities of artificial 
fertilizers were given to the fields since hay-meadows 
were being fertilized. In general, the grain harvests were 
rather stable in the years 1895-1907.2' Calculated in pre-
sent-day indices, the mean yields per hectare were as 
follows: rye - 16.5 metric centners, barley - 15.3 met­
ric centners, oats - 14.4 metric centners, potatoes - 218.8 
Economically usable land 1880 1889 1914 
Arable land 286 310 337 
Hay-meadow 100 114 78 
Enclosure meadow 
- - 32 
Marshy/woodland pasture 115 - . 
Forests and pasture 
- 85 -
Forsets 
- - 68 
Rented small holdings 
(all usable land) 13 6 
-
Total 515 515 515 
Koosa bottom-land 
meadow 78 78 78 
Kaarli hay-meadow 31 31 31 
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Table 2 
Average Yields (in poods) in the years 
1881-192022 
metric centners.Those yields were considerably better than 
the corresponding average ones in Estonia and tsarist 
Russia and were comparable to those in Nordic count­
ries ,24 It should be noted, however, that the average 
yields were considerably decreased by the low yields on 
peasant farms and, therefore, we should distinguish be­
tween the data on manorial estates and those on farms. 
According to the Russian Statistical Board, in the 
years 1901-1913, the average yield of rye per hectare 
on manors in Livonia was 13.2 metric centners, 10.8 
metric centners in the provinces of Central Russia, 9.1 
metric centners in Byelorussia and 9.6 metric centners 
in Lithuania. 
According to L. Balevica, the average rye yield of 
70 (evidently better) manors of the Province of Livonia 
in 1913 (a poor year) was 14.1 metric centners (inclu­
ding for example 18.7 on the Li gaste manor in the Tar­
tu county, 16.4 on the Pajusi manor in the Viljandi 
county and 12.1 metric centners on the Räpina manor 
in the Võru county).25 
A steady increase in the share of fodder crops was 
an important tendency in farming at Tammistu. In the 
year 1907/1908, nearly half of all the arable land of 338 
hectares was under fodder crops (fallow - 56 ha, half 
of that - summer-fallow, the other half - fallow ploug­
hed in autumn; rye - 56 ha; clover - 110 ha; barley -
44 ha; oats - 56 ha; Swedish turnip - 1 ha). Flax was 
not grown at Tammistu in Rathlef's time.26 
The share of different crops in the sown area de­
pended on market conditions. 
G. Rathlef's information on the prices of agricul­
tural produce in the years 1880-1920 based on the cash-
books of the Tammistu manor is of great interest from 
the point of view of economic history.27 The data on 
the marketability of different field crops is of conside­
rable interest as well (see Table 3). 
Rye sold best in the market and it was sown more 
than at the beginning of the century. The price of rye 
which had fallen since the mid-1880s and had reached 
its lowest point in 1896/1897 (0.52-0.58 roubles a pood) 
began to rise and in the year 1912/1913 surpassed the 
price level of the early 1880s (1.1 roubles a pood). 
Barley was also grown for sale at Tammistu, whi­
le its sown acreage was relatively stable. Wheat was 
grown only in some years and only for their own needs. 
The same can be said about oats, the sown acreage of 
which had considerably decreased from the beginning of 
the century. In some years oats were not sold at all and 
only before World War I the Tammistu manor began to 
sell seed oats owing to the collaboration with the Nõm­
miku experimental station headed by Harald von Rath­
lef. 
The market orientation of potato growing was the 
most noteworthy. Potato growing expanded gradually un­
til the turn of the century. Both food potatoes and seed 
potatoes were sold. Smaller quantities of potatoes were 
also sold to distilleries (mainly to the Kokkora manor). 
Nearly 23 per cent of the potatoes were sold to the dis­
tillery in the years 1903-1906. At the beginning of the 
century, that source of income, however, became unstab­
le and less profitable because the state had established 
a monopoly of spirits. Since potato growing was very 
laborious work, the decrease can primarily be attributed 
to a shortage of manpower beginning from the year 
1907.29 For the same reason the growing of Swedish 
turnips was not expanded either. 
The dairy herd which had become the main sour­
ce of income on the Tammistu manor needed ever bet­
ter and more varied feed. The main fodder base was 
made up of clover and vetch, though different kinds of 
feed were additionally bought (bran, oil cakes, oatmeal, 
experimentally also meat meal). Though the total area 
of grasslands in the neighbourhood of the manor dec­
reased, hay harvests went up. If in the early 1880s the 
hay harvest from a hay-meadow of 56 hectares had 
amounted to 23-33 poods per hectare, then, after the ini­
tial draining of the meadow, it grew, on the average, to 
83 poods and even to 147 poods in 1906. In the year 
1902, a drained meadow yielded as much as 383 poods 
of hay per hectare..30 Therefore, the Koosa bottom-land 
meadow, which could not be drained, did not matter 
much to the manor and the peasants were allowed to 
make hay there for 1/3-1/2 of the harvests and the ma­
nor got 0-500-800-1000 poods of hay in different years.31 
Table 3 
The structure of consuming agrcultural produ­
ce at Tammistu in the years 1903-1906 (%)28 
Purpose of use Rye Barley Oats Potatoes 
For the owner 
of the manor t2.2 3.8 8.9 1.3 
Consumed by 
household 17.7 279 69.3 0.8 
Provisions for 
the workers of 
the manor 8.1 14.7 16.2 0 
For sale 72.0 53.6 5.6 97.9 
Total amount 6012 2871 4782 5931 
poods poods poods bushets 
Years Grain Potatoe s Clover and 
vetch 
Meado\ 
1881-1885 9250 9819 5920 4465 
1886-1890 14051 13692 8715 5206 
1891-1900 15309 17918 15797 6023 
1901-1910 14738 6828 20082 8524 
1911-1915 17662 3301 15817 8462 
1916-1920 7672 4491 10602 6147 
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Table 4 
The milk production of the Tammistu herd (kg) and profits of the manor (roubles) in the years 
188119 
Years Milk cows Production per Total production Calculated cross Actual net 
cow profit profit 
1881-1885 68 1354 100 449 15 152 14 705 
1886-1890 101 1602 161 781 23 116 18 379 
1891-1895 127 1714 217 727 27 307 23 189 
1896-1900 166 1956 324 683 31 462 23 910 
1901-1905 164 2203 361 223 29 600 25 343 
1906-1910 181 2078 376 265 27 590 27 543 
1911-1915 150 2528 379 125 31 622 36 652 
1916-1920 99 1685 166 803 17 794 17 060 
During 35 years, G. von Rathlef increased the to­
tal area of arable land of the manor approximately 1.2 
times, grain production 1.9 times, cultivation of clover 
3 times and growing of meadow hay almost twice. The­
re was greater progress in cattle-breeding where the pro­
ductivity grew nearly 1.9 times. As a result of increasing 
the herd 2-2.5 times, the total production of milk grew 
nearly 3.8 times (see Table 4). 
In the year 1905/1906, the Tammistu herd suffered 
a shortage of fodder caused by bad harvests of spring 
cereals, clover and vetch after a dry spring. Besides, the 
so-called revolutionary terror and a strike of milkmaids 
on the manor reduced both the size of the herd and its 
productivity.32 The latter reached its previous level only 
in the year 1910/1911. The year 1912 turned out to be 
the most successful one as the average milk yield per 
cow was 2,636 kg. Before World War I, the normal size 
of the herd was 4-6 bulls, 150-160 milk cows and 60-
80 heads of young cattle. 
Below we shall present comparative data on the 
average annual milk yield in cattle-breeding countries of 
Western Europe before World War I: 3,400 kg in the 
Netherlands, 3,130 kg in Switzerland, 2,560 kg in Den­
mark, 1,630 kg in Sweden and 1,200-1,300 kg in Fin­
land." According to economist V. Krinal's data, the 
average annual milk yield per cow on Estonian manors 
was 1,850 kg and on farms, on the average, 600-750 
kg, while in the best herds it was 1,250 kg a year.34 
A. Muuga, a specialist in cattle-breeding, has estimated 
the annual milk yield per cow on manors in the midd­
le of the 19th century at 900-1,000 kg and in the best 
pedigree cattle on the Kunda manor at 1,800-2,000 kg. 
In the 1912/1913 control year, the average milk yield 
per cow (in the control group) reached 2,552 kg and 
84.1 kg of milk fat per cow, and in the best pedigree 
cattle on the Tuula manor 3,934 kg and 126 kg respec­
tively.' According to L. Balevica, on the basis of the 
data of the milk recording department of the Livonian 
Nonprofit Economic Society, the average milk yield per 
cow in control herds on 113 manors totalled 2,640 kg..36 
The above-given data serve to prove that the Tammistu 
herd was among the best on Estonian and Livonian ma­
nors. 
The progress in cattle-breeding at Tammistu could 
be attributed to the long-time pedigree breeding launc­
hed by G. von Rathlef in the 1870s under A. Middendorff's 
influence. G. von Rathlef presented a detailed survey of 
the story of his Tammistu pedigree herd against the ge­
neral background of pedigree breeding in the Baltic area 
in his letter to Professor J. Mägi in September 1921.37 
In 1880, G. von Rathlef introduced detailed regist­
ration forms for each head of the Tammistu cattle. He 
was among the founders of "The Baltic Herdbook" (1885) 
and "The Baltic Anglian Herdbook" (1891). From that 
time on he acted as an expert who evaluated and ente­
red young neat in the herdbook and so he rode thou­
sands of kilometres in Livonia. The Tammistu herd was 
highly ranked and received numerous awards at agricul­
tural shows. The Tammistu herd as a collection was ex­
hibited and won a medal at the 4th Baltic jubilee 
exhibition in Riga in 1899. The Tammistu herd also won 
first prizes and gold medals at annual agricultural shows 
organized by landowners' societies at Tartu and Võnnu. 
Both individual oxen and herds of cattle were sold from 
Tammistu to neighbouring manors (Kokora, Ahja, Ran­
nu, Ropka, Kukulinna) and farms as well as to more 
distant manors (the Albu and Liigvalla manors in the 
Province of Estonia). As G. von Rathlef pointed out in 
his letter to Professor Mägi, most of the Estonian Red 
Cattle breed in the area had come from the Tammistu 
manor. Thus, G. von Rathlef's activities were of consi­
derably greater importance than promoting cattle-breeding 
on only one manor. 
The income and profitableness of the Tammistu ma­
nor grew as the production increased (see Table 4). The 
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given data illustrate only agricultural production and do 
not include income from renting out and forests. The 
so-called industrial part of the manor was extremely mo­
dest and was completely subjected to agricultural pro­
duction. A mill with one grinder, oats press and a machine 
for shredding peat satisfied only the needs of the ma­
nor. The cutting of peat started at the beginning of the 
20th century. Part of the pressed peat was used as fuel 
for the steam engine and for heating the threshing-barn, 
most of it was used as bedding in the cattle-shed. The 
manor also had a steam-powered creamery with a small 
cheese factory, but that had been leased to a Swiss dai-
ry-master and cheese-maker, who was obliged under cont­
ract to buy all the milk from the manor, process it and 
return part of it as skim milk and whey. 
On the basis of his account books G. von Rathlef 
compiled two series of data on his income. The calcu­
lations of the so-called gross income were based on the 
1907/1909 price level. That curve reflects primarily an 
increase in the production on the manor. The calcula­
tions of the so-called net income were based on current 
prices and that series of data represents the actual inco­
me in cash depending on market fluctuations. Those two 
series of data indicate a relatively rapid growth in inco­
me until the mid-1890s. Then the growth slowed down 
and even stopped. There was a sharp rise in pre-war 
years and particularly in the first year of the war due 
to extremely favourable price conditions. That was fol­
lowed by a drastic fall in the years 1916-1920 as a re­
sult of requisitioning, shortage of labour power and other 
factors caused by the war.'9 The size of the herd, its 
productivity and total yield fell to the level of the ear­
ly 1880s.40 
It is unfortunate that on the basis of Rathlef's data 
it is not possible to make an analogous chart of expen­
diture and net profit. Expenditure was primarily influen­
ced by the prices of consumer goods, but particularly 
by a rise in wages. Thus, according to G. von Rathlef's 
calculations, the wages of the workers on the manor rose 
Irom 283 roubles in 1905 to 380 roubles in pre-war 
years. 
The data on the structure of the income and ex­
penditure as well as on the net profit are available only 
for three economic years - 1903/1904, 1904/1905 and 
1906/1907. The economic year 1905/1906 was not a ty­
pical one and, therefore, has been excluded.41 Cattle-
breeding was the source of 60.5 per cent (including 56.9 
per cent from selling unskimmed milk to the creamery) 
of the average annual income (ca 29,100 roubles, exc­
luding the cost of agricultural machinery - ca 40,000 
roubles) and the sale of grain accounted for 27.5 per 
cent of the income. 
The basic items of expenditure (ca 22,100 roubles 
a year) were as follows: purhases of seed grain, con­
centrated fodder, fertilizers and different materials - 30.3 
per cent, wages 29.8 per cent (including annual wages 
12.6 per cent and daily and piece-wages - 17.2 per cent). 
Considerable sums were also spent on depreciation and 
renewal of agricultural implements (including herd selec­
tion and participation in exhibitions) - 8.8 per cent, on 
building and repairing - 5.8 per cent, on buying house­
hold appliances and consumer goods - 3.7 per cent. In­
surance and various taxes accounted for 2.3 and 3.3 per 
cent of the expenditure respectively. 
G. von Rathlef estimated the net profit of the ma­
nor from agriculture at 7,168 roubles in 1903/1904, 10,350 
roubles in 1904/1905 and 10,431 roubles in 1906/1907. 
(The difference resulted from the different values of ag­
ricultural implements at the beginning and at the end of 
the analysed economic years). Thus, in the first decade 
of the 20th century, the average net profit of the manor 
was about 10,000 roubles, i.e. 33 roubles per one hec­
tare ol arable land.If we take into account the profit 
from rent and forests, the maximum net profit of the 
manor could not exceed 15,000 roubles in pre-war years. 
That profit enabled successful management in some eco­
nomically unfavourable years and, evidently, the accu­
mulated capital would have been sufficient to restore the 
economy of the manor in post-war years as well. 
In evaluating the developments on the Tammistu 
manor in its last decades we can agree with G. von 
Rathlef who wrote in 1914: "...what has been done at 
Tammistu is nothing special - at the same time a large 
number of Baltic manors, making use of more powerful 
means and at a much faster rate, have achieved much 
better results. The only unique thing here is a system 
of long-time and methodical accounting. I myself have 
acted more radically on one of the manors belonging to 
me and now managed by my son (Kokora) as well as 
on other big manors over which I had authority during 
many years" 42 
In conclusion we would like to point out that only 
after studying the development of farming in that period 
more thoroughly would it be possible to say whether G. 
von Rathlef's bitter words about his life's work expres­
sed in a letter to J. Mägi, Professor of Tartu Universi­
ty, in the autumn of 1921 were justified: "If this former 
centre of agricultural culture and promotion of cattle-
breeding as well as numerous other cattle-breeding cent­
res are parcelled out in 1922 or 1923, the work done 
for the improvement of the breed and lasting 50 years 
(that is almost two generations) will be lost here too. 
Sapienti sat! Yours sincerely, G. von Rathlef"43 
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A Discussion about the Principles of 
Forming the Armed Forces in the First 
Years of the Republic of Estonia 
In the 20th century, three principally different met­
hods have been used to form the armed forces: 1. The 
militia army was already known in ancient states whe­
re all men received military training without interrupting 
their regular work and, in case of necessity, were ready 
to fight. In the 20th century, the militia army presuppo­
ses military training in the neighbourhood of one's home 
(territorial principle) in the course of periodical training 
gatherings, the total length of which is below one ca­
lendar year. In peacetime, a militia army consists only 
of a small number of officers-instructors, and the remai­
ning staff are called up in the course of a general mo­
bilization if there is imminent danger of war. The Swiss 
army was the most well-known militia army in the 1920s. 
2. Standing paid armies were common in the Middle 
Ages, but they were supplanted by mass regular armed 
forces after the French Revolution. That system was con­
sidered to be outdated at the beginning of the 20th cen­
tury; nowadays, however, the armed forces of a number 
of leading states (USA, Great Britain, etc.) are again for­
med of paid professionals. 3. A standing cadre army, 
formed on the basis of general conscription, first came 
into being in France in the course of the revolutionary 
wars at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries. This 
method of compulsory military training of all men in 
peacetime during a longer (over one year) period of time 
is rather common nowadays. 
The Estonian national militiary units were born in 
the summer of 1917, i. e. at the time when Estonia was 
still part of the Russian Empire. Naturally, those units 
were formed in accordance with All-Russian laws as a 
cadre army based on general conscription. During the 
Estonian War of Independence that broke out at the end 
of 1918 nobody had time to debate about the methods 
of forming the army because heavy fighting against the 
much more numerous Red Army demanded maximum 
effort and a mass army served that purpose best. 
It was only after the War of Independence, at the 
beginning of 1920, that a discussion about the further 
development of the army began. Though at first, as a 
result of the intoxication from victory, there had been 
ideas that Estonia did not need an army at all, they did 
not become dominant because of the unstable foreign-
policy situation of the newly-formed small state in the 
immediate neighbourhood of the aggressive Soviet Em­
pire. 
However, there were lively debates about the sys­
tem of the army in the future, mainly brought about by 
patriotic sentiment (service in the Russian army had been 
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hated by everybody) as well as by economic difficulties. 
Those debates were aimed at finding the most optimum 
way of forming the armed forces in Estonia. The parti­
cipants in the debate presented different ideas concerning 
the role of the army in society, but were unanimous in 
evaluating the economic situation of Estonia and emp­
hasized the necessity of thrifty spending on the armed 
forces. 
Three different principles of forming the armed for­
ces were advanced as early as in 1920. 
Members of the Estonian Social Democratic Workers' 
Party were most active in propagating their viewpoints. 
Basing their ideas on the resolution adopted at the 1st 
Congress of the 2nd International in 1898, the socialists 
suggested that a people's militia (that is how they cal­
led the militia army) should be formed in Estonia. 
The Estonian Social Democratic Workers' Party poin­
ted out that a militia army had a number of alleged ad­
vantages over a standing cadre army: 1) a militia with 
its small number of instructors would be cheaper than 
a standing army; 2) it would be easier to train the 
soldiers' initiative during short training gatherings than 
under strict barrack-discipline; 3) a militia would be more 
suited^ for contemporary mobile warfare than a mass 
army. 
In December 1920, Admiral Johan Pitka, Comman­
der of the Naval Forces during the War of Independen­
ce, presented totally different proposals to the government. 
His memoranda were based on the presumption that 
Estonia's only potential enemy was Soviet Russia. He 
thought that Moscow was planning to carry out a coup 
d etat in Estonia with the help of Estonian communists 
and then, under the pretext of helping "the fighting pro­
letariat", to send the Red Army to Estonia. But before 
that the bolsheviks would have to establish their orga­
nizations in the Estonian army and, therefore, the army 
could not always be trusted. Consequently, the armed 
forces should consist of several parts: 1) To preserve the 
technical troops which, though small in number, are 
equipped with modern and efficient armaments (armou­
red trains, tanks, planes). Professional soldiers would ser­
ve in those units and they would repulse the enemy on 
the frontier until general mobilization would be carried 
out. 2) To form special "shock troops" of the volunteers 
"who had been in the fierce battles of the War of In­
dependence and who knew what they were fighting for 
and know what they have to defend". In peacetime, tho­
se men would be engaged in their everyday work and 
would assemble periodically for training gatherings. In 
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case of war, they could be quickly (24-48 hours) mobi­
lized and immediately (without additional training) sent 
to fight. 3) All the remaining men should be trained in 
accordance with the principles of a militia army and they 
should be used as a second-rate reserve." 
Thus, J. Pitka's scheme was a peculiar combination 
of a paid army and a militia army, while the latter was 
to consist of the so-called traditional units and elite ones. 
Some officers serving in the Defence League pro­
posed another mixed system consisting of a militia and 
a standing cadre army and recommended to reorganize 
the Defence League into a militia army and to preserve 
the standing army as well. During the War of Indepen­
dence, the Defence League had developed from a vo­
luntary self-defence organization into a mass organization 
that was obligatory for all men and was enganged in 
the internal defence of the republic. 
In December 1919, Voldemar Thomson, a depart­
ment head of the staff of the Defence League, sent a 
memorandum to the government pointing out that it was 
necessary to abandon the former so-called Russian sys­
tem as inappropriate for Estonian conditions and natio­
nal character. His proposal was to enlist every year two 
classes of men (about 8,000) in the permanent army, 
mainly in the frontier guard service. After the enlistment 
period, those men would be incorporated in the so-cal-
led citizens' army consisting of various public organiza­
tions. All persons belonging to the citizens' army would 
get extra military training in those organizations and 
would have arms and uniforms so that they could be 
ready for battle in 24 hours. V. Thomson thought that 
the regional units of the Defence League could perform 
those functions.4 
V. Thomson published his memorandum practically 
unchanged (only "citizens' army" was replaced by a more 
conventional "reserve army") in the first issue of the 
journal "Kaitseliitlane" ("Member of the Defence Lea­
gue"), the editor-in-chief of which he was." 
Second Captain Johannes Gnadenteich, Commander 
of the Viru county unit of the Defence League, also pro­
pagated the idea of reducing to a minimum the standing 
army and increasing the role of the Defence League in 
his article published in the journal "SÕdur" ("Soldier"). 
His vision of the Defence League resembled J. Pitka's 
"shock troops" as joining the organization was volunta­
ry and the enlistment presupposed definite selection. All 
those who did not belong to the Defence League, in ac­
cordance with the practice of tsarist Russia, were to be 
registered as home guards and were to be called up only 
in case of war.6 
Those changes, however, did not receive solid sup­
port from the public. The Estonian Social Democratic 
Workers' Party was the only political force in favour of 
radical reforms. The other parties shared the senior officers' 
views which were rather figuratively expressed by Ma­
jor-General Jaan Soots, the former chief of the staff of 
the Supreme Command: "Experimenting with the arm)/ 
would be beyond our means and extremely dangerous". 
When the Constituent Assembly was debating about sta­
te defence principles in the 1920 constitution, both Kons­
tantin Päts , leader of the rightist Farmers' Party, and 
Ado Anderkopp, a spokesman for the relatively leftist 
Labour Party, were in favour of a standing army as the 
basis of defence organization in Estonia.9 The centrist 
People's Party's newspaper "Postimees" ("Courier") also 
supported the above- mentioned principles.10 
Thus, in 1920, the "Russian system" was preserved 
and all eligible men had to undergo a three-year com­
pulsory military service and, after completing it, were 
registered in the reserve army. It is true that a normal 
cadre army was formed instead of the mass army of the 
War of Independence - in the course of demobilization 
the number of the military decreased from 74,769 to 
27,014 and later, in accordance with a regulation enfor­
ced in January 1921, even to 18,871." This number di­
minished further when the three-year compulsory military 
service was replaced by a two-year one, then by a 1.5-
year one and, finally, by a one-year service (this period 
was further shortened at the time of the economic cri­
sis) - thus, for example, on August 1, 1931, the Esto­
nian army numbered 13,535 men.12 
Although the size of the army had been substan­
tially decreased, people were dissatisfied that the former 
"Russian system" had been applied and more and more 
political forces joined the campaign to reform the state 
defence organization. 
The first moderate reform proposals were made as 
early as at the turn of 1920-1921. Thus, before the elec­
tions of the State Assembly, the Labour Party declared 
that it was going "to push a new military organization 
through" in the Parliament, though not specifying details 
of the new organization.13 Soon afterwards, they speci­
fied their ideas: since small Estonia would have to fight 
against a great power and Estonia's economic situation 
did not enable her to maintain a large standing army, 
consequently, "there is no other way than to transfer mi­
litary training from the barracks to the public /.../. Be­
sides a short-term military service /.../ there would be a 
people's army created from society, there would be a 
nation trained to defend their freedom".14 Similar ideas 
of the necessity of the "armed people" were expressed 
by the People's Party during its election campaign. " 
In the spring of 1921, pressure from politicians was 
so strong that General Jaan Soots, the Minister of War, 
had to declare in a newspaper: "Finding the proper sys­
tem must be left to military experts. And after one sys­
tem has been accepted, the public must not interefere in 
its implementation /.../".16 The general's warning was 
only a voice in the wilderness - the good old days when 
politicians did not dare (were not competent?) discuss 
military issues were gone. Even Professor Jüri Uluots, 
J. Soots' fellow member from the Farmers' Party, poin­
ted out in the State Assembly that such organizations as 
the Defence League could play a certain part in organi­
zing state defence. At a meeting of parliamentary com­
missions held on December 10, 1921, only the top-ranking 
officers supported the existing system, while both the 
People's Party and the Labour Party were in favour of 
a partial change in the system; the socialists insisted on 
setting up a people's militia.17 
At the end of 1921, Admiral J. Pitka's scheme was 
brought up again. Meanwhile, J. Pitka had rallied his 
supporters and had established the Estonian Guard Union. 
The organ of the latter published the forgotten scheme 
again, trying to prove its suitability for Estonian condi­
tions.18 The scheme did not receive any support and lots 
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of arguments against it were presented. J. Soots attemp­
ted to prove that if J. Pitka's scheme were applied, some 
young men would not get any military training at all 
and, therefore, they could not be used in wartime.19 In 
actual fact, J. Pitka had meant the training of all consc­
ripts. Members of the People's Party and of the Labour 
Party considered specially selected "shock troops" dan­
gerous. Thus, the newspaper "Postimees" wrote that the 
proposed scheme was "quite an absurd idea that would 
not guarantee internal security, but would create class 
hatred and social tension".21 The problem seems to be 
unduly inflated since it was not realistic that the "shock 
troops" would seize power. The third argument against 
J. Pitka should be considered more seriously: that the 
system would have been a burden on the treasury sin­
ce it would have been necessary to pay the professio­
nals serving in the technical troops, the instructors training 
the reserve cadres as well as to subsidize the semi-pro­
fessional "shock troops" and to spend money on modern 
armaments for the small defence units to such an extent 
that they could repulse the enemy's first attack.22 Ho­
wever, we cannot be sure that expenditure on defence 
would actually have increased. Nevertheless, J. Pitka's 
scheme to reorganize national defence was unanimously 
rejected by the military and politicians as unsuitable for 
Estonian conditions. 
The socialists advocated setting up a people's mi­
litia in 1922 as well. Although there was much talk 
about the necessity of radical reforms, the concepts "mi­
litia army" and "people's militia" occurred less frequent­
ly in the newspapers. Evidently, there were a number of 
reasons for that. First, it was obvious that neither the 
parliament nor the government would support radical 
changes; second, both the People's Party and the La­
bour Party presented concrete plans; third, more serious­
ly (previously only emotional evaluations like 
"experimenting is dangerous and expensive" had been 
used). 
In 1922, Colonel Nikolai Reek, chief of the Gene­
ral Staff Courses (later: Higher Military College), and 
Major-General Dmitri Lebedev, a lecturer, published an 
article in the magazine "Sõdur" ("Soldier") devoted comp­
letely to militia army problems. The main ideas of the 
article can be summed up as follows: "The state cannot 
rely on the militia because the latter, by its nature and 
as is known from militia history, do not guarantee strength, 
loyalty and readiness for action. /.../ The militia is but 
a crowd of people who, in comparison with a standing 
army, lack the expertise of military technology, discipli­
ne, solidarity and endurance".2"3 The emotional conclu­
sion of the article does not reflect the actual value of 
the article which constituted a thorough analysis of all 
the arguments for and against the militia army. The 
authors theoretical standpoints were illustrated with 
examples from military history and numerical data. That 
article definitely dealt a severe blow to the supporters 
of the people's militia. 
In 1922, the People's Party and the Labour Par­
ty came out with an interesting idea of setting up a so-
called "people's army". The newspaper "Postimees" 
( Courier") carried an article explaining in detail the ba­
sic principles of the people's army: As Estonia's inde­
pendent statehood is continuously threatened by Russia, 
it is clear that we cannot survive without an efficient 
system of state defence; on the other hand, we cannot 
continue the current practice of spending over 30 per 
cent of the budget on military expenditure and so not 
being able to meet the needs of our economy and na­
tional culture. If we take into account the continuous 
threat from the neighbouring great power, it is necessa­
ry to educate and organize all the people for state de­
fence, but not in the form of a large standing army that 
is beyond our means, but with the help of all public 
organizations. Thus, besides a small and well-trained stan­
ding army provided with modern armaments, there should 
exist public organizations responsible for the registration 
and training of reservists and capable of freeing the sta­
te from that expenditure.24 
Propaganda for the people's army became particu­
larly active in October 1922 when the government had 
resigned and consultations for forming a new coalition 
cabinet were going on. The People's Party played a par­
ticularly significant role as its leaders repeatedly empha­
sized the necessity of adapting public organizations to 
the needs of state defence. The new government dec­
lared that the system of state defence should be chan­
ged and improved.26 Nevertheless, they did not go 
beyond words. There might have been a variety of rea­
sons - the government's short term of office (the next 
general election was already in March 1923) or the fact 
that the former Minister of War J. Soots held office in 
the new government as well. It should be pointed out, 
however, that the higher officers lost their former con­
servatism. In the above-mentioned article by Reek and 
Lebedev a promising conclusion was drawn: it would be 
expedient "to preserve the cadre army as long as the 
East European political issue had not been settled and 
later, depending upon the circumstances, to switch over 
to a mixed system".27 ("Mixed system" meant a combi­
nation of the elements of a standing army and militia 
army, i. e. analogously to the proposals put forward by 
the People's Party). 
In the spring of 1923, on the eve of the election 
of the second convocation of the State Assembly, the 
People's Party presented its detailed plan of a mixed 
system under the title "The guiding principles of the 
People's Party": 1. For the purpose of state defence all 
citizens fit tor military service shall be organized into a 
people's army. 2. The main part of the people's army 
shall be a standing army in which all citizens fit for 
military service shall serve for a short period of time. 
3. Those who have served in the army as well as all 
other young men fit for military service shall belong un­
til old age to the reserve army. 4. The reservists are in 
good form as a result of regular trainings in public or­
ganizations of citizens, while the leaders of the people's 
army act as initiators and organizers through the leading 
bodies of the army. 5. School children engage in regu-
lar Physical exercises in order to prepare for national 
defence. 
In 1923, the organizing of a four-month training 
gathering for the reservists who had not served in the 
army was discussed at the second session of the second 
convocation of the State Assembly. The problem itself 
was not significant concerning only 2,000 men, but in 
the course of the discussion more general matters came 
up again. The socialists once more suggested that a 
people s militia should be taken as a pattern for the 
army, while Jaan Tonisson29 asked the public why the 
principles of a people's army had not been put into prac­
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tice yet. He himself thought that the main reason was 
that there had been no public organization capable of 
doing that.30 We should agree with J. Tõnisson - the 
Defence League, a powerful mass organization during 
the War of Independence, which could have been a so­
lid basis for the people's army, was inefficient in the 
early 1920s. In some places there were small hunting 
clubs organizing target practice but not systematic mili­
tary training and quite often they served only as places 
of entertainment. 
In response to the fair criticism of the Defence Lea­
gue by the People's Party, A. Anderkopp, the labourite 
Minister of War, pointed out that the government was 
closely watching the activities of the Defence League, 
that the reorganization of the latter had already begun 
and the training was more intensive, and that military 
training as a compulsory subject was to be introduced 
into the curricula of senior classes.31 Thus, according to 
Minister of War's allegations, the state defence reform 
was due in compliance with the schemes of the People's 
Party and the Labour Party. 
The contents of the magazine "Sõdur" ("Soldier") 
of 1924 also attest to the Minister's words. Contrary to 
the previous years, there were lots of articles on the mi­
litia system in Western Europe, whereas particular atten­
tion was paid to the military training of reservists by 
public organizations after their regular service in the 
army.32 The same can be said about the materials pub­
lished in the newspaper "Ühendus" ("Union") in which 
the revival of the Defence League was criticized - the­
re was a danger that the Defence League could become 
the army of a definite political party and cause troub-
, 33 le. 
It is difficult to say how far the reforms could have 
gone if there had not been the bolshevist attempt at in­
surrection in Tallinn on December 1, 1924, as a result 
of which all the reforms stopped. On the one hand, the 
military used the imminent Soviet threat to emphasize 
once again the necessity of a developed state defence 
system and to warn against all kinds of experiments. On 
the other hand, a number of changes occurred in 1925 
- the Defence League was restored and it was more nu­
merous and organizationally stronger than earlier and un­
dertook to organize, in part, the military training of 
reservists. Some politicians regarded those reforms as the 
implementation of their scheme of a people's army. In 
actual fact, the principles of activity of the Defence Lea­
gue did not completely coincide with those of a public 
reserve army - first of all, the membership of the De­
fence League was not compulsory for everybody. 
In the middle of the 1920s, the organization prin­
ciples of the army were not a subject for debates any 
more. The military and the leading political parties app­
roved of the formed system - a standing cadre army 
with a short period of compulsory military service and 
the Defence League functioning as a public organization. 
In other aspects concerning the army, the discussion con­
tinued and the experience gained in the earlier debates 
was widely applied. 
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First Lessons of Governing 
the Republic of Estonia 
The Republic of Estonia that came into being in 
the tumult of revolutions and the War of Independence, 
at first lacked democratic political traditions as well as 
experience of democratic government. All this had to be 
acquired in the course of everyday practice. In this pla­
ce one of the numerous Cabinet crises in the first years 
of the republic, the crisis of summer 1920, is studied. 
Delving deeply into this problem might provide some 
insight for analysing the present and future political prob­
lems of our republic. 
The government of the Republic of Estonia ente­
red the year 1920 with the following members: prime 
minister J. Tõnisson, minister of foreign affairs A. Birk, 
minister of the interior A. Hellat, minister of finance J. 
Kukk, minister of commerce and industry N. Köstner 
(up to April, on April 17 the government assigned his 
tasks to the prime minister); T. Pool, minister of agri­
culture; K. Treffner, minister of education; E. Särk, mi­
nister of transport; A. Palvadre, minister of labour and 
welfare; J. Kriisa, minister of provision; J. Jaanson, mi­
nister of justice; A. Hanno, minister of war. 4 out of 
the 12 ministers were members of the Estonian People's 
Party, 3 were social democrats, 3 belonged to the La­
bour Party and 2 were independent. The government's 
support came from 80 members, i.e. two thirds of the 
Contituent Assembly. It was a coalition cabinet of the 
Assembly's leading parties. The same cabinet had lived 
through a crisis in November 1919, but the change of 
premiers (J. Tõnnison instead of O. Strandmann) mitiga­
ted political tensions at first. The People's Party had the 
thick end of the stick in the government. They held the 
portfolios of the prime minister, minister of foreign af­
fairs, minister of provision, minister of justice, and, sin­
ce April, also the minister of commerce and industry. 
Prime minister Tõnisson was the most experienced cabi­
net member in the field of political rivalries. At 52 years 
he was the oldest Cabinet Minister. The average age of 
the ministers was 39. 7 out of the 12 Cabinet Ministers 
had graduated from the Faculties of Law of the Univer­
sities ot Tartu or Petersburg, the rest had acquired tech­
nical or commercial education in Riga, Petersburg or 
Moscow. 
In the first half of the 1920s political struggle be­
tween parties did not noticeably show in the government's 
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activities. At the beginning of the year negotiations with 
Soviet Russia to conclude a peace treaty reached a de­
cisive stage. The question of Estonia's further destiny 
united ministers with different political standpoints. A rat­
her complicated economic situation and other problems 
also forced political rivalries into the background. The 
crisis broke out at the meeting of the Constituent As­
sembly on July 2, 1920, when social democrats an­
nounced the recall of their representatives from the 
Cabinet. A statement of the group of Estonian Social 
Democratic Worker's Party at the Constituent Assembly 
said: "Being a principled opponent of the capitalist sys­
tem, the Estonian Social Democratic Worker's Party can 
not take part in the government of a bourgeois state 
beyond extraordinary circumstances. Neither can it take 
responsibility for the government's policy as, even in the 
case of a most democratic regime, its essential features 
can not be anything else but bourgeois; this is the po­
licy of preserving and defending the capitalist system".1 
(Social democrats had had the greatest success in the 
elections of the Constituent Assembly: 33,3% of votes 
that guaranteed them 41 out of the 120 seats in the 
Constituent Assembly.) The declaration mentioned forced 
prime minister J. Tõnisson to make a statement at the 
end of the same meeting that the government was going 
to resign, although only 2 social democrats (A. Hellat 
and A. Palvadre) belonged to the cabinet at that mo­
ment. However, nobody could then foresee how deep 
and complicated the following Cabinet crisis was going 
to be. 
Why did the social democrats take such a step? 
Formally it was based on the decisions of international 
congresses of socialist parties that in principle condem­
ned the participation of socialists in bourgeois govern­
ments. Estonian socialists had up to this time been at 
the helm of the state together with bourgeois parties, but 
did not want to do it any more. Evidently the strategy 
and tactics of the Estonian Social Democratic Worker's 
Party are at the bottom of this event. Political "sins" du­
ring the War of Independence, especially the role of the 
minister of interior, social democrat A. Hellat in sanc­
tions against the 1st Trade Union Congress, had serious­
ly undermined the party s authority. The Estonian 
Communist Party that was gathering strength as well as 
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socialist revolutionaries2 made use of the opportunity to 
keep this and analogous stories a common topic in their 
agitation and propaganda against social democrats. E. 
Laaman, a public figure, journalist and historian, has la­
ter noted that in 1920 the social democrats left the go­
vernment namely under the pressure of communists." H. 
A. Lebbin, who has studied the history of Estonian so­
cial democracy, has noted the decrease of the number 
of socialists in 1920 in comparison with 1919 4 Mention 
should also be made of the fact that the right wing of 
Estonian political forces as alarmed that the "reds" in 
the shape of social democrats had come to power. Ta­
king into account all this, social democrats evidently 
found it a suitable moment to withdraw in order to con­
vince the other parties that it was impossible to govern 
the state without social democrats. Hence the opportuni­
ty to gather support and popularity at the coming elec­
tions to the State Assembly presented itself. In the course 
of elections to the Constituent Assembly in 1919 withd­
rawal from the government and the "opposition game" 
had also been successfully made use of." The moment 
to leave the government was not chosen by chance. It 
coincided with the case of 35 communists that created 
a sensation and that was followed by a political protest 
strike from June 30 to July 2. The Estonian Communist 
Party treated the matter in this way that namely the po­
litical strike forced social democrats out of the govern­
ment.6 
The step taken by the social democrats on July 2 
spoiled the mood of the Constituent Assembly members. 
The atmosphere in the state was strained anyway, now 
the Cabinet crisis was added. Besides, on the next day 
the Assembly had planned to go on its summer holiday. 
Negotiations between the parties to set up a new 
Cabinet were co-ordinated by A. Rei, a social democrat, 
chairman of the Constituent Assembly. As, for forming 
the new government, the social democrats were out of 
the question, it was necessary to make clear the posi­
tions of the Labour Party and the People's Party, the 
two next biggest parties represented in the Constituent 
Assembly. The People's Party nominated J. Tõnisson to 
the post of prime minister after only a few days. But 
then hesitations arose. It came out that his candidacy 
was generally not very highly appreciated and the idea 
to nominate the former minister of foreign affairs A. 
Birk started to gain favour in the party's leading circ­
les. On July 7 the People's Party made an official sta­
tement that it would support J. Tonisson's candidacy. 
The Labour Party answered the decision of People's 
Party with loud protest - anybody but Tõnisson. On July 
9 one of the leading figures of the Labour Party, edi­
tor-in-chief of "Vaba maa" (Free Land) A. Anderkopp 
published a major article "Jaan Tonisson's System" in 
"Vaba Maa" to "unsaddle" Tõnisson completely. He bla­
med Tõnisson as the former head of the government. In 
sum his accusations concerned the following points: 1) 
Due to J. Tonisson's inactivity the government has not 
made use of the economic opportunities that offered 
themselves as a result of the Tartu Peace Treaty with 
Soviet Russia. The Tõnisson government had in this res­
pect "missed all the opportunities, the country's econo­
my had suffered a severe unrepairable blow as a result 
of hesitation and incomprehensible delay; 2) The Tõnis­
son government has beyond measure prolonged the dra­
wing up of regulations necessary for the agrarian reform. 
The Land Bank that was to give support to new land­
owners has not been created yet; 3) Military reform has 
remained unrealized. The expenditures of the Ministry of 
War are enormous and it does not report to the Cons­
tituent Assembly; 4) There reigns inadmissible luxury in 
Estonia's foreign missions. "According to our informa­
tion some of our embassies live in such lordly clover 
that other small states even can not imagine"; 5) Eco­
nomic policy is hanging fire, it develops" without any 
course, there does not exist any system". Final conclu­
sion - the Labour Party does not support J. Tonisson's 
candidacy because his activity would mean a way to 
gulf, decorated "with J. Tonisson's big talk and round 
gestures". 
J. Tõnisson certainly could not put up with the cri­
tics that befall him. First of all he sent an extremely 
long reply letter to A. Rei (chairman of the Constituent 
Assembly) where he justified his activities as premier 
and cautioned not to let the Labour Party to form a new 
cabinet. In public J. Tõnisson replied to A. Anderkop in 
"Postimees" (Courier). 
Mutual critics and self-justfications did not contri­
bute to the liquidation of crisis, but deepened the cont­
radictions between parties. A complicated political 
backdoor game started to develop. The split between la­
bourists and the People's Party forced A. Rei to consult 
also the minor parties of the Constituent Assembly on 
the question of the new cabinet. Among those only the 
Christian People's Party agreed to participate in making 
up the new cabinet (5 deputies in the Constituent As­
sembly) on the condition that the Law of Elementary 
Schools would been given a fixed place in the educa­
tional system. 7 
After exchanging thoughts with A. Anderkop and 
A. Rei J. Tõnisson made known that he would give up 
the forming of the new cabinet. The People's Party se­
riously considered whether to send its representatives to 
the next government at all, but then nominated A. Birk 
for the post of the premier. The Labour Party in its turn 
put up A. Piip, the London ambassador of the Repub­
lic of Estonia, and J. Kukk, the former minister of fi­
nance, as candidates. A. Rei made both parties a proposal 
to form a one-party cabinet, but neither of them wan­
ted to take the risk. In the second half of July General 
Laidoner8 as a neutral figure was asked to undertake the 
formation of the cabinet. He refused. Oppositionary for­
ces started to use the lasting cabinet crisis in their in­
terests. "Kaja" (Echo), newspaper of the Agrarian League, 
suddenly started to publish letters expressing the people's 
deep anxiety and dissatisfaction. "Päevaleht" (Daily) joi­
ned "Kaja", drawing the sad conclusion that "up to now 
all the governments have been only guests staying for 
the night in the government's house". That's why "con­
fidence in us, belief in our future is quickly declining 
here and abroad".9 
After numerous consultations that mainly remained 
unknown to the public, A. Birk expressed his opinion 
that he had in principal succeeded in forming the new 
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cabinet consisting of the representatives of the People's 
Party, the Labour Party, the Christian People's Party and 
the independent deputies of the Constituent Assembly. 7 
out of the 12 proposed cabinet ministers were members 
of the People's Party, 1 was a labourist, 1 a member of 
the Christian People's Party and 3 were independent. It 
seemed that public complaints and attacks by the press 
would help the new cabinet to come into office. On the 
other hand it was to be feared that the extremely sharp 
relationship between the Labour Party and the People's 
Party would bring to the labourists' attempts to reject 
the new cabinet at any price. That's how it really hap­
pened. 
The government had to take office in the afternoon 
of July 28, at the session of the Constituent Assembly. 
There were delicate matters on the agenda of this mee­
ting - interpellations of the Estonian Independent Socia­
list Workers' Party and their proposal to cease martial 
law, to stop carrying out death sentences, the Irboska 
bloodshed10, an application to hand members of the Cons­
tituent Assembly H. Kruus, J. Kärner and some others 
over to judical authorities. The meeting started at 5.30 
p.m. 79 members of the Constituent Assembly were pre­
sent. The opening formalities went quickly and easily. 
Anyhow, when the staff of the newly formed govern­
ment was being introduced, tensions arose at once. O. 
Strandmann demanded that before the Constituent As­
sembly started voting, the new cabinet should introduce 
its program and declarations; otherwise the Labour Par­
ty deputies would abstain from voting. This equalled a 
vote of censure to the government not yet formed, as 
generally the new government introduced its programme 
after taking office. Social democrats announced through 
K. Ast that they would abstain from voting. J. Piiskar, 
the representative of the Estonian Independent Socialist 
Worker's Party, announced that his party opposed to the 
new government. All these attitudes became known in 
about a quarter of an hour and did not look like any­
thing good for the voting procedure. The results of the 
voting were as follows: 18 deputies of the Constituent 
Assembly voted in favour of the new government (most 
of the People's Party members and Christian People's 
Party members), 3 deputies, representatives of Estonian 
Independent Socialist Worker's Party, voted against, and 
the rest of the deputies abstained from voting. In such 
a rather unpleasant situation, A. Birk managed to pos­
sess himself well. Having come to the rostrum, he an­
nounced that 18 votes in favour are of course more than 
3 against, but, taking into account the results, asked to 
make a pause. The 5-minute pause dragged on to 40 
minutes. After that the new Head of the State was gi­
ven the floor again. The essence of A. Birk's speech 
was summed up in one of his sentences: "We thank the 
Constituent Assembly for putting its trust in us that now 
absolves us from this high obligation".11 So the new ca­
binet resigned. A proposal came to make a 15-minute 
pause that this time dragged on to an hour. After the 
pause A. Birk and his government were again persua­
ded to take office. O. Strandmann even came out with 
a threat that in the case of refusal the Supreme Court 
can impeach A. Birk. In his reply A. Birk mentioned 
that as he knew "in Estonia the Law of Penal Servitu­
de is valid as to work in the forests, but now it also 
comes into force for governing the republic".12 After 
fruitless exchange of thoughts only one question - what 
else? - arose in the Constituent Assembly. It was pro­
posed that the former, J. Tõnisson government would 
continue, until the crisis became solved. But this was 
hindered by the legal aspect of the matter - A. Birk 
had to hand in his resignation to the Constituent As­
sembly in written form before, and it had to be official­
ly accepted. That's how the meeting of the Constituent 
Assembly ended. Another meeting was set for the next 
day. 
The meeting of July 23 started with reading aloud 
J. Tonisson's letter. In this letter he urged that the ques­
tion of power had to be solved immediately, because in 
the present situation even a few days without govern­
ment were dangerous to the state. The reason for J. 
Tonisson's anxiety was an actual threat of a general stri­
ke that ripened day by day and finally broke out on 
August 3. Feeling ill at ease the Assembly saw a dan­
ger to the further existence of the Republic of Estonia. 
About 8.30 p.m. the deputies voted in favour of the 
transition formula so that the old government could con­
tinue its work until the new one was formed. 
The A. Birk government was of the shortest dura­
tion in the whole history of the Republic of Estonia.The 
press of that time considered that it's duration had been 
only some twenty minutes - from voting to A. Birk's 
announcement that the government would not take offi­
ce. This is evidently not quite exact. Formally the A. 
Birk government was on power for about 27 hours, i.e. 
until the moment when the Constituent Assemly voted 
in favour of the transition formula. 
At the helm of the state again, J. Tõnisson took a 
decisive step to form the new government. Namely A. 
Rei had negotiated the question of new government with 
the Labour Party on July 29, before the meeting of the 
Constituent Assembly. The Labour Party did not want to 
go through fire for this as the social democrats had dec­
lared that they would rather support the People's Party 
than the labourists. The Labour Party opposed to the 
leader of the People's Party and the former premier J. 
Tõnisson, as they considered his policy "directly dange­
rous to Estonian statehood".11 Proceeding from this si­
tuation and feeling the silent support of social democrats, 
J. Tõnisson formed a People's Party government that was 
ratified on July 30. Among the 12 cabinet members 9 
belonged to the People's Party: prime minister J. Tõnis­
son, minister of foreign affairs A. Birk, minister of the 
interior K. Einbund, minister of commerce and industry 
O. Wirkhaus, minister of agriculture A. Kerem, minis­
ter of transport A. Bürger, minister of labour and wel­
fare A. Bachmann, minister of provision J. Kriisa, minister 
ol justice J. Jaakson. There were 3 independent mem­
bers of the cabinet: minister of finance T. Vares, minis­
ter of education F. Sauer and minister of war A. Tõnisson. 
The explanations of E. Laaman, head of the De­
partment of Information in the Ministry of Foreign Af­
faires to Estonian ambassadors in London and Stockholm 
about the establishment of the J. Tõnisson government 
and the liquidation of the cabinet crisis, are of great in-
Jüri Ant 54 KLEIO. Estonian Historical Journal 
terest.15 E. Laaman was of the opinion that an impor­
tant role in the failure of the A. Birk government was 
played by N. Kann, a christian democrat who was to 
become the minister of education. His candidacy strong­
ly irritated the Estonian Teachers' Union. The "Estonia 
Biographic Lexicon" characterizes N. Kann as a repre­
sentative of the moderate wing in Estonian education po­
licy. Taking into account the general positions of the 
Christian People's Party at that time, as well as several 
of N. Kann's sentiments, he can obviously be taken for 
a, to some extent, reactionary figure. By the way, later 
N. Kann moved from the Christian People's Party to the 
Agrarian League. In "Päevaleht" he quite clearly expres­
sed his opinion about the government and the govern­
ment members of that time. He wrote: "Our misfortune 
is caused by our young deputies who have mostly ac­
quired a Russian education, being sent to the Constituent 
Assembly by our people with little political experience. 
They have little or almost no proficiency in governing 
the state, but are now trying to arrange our life after 
prescriptions that they have read from foreign party prog­
rams". 
According to E. Laaman, as there were many teac­
hers among the supporters of the Labour Party, the par­
ty could not ignore their displeasure and protest. That 
is why O. Strandmann and K. Konik forced the cabinet 
crisis further, voting down the A. Birk government. E. 
Laaman commented on the solution of the crisis as fol­
lows: "It has to be said that this crisis made a rather 
stupid impression from every point, but the labourists 
cut the poorest figure by, first of all, trying to remove 
J. Tõnisson and then, having achieved this, could not 
stop, and helped him into office anew". 
The reaction of the public to what had happened 
in the Constituent Assembly was rather bitter. H. Raud­
sepp (Miili M allikas), member of the CA, reviewer and 
feuilletonist of "Vaba Maa", published a sarcastic artic­
le under the heading "A. Birk's benefit". He characteri­
zed the formation of the Birk government as a performance 
where "a great original farce of national power was 
played". The article ended with the words: "Let's hope 
that this first sight would not remain a last one, but will 
be repeated at the desire of the public with new players 
who also wish to show their abilities". 
H. Raudsepp was right. From May 8, 1919 to Oc­
tober 21, 1933 there were 21 governments altogether at 
the helm of state in Estonia. Cabinet crises lasted a to­
tal of 390 days.17 Learning to govern democratic Esto­
nia was not an easy job. 
References 
1 Records of the Constituent Assembly. Session 4, 1920. P. 
1340. 
2 In March 1920 the Estonian Socialist Revolutionary Party 
and the left-wing members who had seceded from the 
Estonian Social Democratic Worker's Party, founded a 
new party — Estonian Independent Socialist Workers' 
Party which was called Party of Independent Socialists 
in everyday speech. 
3 Laaman E. Erakonnad Eestis. Tartu, 1934. Lk. 36. 
4 Lebbin H.-A. Sotsiaaldemokratismi pankrot Eestis. Tallinn, 
1970. 
5 Graf M. Poliitilised Parteid Eestis 1917-1920. Tallinn, 
1982. Lk. 245. 
6 "Kommunist" (Communist). 1920. 5. juuli. 
7 "Vaba Maa" (Free Land). 1920. 8. juuli. 
8 Johannes Laidoner (1884-1953) — Commander-in-chief in 
the Estonian War of Independence. Therefore he was a 
popular public figure. 
9 "Päevaleht" (Daily). 1920. 24. juuli. 
10 Bloodshed of Irboska — Deportation of more than a 
hundred bolshevist functionaries to Soviet Russia in 
September, 1919. 25 of them were executed near 
Irboska. 
11 Records of the Constituent Assembly. Session 4, 1920. 
P. 1405. 
12 A. Birk meant the general labour conscription in the 
woods that was enforced in the winter of 1919/20. 
13 "Vaba Maa". 1920. 3. august. 
14 In fact O. Wirkhaus did not start to fulfill the duties of 
minister as he went on convalescence vacation on 
August 7. 
15 Estonian State Archives (=ESA), Stock 957, Series 1, 
Item 77, p. 42. 
16 "Vaba Maa". 1920. 31. juuli. 
17 Mägi A. Das Staatsleben Estlands während seiner Selbs­
tändigkeit I. Das Regierungssystem. Stockholm, 1967. 
S. 322-324. 
KLEIO. Estonian Historical Journal 55 Piia Jullinen 
The War Debt of the Republic of Estonia to 
the United States of America 
Europe became a debtor to the USA in the cour­
se of World War I; between April 1917 and the midd­
le of 1920, the USA had credited the Allies with 9.5 
thousand million dollars. 
There was much talk about the war debt at the Pa­
ris peace conference and before it. Attempts made by 
England and France to cancel the debt in full or in part 
were resolutely opposed by President W. Wilson's eco­
nomic experts. The USA did not agree to guarantee the 
debt with German reparations either. It was only at the 
end of 1919 that the USA government assented to pro­
long the time of payment of interest on war debts. 
Like in other countries, the development of Esto­
nian economy was retarded by the war debts. 
According to the official data, Estonia's war debts 
at the end of the war were as follows: 
USA - USD 14,006,463.88 
England - GBP 1,350,546 
France - FRF 13,145,304 
Denmark - DKK 634,720 
Finland - FIM 20,000,000. 
The debt to Finland had been repaid by 1921, to 
France - by 1926, but Estonia was not able to repay its 
debts to the USA and England. 
On February 1, 1923, the debt to England was fun­
ded to the USA and the debt was to be repaid in the 
course of 62 years. 
In December 1924, the war debts and interest of 
the European countries totalled 12 thousand million dol­
lars. By that time funding agreements had been conclu­
ded with England, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania and Poland. 
Thus 42 per cent of the debt was regulated. In his speech 
to the Congress in December 1924, President C. Coo-
lidge pointed out that the discharge of war debts was 
not only an economic, but also a moral obligation and 
that, despite a variety of funding bases, all the states 
were bound to carry out their financial obligations to 
the USA. Though France expressed a strong protest and 
presented several demarches, it concluded an agreement 
under which the total sum to be paid exceeded the ori­
ginal debt by one-third of the sum. The National As­
sembly, however, did not ratify that agreement. 
The war debts were under discussion in Estonia as 
well. On December 6, 1921, Finance Minister G. Wes-
tel informed the State Assembly of the USA Senate's 
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decision not to cancel the war debts of European count­
ries, but only to prolong the time of their payment. 
In January 1922, in the memorandum of the Re­
public of Estonia on USA debts it was announced that 
by January 1 the debt had grown to USD 15,876,755.71 
by virtue of unpaid interest. It was also pointed out that 
despite the fact that there were three possible dates of 
debt settlement - June 30, 1922, June 30, 1923 and June 
30, 1924 - it would be difficult even during a longer 
period of time, in particular because of the war debts 
to other states as well. Since Estonia did not possess 
any particular national wealth, the rate of taxation would 
be too high in case Estonia repaid the debt on those 
terms. The consolidation of the debt for at least 30 years 
at an interest rate of below 5 per cent was considered 
the only possible solution, though an onerous one. 
It was necessary to cut the state budget because of 
the foreign debt. Only the Foreign Ministry's budget was 
reduced by 25,526,900 marks by the State Assembly on 
March 24, 1922. 
The fact that England set its debt to the USA at 
the beginning of 1923 indicated to the Estonian govern­
ment that the USA was not going to cancel the war 
debts and that the terms of payment would be unfavou­
rable. In its explanatory letter to the 1924 budget bill 
the Government stated that "debts both to the USA go­
vernment and to the Relief Administration are a severe 
burden on us because interest alone which constitutes a 
relatively big sum /.../ is added every six months to the 
sum owed". The indebtedness continued to grow. 
The first concrete steps to conclude an agreement 
on the debt settlement were made by Ants Piip, the en­
voy accredited to the USA in November 1923. Negotia­
tions with the Foreign Debt Commission of the USA 
began in January 1924. 
According to the report on Estonia's foreign debt, 
drawn up by the loans department of the treasury of the 
Ministry of Finance, Estonia's debt to the USA, inclu­
ding unpaid interest, had grown to USD 18,370,704.81 
(6,833,902,189.32 EMK). Estonia had paid neither debt 
nor interest and the Foreign Minister K. R. Pusta poin­
ted out that the sum finally stipulated was unknown. 
Official negotiations for the debt settlement between 
A. Piip and A. Mellon, USA Secretary of the Treasury, 
began in May 1925. The USA rejected the idea of hol-
ding a general conference and preferred to make agree­
ments with its partners separately in order to dictate 
different terms of payment to different countries. 
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The USA made a proposal to the Estonian govern­
ment to conclude an agreement on funding the debt ana­
logous to the USA-Polish debt settlement agreement. 
According to that agreement, the debt would have to be 
paid during 62 years. 
A. Piip and A. Mellon signed the debt settlement 
agreement in Washington on October 28, 1925. That was 
Estonia's last unsettled debt. The negotiations lasted two 
years and Finally the principal sum was fixed at USD 
13,830,000 on December 15, 1922. 
The debt of the Republic of Estonia to the United 
States of America consisted of three parts: 1) In the 
years 1919-1920, the government of the Republic of Es­
tonia received through the Revalis corporation military 
equipment (estimated finally at USD 2,213,378) from the 
USA expedition corps depots in France before their liq­
uidation. 2) The Food Ministry bought from the Ameri­
can Relief Administration (ARA) grain on credit for USD 
2,714,600. The term of payment was June 30, 1920 and 
the annual interest rate until the final payment was 5 
per cent. A large part of the debt was cancelled and the 
final sum was fixed at USD 1,785,768. 3) The debt to 
the Danish branch of the American Relief Administra­
tion (seed corn) amounted to DKK 634,720. The Repub­
lic of Estonia repaid DKK 308,680 in August 1919 and 
at the beginning of 1920. The rest of the debt as well 
as the interest were paid to Denmark by the ARA Da­
nish branch by May 1920 and the sum was added to 
the total debt of Estonia. 
In the agreement the value of goods on board the 
wrecked steamship "J. Russ" was deducted from the debt 
(USD 1,932,923.45). On concluding the agreement a sum 
of USD 1,441.88 was repaid and the remaining sum of 
USD 13,830,000 was to be repaid in the course of 62 
years, i. e. by the year 1984. Interest on the bonds was 
to be paid every 6 months (on June 15 and December 
15) at an annual interest rate of 3 per cent during the 
first ten years and 3.5 per cent in the later years. 
The agreement between the Republic of Estonia and 
the USA on debt settlement was ratified by the State 
Assembly on March 26, 1926 and it came into force in 
the USA on April 30 and in Estonia on May 2, 1926. 
Although the terms for cancelling debts were rat­
her similar in the cases of different countries, the sums 
to be cancelled varied to a considerable extent. Despite 
the initial proposal made by the USA, the debt settle­
ment agreement was not concluded analogous to the 1923 
USA-Polish agreement which stipulated that Poland could 
pay its 3 per cent annual interest during 15 years. 
Estonia's funded debt constituted 90 per cent of the ori­
ginal debt, while the respective percentage in case of 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland and England was 82, 
Czechoslovakia - 81, Hungary - 80, Belgium - 54, Fran­
ce - 50, Yugoslavia - 32 and Italy - 26. It is evident 
that the most unfavourable funding terms were set for 
England and those European small countries which po­
litically leaned towards England. In that way the USA 
attempted to hinder England trom using European small 
states as a compensation for the loss of its positions in 
Latin American countries. 
Latvia, having equal repayment conditions with Es­
tonia, was obliged to pay USD 5,775,000, Lithuania owed 
to the USA a total of USD 5,041,627. 
The magazine "Eesti Majandus" ("Estonian Econo­
my") gave quite an objective survey of the factors un­
derlying the conclusion of the debt agreement: "The 
American tariff policy hinders the import of European 
goods and, although demanding the payment of the debt, 
America does not give Europe any possibility of settling 
its debt. This situation will lead to the immediate de­
pendence of European countries on the USA both eco­
nomically and financially." It was also pointed out that 
by giving those loans the USA had made a good "bar­
gain" since the loans were given in goods that the USA 
was unable to sell in Europe anyhow. A year and a half 
later, however, the price of the same goods was twofold 
to fourfold lower. 
Less favourable payment terms for the Baltic sta­
tes were motivated in the USA Senate by the solvency 
of Estonia and the other Baltic states which was proven 
using incorrect data on the population and the economic 
situation of the Baltic states. Estonian statesmen them­
selves were also eager to draw a more favourable pic­
ture of Estonia's economic situation. "Christian Science 
Monitor" (February 24, 1925) carried an excerpt from 
the Estonian Finance Minister's speech to the State As­
sembly in which it was stated that the budget was ba­
lanced and the foreign debt per one inhabitant was 
relatively small in comparison with Finland, France or 
Italy. 
The first part of Estonia's debt to the USA (USD 
50,000) was repaid on time, on June 15, 1926. It was 
transferred through the New York Federal Reserve Bank 
to the USA government's account. According to the ag­
reement, the annual payment was USD 560,000 in the 
first decade and USD 635,000 in the later years. In case 
of necessity the USA government was ready to lower 
the sum to be paid in the first five years. The fact that 
Estonia repaid part of its debt was regarded in the USA 
as an indication of its successful economic policy and 
it was considered that Estonia had recovered its favou­
rable trade balance. 
On October 18, 1926, the Estonian Embassy in 
Washington paid USD 13,830,000 to the USA Finance 
Minister in bonds of the government of the Republic of 
Estonia. 
During the great depression that began in 1929 Es­
tonia could not pay its annuities to the USA any more. 
The 1925 agreement provided definite preferential terms 
of payment before the end of 1930. During that period 
Estonia managed to repay USD 1,000,000. The interest 
for that period was funded on November 18, 1931. By 
that time the debt had grown to USD 16,466,012.82. 
When the preferential period expired, Estonia, like other 
European countries, applied for a moratorium on war 
debts. As early as in October 1930, serious doubts were 
voiced by the State Assembly that Estonia could repay 
the necessary sum on June 15, 1931 owing to its fiscal 
difficulties. In August 1930, A. Piip suggested that the 
Minister of Finance should apply for an extension of 
two years for preferential payment since the clauses ot 
the contract allowed for that kind of interpretation. On 
November 3, 1930, Viktor Mutt, the Estonian consul in 
New York, informed the Estonian government that the 
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USA Ministry of Finance did not consider the preferen­
tial payment of interest acceptable. It was emphasized in 
the September 1930 report of the consulate on the USA 
economic situation that there was a great demand for 
the bonds in the USA and that their prices had risen. 
Therefore, Estonia could not make use of USA bonds 
in repaying the war debts. 
On July 5, 1931, the Foreign Ministry of the Re­
public of Estonia received through Riga President H. C. 
Hoover's June 20 message on prolonging the time of 
payment of intergovernmental reparation and assistance 
debts by one year (July 1, 1931 - July 1, 1932). In con­
nection with Hoover's moratorium, the British Foreign 
Office annouced the British government's decision to dec­
lare a one-year moratorium on the debts of Poland, Rou-
mania, Yugoslavia, Estonia and Latvia. Thus, the payment 
of over 3.5 million kroons was suspended for a year. 
In the spring of 1932, negotiations about the un­
paid sums during the period of Hoover's moratorium 
were conducted between the governments of the USA 
and England and the European debtor-states. Estonia made 
a proposal to the USA government that the unpaid sum 
be equally divided to all the remaining years at an an­
nual rate of interest of 3.5 per cent. The proposal was 
rejected and, under the terms of the special agreement 
between Estonia and the USA on June 11, 1932, Esto­
nia was to repay its debt during 10 years beginning with 
July 1, 1933 at an annual rate of interest of 4 per cent. 
A sum of USD 600,373.06 was not paid during Hoover's 
moratorium. 
On September 2, 1932, the government of the Re­
public of Estonia applied for prolonging the time of the 
payment of the debt by two years as well as the pay­
ment of interest. In December 1932, USA Secretary of 
the Treasury Mills announced that a two-year extension 
of the debt payment could be granted to Estonia, Lat­
via, Poland and other countries, but President F. D. Roo­
sevelt did not give his consent to that and the time of 
payment was not prolonged. It was promised that the 
debt settlement problems would be discussed separately 
with all those countries. 
On December 10, 1932, the Foreign Ministry of 
the Republic of Estonia sent a note to the USA govern­
ment on prolonging the payment time of the original 
debt (USD 110,000). On December 13 the government 
decided not to pay the interest amounting to USD 245,370 
to the USA on December 15. Estonia followed the examp­
le of France who had stopped repaying its debt. Latvia 
sent an analogous note. The USA gave a negative ans­
wer to both of the notes. Latvia, however, decided to 
pay the sum due on December 15 and here is what the 
newspaper "Päevaleht" ("Daily") wrote about it: "/.../ the 
government should be free to decide whether it is more 
disadvantageous to lose the above-given sum than to re­
sist the political and economic pressure from the USA". 
The Ministry of Economics motivated the prolonging of 
the time of payment with a sharp decline in Estonia's 
loreign trade turnover caused by a decrease in interna­
tional trade resulting from the great depression of the 
1930s. 
On December 15, 1932, Foreign Minister A. Rei 
delivered another note to H. Carlson, USA charge d'affaires 
in Estonia, but received no reply. 
England, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Latvia and 
Lithuania paid their sums due in time, while France, 
Belgium, Poland, Hungary and Estonia did not. By Ja­
nuary 1, 1933, Estonia's debt to the USA had grown to 
USD 17,203,743.06, the sum constituting nearly half of 
the total foreign debt of Estonia. Nevertheless, according 
to the calculations by Estonia economists, the actual va­
lue had dropped from USD 13,831,441 to USD 6,601,706 
owing to a fall in market prices. 
On March 17, 1933, the Estonian Foreign Minister 
A. Piip informed the USA charge d'affaires that Esto­
nia was not able to pay the sum due in the summer 
1933 since Estonia's economic situation had not impro­
ved during the depression. In June, the USA responded 
to that statement with a note to France, Yugoslavia and 
Estonia pointing out that the above-given states had not 
paid their sums due on June 15. 
On November 29, 1933, Estonian consul K. Kuu­
sik delivered the Estonian Foreign Minister's November 
16 note to the USA Secretary of State stating that owing 
to its economic and financial difficulties Estonia would 
again not be able to pay the necessary sum. 
Estonia did not repay its debt to the USA. During 
the period studied in the present paper a total sum of 
only USD 1,001,441.88 was transferred and that inclu­
ded USD 1,441.88 paid when the agreement was conc­
luded. By April 1, 1934, Estonia's debt to the USA had 
grown to USD 17,787,280. The other debtor-states (with 
the exception of Finland) did not pay their debts to the 
USA either. A total of 2.7 thousand million dollars had 
been repaid to the USA by the year 1933, i. e. the time 
when repayment actually stopped. 
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Estonian Seamen in the Belgian Congo in 
the 1920s 
Although relatively little light has been shed on the 
relations of Estonia and Estonians with Asian and Afri­
can countries, it does not mean that those relations did 
not exist. The present article attempts to fill this gap. 
We have chosen this theme because the number of 
Estonians in the Belgian Congo in the 1920s was the 
third biggest in Asian and African countries - Estonians 
were more numerous only in China {ça 200-300) and in 
Turkey (ca 150-200 in the 1920s, later 50-60). 
The migration of Estonians to the Belgian Congo 
should be viewed against the background of the general 
economic and political situation in the Republic of Es­
tonia which brought about rather extensive emigration. 
The emigration took place in waves, a considerable inc­
rease began in 1924 and the peak - 2,676 people - was 
reached in 1925. From 1930, the number of emigrants 
began to decline. Although information about the count­
ries of emigration was collected at that time, it often 
turned out to be unreliable. It was quite common that 
when submitting his application for travelling abroad, the 
person himself did not know in which country he would 
stay and, therefore, did not indicate any country or wro­
te "to all the countries". Moreover, the number of pass­
ports issued and the number of emigrants do not always 
coincide because in some cases one passport was issued 
for several people. 
Seamen were quite numerous among the emigrants 
because their chances on the labour market in Estonia 
were rather poor. A sharp rise in maritime trade after 
World War I did not last long and, as early as in 1921, 
a number of cargo ships were without work and, at ti­
mes, even 90 per cent of the Estonian merchant marine 
did not go to sea. Estonian seamen were out of work 
in the later years as well. Thus, for example, in the year 
1926/1927, the private corporation "Meremeeste Kodu" 
(Seamen's Home) registered 510 seamen seeking work. 
The majority of unemployed seamen, however, did not 
place their hopes on the corporation but tried individual­
ly to make an agreement with captains in the harbour. 
When the great depression began in 1929, the number 
of unemployed seamen grew even more. In the summer 
of 1931, 2,370 seamen were in the employ of the Es­
tonian merchant marine, a year later their number was 
only 1,345, while the number of seamen in Estonia to­
talled 6,500-7,000 in the early 1930s. In the later years, 
unemployment among seamen decreased to some extent. 
Toivo Jullinen 
Since seamen were not able to find work in Esto­
nia, they started to look elsewhere. Moreover, wages on 
Estonian ships were two to three times lower than tho­
se on English, German or USA ships. Seamen's wages 
in the Scandinavian countries were higher as well. Es­
tonian seamen often went to the big ports of the Net­
herlands - Rotterdam, Antwerp, Gent and Oostende. That 
growing tendency was not ignored and it was pointed 
out by the State Assembly on October 27, 1927 that in 
the Netherlands "people board ships and then disappear 
without leaving a trace". Several of them went to the 
Belgian Congo. 
Estonians migrated to the Belgian Congo mainly in 
the early 1920s and the peak years were 1924 and 1925, 
while, in later years, only a few Estonians went there. 
According to the immigration regulations in force 
in the 1920s, it was possible to immigrate into the Bel­
gian Congo only via Belgium and it was comparatively 
easy to move there in those years. The migration laws 
of the Belgian Congo were based on the ordinance of 
March 8, 1922. In order to get an entry permit to the 
country one had to conclude a labour contract in Bel­
gium with an employer of repute in the Congo for a 
term of at least six months and then the employer app­
lied for an entry for the employee at the Belgian Colo­
nial Ministry. Proficiency in the French language was 
also required. The travelling expenses were paid by the 
employer. There were lots of foreign seamen in Belgium 
before the 1929-1933 economic depression because local 
seamen failed to man all the Belgian ships. Estonian 
seamen were fairly numerous in the Belgian ports, par­
ticularly in Antwerp, the largest port of the country. Ac­
cording to the information reaching Estonia at the end 
of 1926, over 200 seamen seeking work were perma­
nently staying in Antwerp. Only a few of them succee­
ded in getting a job. Some of them even had to stay 
overnight in piles of boards or to beg food from ships 
in the harbour. Nevertheless, Damasius Treude, Estonian 
vice-consul in Antwerp, regarded the port of Antwerp as 
a major labour exchange for seamen in Western Euro­
pe. Special bureaus in Belgium were hiring seamen to 
work in the Congo and it is most likely that they ren­
dered assistance to Estonian seamen as well. 
The working and living conditions in the Belgian 
Congo, mainly from the point of view of emigration, 
were described in the Estonian press. The newspapers 
"Päevaleht" (Daily) and "Vaba Maa" (Free Land) carried 
articles based on the letters of seamen working in the 
Belgian Congo, giving a very promising picture of life 
there. Emigration was considered better than being unemp­
loyed in one's native country. 
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In 1926, Ch. Aertssens, honorary consul of the Re­
public of Estonia in Antwerp, sent the Foreign Ministry 
a report on the conditions and prospects in the Belgian 
Congo and his article "The Belgian Congo - a Land of 
the Future" published in the newspaper "Päevaleht" (Ap­
ril 25, 1926) dealt with the same issues. Ch. Aertssens 
wrote that lots of Estonians worked, mainly as captains 
and ship's engineers, on river boats in the Congo. He 
thought that more Estonians could find work in the Con­
go as captains, ship's engineers or even as doctors and 
described the good living conditions and favourable wage 
conditions there. The article aroused interest and its aut­
hor received numerous letters from Tallinn, Pärnu, Vil­
jandi and other places in which people asked for more 
detailed information. 
The newspaper "Päevaleht" responded to Cr. 
Aertssens' writing with "Life in the Belgian Congo and 
its advantages. What kind of a "future country"?" based 
on the impressions of a seaman who considered life and 
the climatic conditions in the Congo unbearable for Euro­
peans. The author concluded that "the Congo is not a 
promised land for Estonians since nobody is ready to 
sacrifice his life for money". 
It is most likely that Estonians displayed lively in­
terest in the Congo because the Belgian consulate in Tal­
linn published an announcement in the newspaper "Vaba 
Maa" on September 11, 1927 that its responsibilities did 
not include organizing emigration to Belgian colonies. In 
addition, people were warned against illusions and infor­
med that, on hiring workers, preference was given to 
Belgians, that proficiency in the French language was 
required and that only applicants under 35 years of age 
were eligible. In the late 1920s, the first Estonians wor­
king in the Belgian Congo were home on holiday. Ac­
tual experience had changed their views and a number 
of newspaper articles refer to poor living conditions in 
the Congo as well as to difficulties encountered by emig­
rants there. People were warned against concluding la­
bour contracts with unknown employers or under the 
terms that did not stipulate the employer's contractual 
obligations. In those years, it took up to one year to 
get work in the Congo. 
Most of the Estonian seamen working in the Con­
go were ship's engineers (A. Akatus, A. Elb, A. Kesk, 
R. Beilberg, J. Snamensky, J. Tauben, L. Oltov, N. Tut­
ti, E. Vakkermann and J. Suurmann) whose chance of 
finding work in Estonia had considerably decreased in 
the early 1920s. Besides them, captains K. Luks, A. Or-
pus and V. Filimonov and M. Viitorg, a ship's carpen­
ter, and G. Laubach, a locksmith-motor mechanic, found 
work in the Congo as well. 
Most of the Estonians in the Congo had got ac­
quainted already during their studies at a school of ship's 
engineers, some of them had served in the army toget­
her. 
The number of Europeans in the Congo in the 
1920s was relatively small, though a continuous growth 
tendency could be observed and, in 1931, there were as 
many as 25,000 Europeans there. Of the total number 
of Europeans, Belgians accounted for 50-60 per cent. 
The number of Estonians is comparable with that of Da­
nes, Norwegians and Finns (in 1926, 28, 29 and 11 res­
pectively). The maximum number of Estonians staying 
in the Congo at the same time was around a dozen, 
while the total number was about 30. Nevertheless, the 
local press mentioned Estonians among other nationali­
ties working in the Belgian Congo. 
The tact that so many foreign ship's engineers had 
to be hired to work in the Belgian Congo could be exp­
lained by the peculiarities of the transportation system 
of the country. The development of river transport was 
comparatively cheap because the abundance of water and 
the basin of the Congo River is the second largest in 
the world after the Amazon. According to the informa­
tion provided by the colonial authorities, 12,000 km of 
the total length of the 23,000 km of the Congo basin 
was navigable. Steamboats, often towing barges, were 
mainly used on the rivers flowing through the jungle. 
First steamboats were used on inland waters in the Con­
go as early as in the 1890s. There was a great lack of 
local seamen in the Belgian merchant marine, but the 
shortage was particularly acute in colonies. Since wages 
were too low, colonial companies could not hire expe­
rienced seamen from other ships, but only those who 
were out of work. Therefore, Estonians were hired among 
others, though only if they had a proper diploma. The 
language requirement was not very strictly observed eit­
her and the German language was also considered ac­
ceptable. In order to get used to local conditions, seamen 
had to work as locksmiths (with an engineers salary) for 
6 months before they could begin their work on ships. 
As Estonian seamen were held in high esteem in 
the Congo, they worked in the regions where bigger 
ships ot over 500 tons displacement could be used. Cap­
tain V. Filimonov even set a local record when he sai­
led his ship on the Ubang River for 17 days running. 
Despite positive attitude and decent wages (up to 500 
kroons a month), working in the Belgian Congo was 
considered hard. A European, who had spent several 
years in the Congo, described a boatman's life there as 
a real hell consisting of "slow sailing, estuaries full of 
dangerous shoals, yellow fever, streams, the tides, slimy 
depths . There were neither leading lights nor buoys, the 
maps were inaccurate. As a result of the unhealthy cli­
mate, people from northern lands suffered from a num­
ber of diseases, including malaria. A daily dosage of 16 
grams of quinine taken against malaria impaired hearing 
and eyesight. Yellow fever, sleeping sickness, dysentery 
and leprosy occurred as well. 
R. Beilberg, N. Tutti and Sikk had to terminate 
their contracts before the term was completed because 
of unbearable working conditions. Captain K. Luks had 
a minor labour dispute and he was transferred to anot­
her job in the same company. 
V. Filimonov had a more serious labour dispute. In 
1926, while spending his holiday in Europe, he had conc­
luded a new labour contract. Having spent all his 
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vings on buying equipment, V. Filimonov returned to the 
Congo in December. He set to work on January 10, 
1927, but eleven days later the managing director of the 
company informed him of the rescission of his contract. 
V. Filimonov took legal proceedings against the compa­
ny in the local court of law. V. Filimonov's well-groun­
ded argumentation in court made the company agree to 
a compromise. Filimonov, in the hope of getting com­
pensation for the damage suffered, rejected the proposal 
and appealed to a higher court in Brussels. In August 
1927, Filimonov arrived at Antwerp and contacted a num­
ber of government offices during a month. In Septem­
ber he was received by Ambassador K. R. Pusta in the 
Estonian consulate in Brussels. Leon Moreau, Estonian 
honorary consul general in Brussels, and C. Aertssens, 
honorary consul in Antwerp, also participated. Filimonov 
informed Pusta of the course of events and learnt that 
L. Moreau had found a job for him on a state-owned 
ship at Borne. The discontinuance of the lawsuit was set 
as the precondition for the job. On the following day 
Pusta discussed Filimonov's case with Emile Vandervel-
de, Belgian Foreign Minister, and the latter, in his turn, 
informed the Colonial Ministry of the issue. On the same 
day, L. Moreau and a lawyer went to the Colonial Mi­
nistry as well. V. Filimonov returned to the Congo in 
February 1928. His case was to be considered by the 
Brussels court. The long-time exhausting work in the 
Congo and the nerve-racking litigation had ruined 
Filimonov's health and he died in Coquilhattville in June 
1928. His wife continued the case in court and finally 
won. 
Estonians in the Belgian Congo did not have their 
own organization. There had been attempts to establish 
an Estonian society, but the colonial authorities had re­
fused to register it. Nevertheless, Estonians kept in touch 
with one another. There were few possibilities to spend 
their scarce spare time or, as they themselves put it, 
"For Europeans life in the Congo is dull and monoto­
nous /.../ Otherwise cheerful people, they become "ho­
mesick and sad" here /.../ The only places of entertainment 
are the restaurant and the hotel". We know that H. Ka­
ti ak and J. Suurmann occasionally went fishing on the 
Congo River and hunting in tropical forests. Estonians 
also took an interest in local life and culture and found 
that the Africans lived under severe colonial oppression, 
had to be content with lower wages and poorer working 
conditions than the Europeans working there and were 
not allowed to live in the same districts with the latter. 
There were only weak ties with Estonia and, in 
most cases, on the initiative of seamen working abroad. 
A. Akatus, H. Kadak and J. Tauben sent news items to 
Estonian newspapers and Estonian newspapers reached 
the Congo as well. Filimonov also gave some informa­
tion. A. Akatus, R. Beilberg, J. Tauben and N. Tutti 
spent their holidays in Estonia at the beginning of 1928. 
In the summer of 1928, H. Kadak and J. Suurmann, 
who were spending their holidays in Europe, came to 
Estonia to participate in the IX Song Festival and in the 
day of Estonians living abroad organized by the Fenno-
Ugria society. The fact that Estonian official circles knew 
so little about our seamen in the Congo can be explai­
ned by the competition among seamen, which was par­
ticularly stiff in the late 1920s, as well as by weak 
contacts in general with those seamen who were "far 
from Estonia due to circumstances". Captains V. Filimo­
nov, K. Luks, A. Orpus and J. Snamensky were not 
members of the Estonian Masters' Society and only a 
few ship's engineers working in the Congo belonged to 
the Union of Estonian Merchant Marine Engineers. Alt­
hough A. Akatus, J. Tauben and J. Suurmann had paid 
their membership fees to "Meremeeste Kodu" ("The 
Seamen's Home") regularly in the years 1925-1927, the 
Register of Estonian citizens employed on foreign ships, 
compiled by the union in 1927-1928, did not include 
their names. 
The 1929-1933 world economic depression was ac­
companied by a number of new arrangements. The Bel­
gian authorities started to limit the presence of foreigners 
in the country. The Estonian Seamen's Home was clo­
sed. When hiring seamen, preference was given to Bel­
gians. All those restrictions were imposed in Belgian 
colonies in Africa as well and the corresponding amend­
ments to the immigration regulations were made. The 
colonial authorities did not allow the hiring of extra wor­
kers any more. The committee on colonies of the Bel­
gian Parliament discussed the issue in May 1930 and 
decided to send a special delegation to the Congo. The 
colony of Estonian seamen in the Congo became less 
numerous as their labour contracts were not renewed and 
most of them returned to Estonia. Captain A. Orpus ma­
naged to find a job in Belgium. Several Estonians went 
to South Africa and Sikk, a ship's engineer, settled in 
Australia. Captain K. Luks quit his job and bought 100 
hectares of land at Lake Tanganyika and cultivated to­
bacco, maize and coffee on his plantation there. 
The Estonian merchant marine was affected by the 
economic depression as well and lots of ships were out 
of work and the shipping charges fell. Nevertheless, the 
number of ships of the Estonian merchant marine inc­
reased because cheap steamships were bought from Euro­
pe. After the depression, however, the maritime trade 
became lively again as raw materials were stored becau­
se of the imminent danger of war. There was a tempo­
rary shortage of ship's engineers in the Estonian merchant 
marine and the Estonian seamen who returned from the 
Belgian Congo could find work. Some of them, howe­
ver, quit their jobs. But most of the former "Congole­
se" adapted themselves to the new circumstances rather 
quickly. 
In conclusion we would like to point out that the 
Belgian Congo has a peculiar role in the emigration of 
Estonians in search of work where a number of quali­
fied specialists (ship's engineers with diplomas) concent­
rated in one region. That was possible due to the 
differences in sea and river transport systems in Estonia 
and in the Congo. Nevertheless, the Congo could not 
become a popular country of emigration mainly due to 
its unfavourable climatic conditions and the Belgian im­
migration policy. Estonian seamen had to work there 
only because of unemployment in Europe. 
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Estonia and Japan: A Glimpse 
of the Past and Prospects for 
the Future 
Olaf-Mihkel Klaassen 
Estonian-Japanese contacts date back to the 19th 
century. The Russian sloop "Nadezhda", whose captain 
Adam Johann von Krusenstern1 came from a place near 
Tallinn, called at the port of Nagasaki from October 
1804 to April 1805. There were other men from Esto­
nia on board the sloop as well. Krusenstern's diary, near­
ly 200 copies of which were subscribed for in Estonia 
and Livonia2, was the first publication to acquaint the 
Estonian reader with Japan on the basis of the seaman's 
personal experience in that exotic country. Over half a 
century later, Jüri Jürisson from Western Estonia, serving 
as an officer on the Russian warship "Askold", had an 
opportunity to get a glimpse of Japan. His travel artic­
les were published by the newspaper "Eesti Postimees" 
(Estonian Courier) in the years 1867-18691 and gave Es­
tonians firsthand information about Japanese life and cus­
toms. 
Estonian seamen visited Japanese ports in the later 
years as well, but only a few of them published their 
rare travel impressions. Roman von Rosen from Tallinn, 
who was the Russian consul in Yokohama and the sec­
retary of the embassy and the envoy in Tokyo, stayed 
in Japan for a longer period of time - with intervals 
between 1872-1904. Emil Karl Gustav Albert Mattiesen 
from Tartu was a German language lecturer at Kyoto 
University in the years 1899-1906. Over 8, 000 Esto­
nians were drafted into the Russian army and fought in 
the Russian-Japanese war (1904-1905). A great number 
of later army commanders, doctors and diplomats of the 
Republic of Estonia familiarized themselves with the Ja­
panese art of warfare.4 
At the time when Estonia was incorporated into the 
Russian Empire the chances of Estonians to visit Japan 
were almost non-existent. Estonians were regarded as "in­
ferior" and did not enjoy full and equal rights of citi­
zens. Estonians lived under political as well as economic 
oppression, their chances to travel were scarce. The Bal­
tic Germans, who had been ruling Estonia for almost 
700 years, were in a privileged situation. Numerous well-
known Russian navigators, army commanders and poli­
ticians came from among the Baltic Germans. The Estonian 
national awakening in the 2nd half of the 19th century 
brought along a keen interest in far-away countries, Ja­
pan among them. During his studies in Leipzig, the lin­
guist Karl August Hermann got interested in the Japanese 
language and later (1895) expressed an idea that Esto­
nians and Japanese were linguistically distant kindred 
people.5 The writer Eduard Bornhöhe published a long 
article about Japanese history in the same year.6 In 1904, 
Jaan Karu, a translator and publicist, wrote a book en­
titled "About the Japanese people".7 
In 1918, the Estonians succeeded in restoring their 
independence that they had had in ancient times. That 
enabled relations with Japan to be established on a new 
basis of mutually beneficial contacts between two sove­
reign states. It is true that geographically the countries 
were far away from each other, their size was different 
and their priorities did not coincide in most cases. Ne­
vertheless, contacts developed at political, commercial 
and cultural levels. Already the first meetings of Ants 
Piip8, an Estonian representative in London, with Kuma-
taro Honda, a counsellor of the Japanese Embassy, on 
May 28 and 31, 1918 were very promising. Having ac­
cepted from A. Piip a memorandum on the situation in 
Estonia and a plea for recognizing the independence of 
Estonia, K. Honda expressed his confidence that the Ja­
panese government would receive Estonia's plea favou­
rably.9 
In that period it was of vital importance for Esto­
nia to gain international recognition of its independence. 
It would have been a warning both to the bolsheviks in 
power in Russia and to the Russian white guards who 
were attempting to preserve the Russian Empire. Recog­
nition enabled Estonia to maintain normal relations with 
other states, to get assistance and support from them in 
safeguarding its independence. Moreover, the Estonian 
people derived strong moral support from it. 
Nevertheless, Japan delayed recognizing Estonia. It 
was only on March 6, 1919 that the Japanese govern­
ment recognized the Estonian National Assembly as a 
de facto independent body.10 Two years later, on March 
8, 1921, Viscount Kikujiro Ishii informed the head of 
the state Kostantin Päts of Japan's de iure recognition 
of Estonia as well.11 By that time Estonia had already 
been recognized de iure by 10 states, among them all 
the Great Powers of Europe. 
The de facto recognition of Estonia in the spring 
of 1919 was associated with the circumstance that the 
Japanese government was planning to open its military-
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diplomatic legation in Estonia. This plan was carried out 
in the summer of 1919 when Captain Michitaro Komat-
subara and Masamoto Kitada from the Japanese Embas­
sy in Stockholm arrived in Estonia. By order of 
Commander-in-Chief Johan Laidoner they gained access 
to all the information they were interested in as well as 
to the front-line area.12 The Japanese legation resided in 
Estonia until the end of November 1922. 
Having received de facto recognition, Estonia star­
ted to consider opening its legation in Tokyo. In the 
autumn of 1919, the Finnish charge d'affaires Gustaf 
Yrjo Ramstedt, who had just been nominated to the post, 
agreed also to represent Estonia's interests in Japan. He 
received his credentials from the Estonian government 
and during a period of over 10 years he did quite a lot 
for the benefit of the Estonian state as well as Estonians 
living in Japan (10-15).13 
Parallel to establishing diplomatic contacts, trade be­
tween Estonia and Japan began as well. The official sta­
tistics do not provide detailed data for the period before 
1926. Nevertheless, there is some information that Esto-
Estonian trade with Japan in the years 1924-
1939 (beginning with 1926 for Estonian ex­
ports) According to the State Statistical 
Central Bureau.15 
Tons Thousand 
kroons 
Imports into Estonia 
from Japan 453 974.8 
Percentage from the total 
imports from Asia (%) 0.47 2.70 
Exports from Estonia to 
Japan 1270 169.7 
Percentage from the total 
exports to Asia (%) 2.75 1.59 
nia purchased rice from Japan in 1919 and exported pa­
per goods to Japan by 1923.14 Both Estonia's purcha­
sing power and Japan's need to buy Estonian goods 
determined the development of trade relations in the la­
ter years. 
Japan bought from Estonia mainly cellulose, paper 
and scrap iron. Estonia imported from Japan celluloid, 
foodstuffs, spices, chemicals, agar-agar and several other 
goods. Trade between Japan and Estonia reached a peak 
in the second half of the 1930s, partly owing to the tra­
de agreement concluded in 1934. 
The possibility of expanding trade with Japan was 
one of the reasons why the question of opening diplo­
matic legations, neglected in the meanwhile, arose again 
in the 1930s. Increasing international tension also acce­
lerated the process since firsthand information became 
more valuable. 
Estonia was a poor country and could not afford 
maintaining a permanent diplomatic legation in Tokyo. 
Therefore, an honorary consul had to be found. Accor­
ding to Estonia's consular policy16, preference was gi­
ven to local respectable businessmen of Estonian nationality 
whose economic interests were in harmony with the in­
terests of the Republic of Estonia. There was no infor­
mation about such people in Japan, but a suitable man 
lived in a small town of Dairen in Southern Manchuria 
that was in possession of Japan at that time. He was 
Alfred Ruthe, a businessman in export and import tra­
de, who came from Järva County in Estonia. After the 
Japanese government had given its consent, Alfred Rut-
he became the Estonian honorary consul in Dairen on 
September 1, 1934.17 His consular district was not spe­
cified in the decree of his appointment, but it is evident 
from other archival sources that the Japanese islands were 
included in it. In his practical work, however, he confi­
ned himself to Southern Manchuria. The Estonian Fo­
reign Ministry agreed to that, evidently on diplomatic 
considerations. In view of the international developments 
of the 2nd half of the 19th century, it was preferred to 
be modest. 
The Japanese government, however, had no need 
to take a modest course, Japan left the League of Na­
tions after the latter had disapproved of its policy in 
Manchuria and of the founding of the state of Manz-
houguo, and strove to develop bilateral relations with 
European countries. The Baltic countries, particularly Es­
tonia, acquired strategic importance for Japanese politi­
cians. Political developments in Estonia as well as its 
foreign policy were closely observed in Japan. By the 
spring of 1934, a scheme had been devised to open a 
Japanese diplomatic and counsular legation in Riga for 
all the three Baltic states. Then the search for the futu­
re honorary consul began. Voldemar Puhk, a wholesale 
dealer, proved to be a suitable person for the post of 
the honorary consul in Tallinn. Emperor Hirohito presen­
ted the consul's patent in the 2595 year of the acces­
sion to the throne of his legendary predecessor Jimmu 
(i.e., the official beginning of the Japanese imperial dy­
nasty) on the 6th day of the 9th month of the 10th year 
of the Showa era (i.e., on September 6, 1935).18 In the 
mid-1930s (1934-1937), 431 Japanese citizens19 visited 
Estonia and quite a large number of them needed the 
consul's help and advice. The existence of the consula­
te opened up bright prospects for the development of 
Estonian-Japanese relations in a number of fields. The 
honorary consulate terminated its activities after V. Puhk's 
unexpected death on May 3, 1937. A couple of weeks 
later (May 20), Shin Sakuma, Japanese Ambassador to 
Riga who was also accredited to Tallinn, presented his 
credentials to President K. Päts. In the summer of 1939, 
Shojiro Ohtaka was appointed instead of him.20 
The opening ot the Japanese diplomatic bureau in 
Tallinn on December 8, 1939 marked a qualitatively new 
stage in the diplomatic relations between Japan and Es­
tonia. Shigeru Shimada, head of the bureau, collected 
valuable information during the eight-month existence of 
the bureau. 
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Between the two world wars, Estonian-Japanese cul­
tural contacts were rare and were limited only to mate­
rials published in the press. Relations became more lively 
in 1935 when the Tartu Academic Oriental Society was 
set up: contacts with Japanese intellectuals were estab­
lished and the latter donated books to the Society, Pent 
Nurmekund, a young polyglot, read a paper on Japane-
22 
se scripts. 
World War II was crucial for Estonia as well as 
for Japan. As a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact 
(1939), Estonia was occupied and then annexed to the 
Soviet Union. The independent Republic of Estonia cea­
sed to exist for half a century and its people fell vic­
tim to genocide. Japan was defeated in war, had to 
capitulate and, for a short period of time (1945-1952), 
was occupied by the victorious states. Part of the Japa­
nese territory - the South Kurile Islands whose belon­
ging to Japan had already been confirmed by J. von 
Krusenstern - are still under foreign rule. 
The policy of the Soviet Union put an end to the 
Estonian-Japanese relations, but the interest of the Esto­
nians in Japan survived. Some Estonians were fortunate 
to visit Japan as tourists. In 1957, Assistant Professor 
Pent Nurmekund began to teach the Japanese language 
at Tartu University and taught it until he was forced to 
leave his post of the head of the Oriental Studies Ca­
binet in 1983. Young enthusiasts, whom he had taught, 
started to translate books of Japanese literature into Es­
tonian and to study Japanese culture. A course of lectu­
res on Japanese history was in the curriculum of history 
students. Professor Jaan Konks published a short survey 
of Japan in the Middle Ages.23 Contacts were established 
with those few Japanese whom the authorities allowed 
to visit Estonia. 
The restoration of Estonia's independence on August 
20, 1991 opened up new prospects for the Estonian-Ja­
panese relations as well. As early as on August 26, Mi-
soji Sakamoto, Chief Cabinet Secretary, made a statement 
supporting Estonia's independence. On September 6, Ja­
panese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama declared that 
his government was determined to recognize the inde­
pendence of the Republic of Estonia. In his letter to Es­
tonian Foreign Minister Lennart Meri T.Nakayama declared 
that "the Government and people of Japan sincerely hope 
for the prosperity of the Republic of Estonia and ardent­
ly desire to promote friendship and goodwill between 
the two countries".24 In the summer of 1992, the Japa­
nese Ambassador to Helsinki Kurokochi was also accre­
dited to Tallinn. On January 1, 1993, the Japanese 
Embassy's office headed by temporary charge d'affaires 
Terafusa Ariga was opened in Tallinn. 
Estonia could get much benefit from Japan's eco­
nomic potential and its political influence in the world 
if our government can make proper and efficient use of 
every opportunity. Japan is ready to render assistance to 
Estonia, but not to waste its money. Estonian politicians 
would profit much from studying the open secrets of 
Japan's economic miracle and, first of all, how the Ja­
panese used foreign aid in post-war years to meet the 
needs of their country. 
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Estonian Embassy and 
Ambassadors in Riga 
Eero Medijainen 
"There is no Estonia without Latvia and Latvia wit­
hout Estonia". These words are attributed to Arturs Al-
berings (1876-1934) — former chairman of 
Latvian-Estonian Society, a well-known Latvian politi­
cian. However, he was not original. One of the most fa­
mous Estonian diplomats Karl Robert Pusta expressed 
the same thought in a much more prosaic way — "The 
solidarity of Estonia and Latvia is best proved by the 
fact that if one's stomach is aching, the other feels sick 
as well". 
Strangely enough such a close relationship has been 
attached very little importance. At the present time much 
less is known of Estonia's political and military ally be­
tween the two world wars than of our overseas neigh­
bours — the Finns and the Swedes. One usually has a 
vague idea that Latvians were more "red" than Estonians. 
There are usually two answers to the question why 
the Baltic states were unable to preserve their inde­
pendence in 1939-40 in special literature on the mutual 
relations of the Baltic states. One opinion suggests that 
the Great Powers who extended their spheres of influen­
ce and territories at the cost of small states were guil­
ty of what happened. They tried to acquire more useful 
positions "selling" the Baltic countries. Therefore the lat­
ter were not able to control their destinies and were for­
ced to subordinate to the dictatorship of the Soviet Union 
in 1939.1 
According to the other vanant the Baltic states 
themselves were responsible for the fatal events as they 
did not organize enough co-operation, unite and make 
up resistance. This point of view usually sets Finland as 
an example and generally blames Estonia for balking at 
the developing military co-operation between the Baltic 
states. The present article is based on the latter opinion. 
But taking it as a starting point we do not find an ans­
wer to the question whether the diplomats of the Baltic 
states really were so ignorant or they did not care about 
the fate of their country. Did they not realize the threa­
tening danger and could they not avoid the mistakes 
they made? Maybe they represented more than just the 
views and opinions of men leading the foreign policy 
of their countries. The Estonian embassy in Riga and 
the ambassadors residing there probably reflect the 
Estonians' attitude to their southern neighbours in gene­
ral. But was it their mistake? And if it was, then who­
se mistake? 
The Beginning 
From the very first days the Estonian embassy in 
Riga caused headaches for diplomats and politicians. Even 
its date of birth is disputable. 
The military attachés sent to Lithuania and Poland 
soon became heads of the embassies. It is no wonder, 
taking into account that the Estonian War of Indepen­
dence was still going on. On March 13, 1919 the mili­
tary representative in Latvia Julius Jürgenson was sent 
on a mission to Liepaja. A few days later Estonian con­
sul entered service in the same town. In May 1919 J. 
Jürgenson already opened the consulate in Riga under 
the title Consulate of the Republic of Estonia and offi­
cer of the general staff. 
However, he did not have commission of a consul, 
the title was necessary to avoid his arresting by the Ger­
mans. Unfortunately this did not help. The Landeswehr 
men did not care of any titles - from June 6 — July 
4, 1919 the attaché and consul was kept captive by the 
Germans. From July 14, 1919 one more consul — Theo­
dor Tallmeister — was active in Riga. He himself used 
such title although he was considered the Estonian am­
bassador in Latvia according to the government's deci­
sion. By the end of 1919 Tallmeister used the title 
"representative of Estonia".3 
The mutual relations of the two representatives were 
evidently not very warm. In a number of letters to Es­
tonian authorities Tallmeister mentioned that Julius Jür­
genson was under suspicion for collaborating with the 
bolsheviks; that he accepted bribes from Jews for visas, 
was a boaster, a drunkard and ignored the ambassador. 
Th. Tallmeister was most upset by the fact that he as 
the representative of the state and government had to go 
on foot to official receptions or to take a cab while cap­
tain Jürgenson drove "with Estonian flag on his automo­
bile". Soon T. Tallmeister returned to his former job as 
a clergyman. J. Jürgenson made attempts to make busi­
ness after his demobilization, but was not very success­
ful. In 1926 he wanted to study at a police school, but 
was soon expelled for "improper behaviour". He died on 
October 19, 1927 in Riga at the age of 35. So the be­
ginning was not very inspirating. 
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The then Estonian foreign minister A. Piip had qui­
te positive contacts with Latvia. The treaty of military 
union concluded in 1921 was not ratified, but during the 
negotiations he got acquainted with a smart and intelli­
gent lady called Benita Uipus. She had worked under 
both Julius Jürgenson and Theodor Tallmeister. In March 
1920 the new consul in Riga Karl Mägi complained that 
Benita Uipus had left for London at A. Piip's call. Mägi 
asked for a man for that post as there was always some 
risk with young female colleagues. B. Uipus became A. 
Piip's wife. 
A Purchase 
In September 1920 an inner scandal broke out in 
the Estonian embassy the consequences of which made 
themselves felt until the end of the republic and are a 
problem even today. Consul K. Mägi was not at all sa­
tisfied with his position. The staff of the embassy was 
diminishing but the amount of work grew. Besides he 
probably was not very highly appreciated in Tallinn. 
In addition to this a serious conflict broke out with 
the acting deputy consul Herbert Griinfeldt. The prob­
lems were so serious that the latter even challenged him. 
The quarrel started from the deputy consul's comp­
laint against K. Mägi for currency speculations. Accor­
ding to him K. Mägi had sent 1 million czar roubles 
that he got from Tallinn to Berlin in a courier's parcel 
in order to exchange them into marks. The marks were 
brought back to Riga and exchanged into Latvian cur­
rency. This had given a great agiotage and enabled K. 
Mägi to buy the future house of the Estonian embassy 
in his name. This was not, in fact, anything extraordi­
nary. In London, Berlin and Helsinki one acted in the 
same way. Everywhere the accounts were later settled. 
But K. Mägi took offence and dismissed the deputy con­
sul. The duel was not still held yet. 
Court of Arbitration 
Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
A. Hellat and K. R. Pusta who were at a conference in 
Buldur at that time stated that the consul and deputy 
consul had behaved like "the pot calls the kettle black". 
Still, H. Grünfeit was probably a bit dirtier. He also sin­
ned in currency matters, but besides confessed that he 
"lived a light-minded life for 2 weeks due to an ac­
quaintance with a lady... "Such a life of course brought 
about huge debts and a need to borrow money or to 
obtain it some other way. 
Besides it became evident that namely the Estonian 
deputy consul had made noise in the street during the 
Buldur conference coming home at about 3 o'clock. He 
even could not find his way home from the villa of 
Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs Z.A. Meierovics. Be­
sides he had sat in the diplomats' box at the theatre 
with another lady. H. Griinfeldt was explained that this 
was only suitable with his own wife. The deputy con­
sul, however, denied the accusation that he often went 
to restaurants with Jews — "only one of my close la­
dies has oriental looks". However, he had to find anot­
her job. Even seven years later Pusta remembered him 
in a negative context. Then — already under the name 
Herbert Haljaspõld4 — he was active in Antverp at the 
head of the local "Home of Estonian Sailors". Pusta con­
sidered him to be an alcoholic and a weak-willed per­
son. Pusta admitted that Haljaspõld was a talented writer, 
but of uneven temper and without a sense of moral res­
ponsibility.5 
But K. Mägi was not quite guiltless either. In the 
course of investigations in 1921 a number of testimo­
nies were given about his currency speculations. Howe­
ver, the investigation could not prove these accusations. 
Trouble with the Embassy House 
The future house of the embassy was bought in 
order to sell it soon profitably and to acquire a more 
suitable one. The problem was that the house seemed 
too big. When A. Hellat arrived in Riga as an ambas­
sador in 1921, he counted all the rooms of the house 
and got - 167! He concluded that it was not appropria­
te for an embassy "to have to do with a great number 
of tenants". The ambassador even found a new suitable 
house, but was then sent on to Poland and Hungary, 
and the deal was left unfinished. 
The tenants and their troubles were a constant prob­
lem for Estonian ambassadors. In the 1930s the unpaid 
rent of Vidrik Ivask — an Estonian-Latvian public figu­
re — became a serious problem. V. Ivask was chairman 
of the Estonian Club in Riga and treasurer of Rotary 
Club and Latvian-Estonian Society. To cover his rent 
debts he also used the money of these organizations. 
The affair was to end with forced sale of V. Ivask's 
household furniture in November 1939. But the Estonian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not want a scandal, stop­
ped the auction and cancelled at least a half of the debt. 
Almost all the following ambassadors tried to get 
a new house and get rid of the tenants. Hans Rebane, 
the ambassador in 1937-40, was especially successful. 
He had already managed to find a new embassy house 
in Helsinki and did not doubt that he could do the same 
in Riga. First of all he found a new ground in the cor­
ner of Antonias and Pumpur streets that belonged to the 
YMCA of USA. But this caused a misunderstanding with 
Latvian authorities. The latter argued that a kindergarten 
was planned to be built on the same site. H. Rebane 
got upset — "take that ground, you have the privilege, 
but then a scandal will follow". The Latvians did not 
want this and Estonia got the permission to build a new 
embassy. Unfortunately the building was never started as 
the year 1940 came. . . 
Battles for the Ambassador's Title 
In 1920 Karl Mägi was offended that Tallinn did 
not name him a diplomatic representative like Tallmeis­
ter but confined with consul's title. He even wrote a re­
signation, but still put up with the situation and remained 
a consul in Riga until 1924. In September 1920 the Es­
tonian government decided to send a new ambassador 
to Riga. On March 22, 1921 Aleksander Hellat handed 
over the credentials of a minister plenipotentiary and en­
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voy extraordinary. This was the time when the Baltic 
states finally recognized each other de jure and thereby 
established official relations. Now the former title "rep­
resentative" was given up and generally recognized tit­
les were introduced. 
Latvian representative Janis Seskis who arrived in 
Tallinn was only titled minister-resident in his creden­
tials. K. R. Pusta who precisely adhered to such ques­
tions made an inquiry to Herman Hellat, assistant of the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. He demanded an explana­
tion how Estonia could accept such injustice and insult. 
H. Hellat did not take the matter so seriously, he 
turned to his brother in a joking manner — "to avoid 
the breaking up of war again, Prof. Piip is asking you 
to sound about whether it would be possible to promo­
te Seskis to minister plenipotentiary. Otherwise he should 
resign from his office. J. Seskis still remained in Tal­
linn until 1929. A. Helllat moved on southwards alrea­
dy in the summer of 1921. He became chief consul and 
later ambassador in Warsaw, as well as in Hungary and 
Rumania. This also meant that the embassy in Riga re­
ceded into the background. 
Seljamaa's time 
Julius Seljamaa was ambassador in Riga for 5 years 
from January 1922. He had had contacts with Latvians 
already earlier, for instance while studying at the Valga 
Teachers' Seminar (1899-1902). He started his diploma­
tic career as Estonia's representative in Russia in Feb­
ruary 1918. He was a member of Estonia's first foreign 
mission. 
The heyday of Estonian-Latvian relations coincides 
with the period when J. Seljamaa worked as the ambas­
sador. Border disputes were finally settled and in 1923 
even military union was concluded. The role of modest 
J. Seljamaa in this is indisputable. It is also questionab­
le whether he could in some way have avoided the coo­
ling down of the relations in 1926-28. Favourable offers 
by the Soviet Union brought about Latvian-Soviet com­
mercial contract (1927) and made the idea of Estonian-
Latvian customs union senseless. This in its turn caused 
mutual accusations and insults. 
At the end of 1927 one relied on A. Hellat who 
became foreign minister for some time, but in fact re­
sided in Helsinki as the ambassador. Even Estonian am­
bassador in Berlin Karl Menning was worried about 
Estonian-Latvian relations. He wrote to A. Hellat: "It is 
clear to me that despite a number of unpleasnt things 
from the Latvian side this mustn't spoil the relations be­
tween our nations. Here must cold-bloodedness, patien­
ce and faith play the main role, not insulted feelings, 
how very grounded they may be. Probably J. Seljamaa 
was also responsible for the situation as he did not go 
deeply into the Latvian problems, as in the years 1923-
26 he was also the Estonian ambassador in Kaunas. He 
himself argued that Latvia was more guilty. He was con­
vinced that "Ulmanis uses every possible occasion to di­
soblige Estonia". 
The beginning of 1928 brought changes. In March 
he already asked the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
to give agreement to a new man — Eduard Virgo. The 
change did not improve J. Seljamaa's situation. On the 
contrary - he got out of the frying pan into the fire. In 
other words, he became the ambassador in Moscow. 
Eduard Virgo's Problems 
The new ambassador in Riga considered himself to 
be the founder of Estonian diplomacy as namely he had 
composed the credentials to the members of the Esto­
nian Foreign Mission on December 16, 1917, and used 
the word "diplomats" for the first time. At first he had 
to become the representative in Finland.6 As the civil 
war broke out there he went to Scandinavia and then to 
Italy. In 1920 it was intended to send him to the USA. 
He himself hoped to stay in London. Finally E. Virgo 
remained in Stockholm, but felt there rather uncomfor­
tably. Despite several attempts he was not given an 
ambassador's title. He worked as a secretary but had to 
carry out the duties and expenses of an ambassador. This 
gave grounds to a case between E. Virgo and the Mi­
nistry of Foreign Affairs. Virgo thought that as he subs­
tituted the ambassador he had the right to get his salary 
as well. Such ignorant demand irritated the Commission 
of Foreign Affairs - the "king" of Estonian foreign re­
lations as it was called in the 1920s. 
Finally, on May 1, 1928 Virgo got his own way. 
He was made ambassador, but into unfriendly environ­
ment. Already in September 1928 he was convinced that 
"Latvia is offended and envious". This had foundation 
as Estonia did not respond to the visit of Latvian navy 
in 1925 but paid a visit to the king of Sweden instead. 
E. Virgo warned State Head J. Tõnisson that there was 
"rather reserved and suspicious" air in Riga towards Es­
tonia. Virgo tried to improve the relations by inviting 
the Estonian navy to the anniversary of the Republic of 
Latvia and organizing Latvian-Estonian Friendship Socie­
ty, but the success was only temporary. 
He himself was not content with his position. Du­
ring the 1929 summer holidays Virgo got in touch with 
the Finnish ambassador Aarne Vuorimaa. He sounded 
whether A. Hellat who had problems with Finnish so­
cial democrats felt himself firm in Helsinki. A. Vuori­
maa of course saw him through at once. In his report 
to Helsinki he mentioned: "By the way, Virgo feels very 
uncomfortably in Riga and seems to lie in wait for Hel­
sinki now".7 
New Troubles 
But this was only the beginning of Virgo's mise­
ry. After the visit of State Head O. Strandman to Po­
land (beginning of 1930) Latvia's self-respect was 
decisively insulted. Rumors about E. Virgo's departure 
grew bigger. He was attacked both in Riga and in Tal­
linn. It was judged in Tallinn that Virgo should be made 
the chief consul to the USA. The ambassador did not 
agree, otherwise he was ready to leave foreign service. 
He did not go along with Moscow either although un­
derstood the wish of the then Foreign Minister J. Lat-
tik to come to Latvia himself. Only " any other embassy 
in Europe" suited Virgo. 
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His colleague in Stockholm days Oskar Õpik (Ma-
mers) writes in his memoirs about Virgo in a superior 
manner and disdainfully. He hints that Virgo was unfit 
for diplomatic work.8 He was not familiar with diplo­
matic protocol. In an interview to the "Segodnja" news­
paper in Riga Virgo had confused the notions 
"self-made-man" and "desperado', passing himself for the 
latter, i. e. a reckless person or even a bandit. This was 
just one of the stories that were told about Virgo. Or, 
as he himself affirmed, "this is dirty provincial gossip 
which isn't at all a rare phenomenon in Riga". 
The ambassador got tired of all this soon. In May 
1930 he came to the conclusion that he could not stand 
the situation any longer as "the ambassador's work here 
demands a lot of representation during a season that lasts 
almost 8 months. My health has suffered from being 
constantly awake, eating and drinking at night. I have 
been so weak lately that I have often suffered from 
sleeplessness and even applied to a doctor for longer pe­
riods. Therefore I would prefer a more peaceful place 
as for representative tasks". 
Scandal with Summer Holidays 
A small holiday trip in the summer of 1930 brought 
about a new scandal. As a former sailor Virgo was very 
fond of yachting. Once he sailed to a beach in Curonia 
with the director of LETA (Latvian Information Agency) 
and two ladies where they stayed overnight. The yacht 
seemed too narrow and a common bed was made on 
the beach. 
Later rumors got about that Virgo who took offen­
ce as one of the ladies rejected his overtures, he had 
left the Latvians to the coast and sailed away. Virgo 
proved that it had to do with slander again, but journa­
lists spread the story in Estonia, too. 
In addition to this he was accused of having in­
sulted a group of actors from the "Estonia" theatre at 
the republic's anniversary in 1931. After a performance 
in Riga the actors wanted to have a good time at the 
embassy, but Virgo sent them away at 2 o'clock at night, 
saying: "Damn it, I want to sleep". 
The accusation that the ambassador cared too much 
for Miss Estonia who was visiting Riga and was there­
fore late for a reception, comes from the same time. Be­
sides, some journalists got the impression that Virgo came 
drunk to a gathering of the Latvian-Estonian Society. 
The ambassador denied this categorically and claimed 
that the speech in Latvian that he tried to read out, had 
caused the lapses. He later never agreed to make a 
speech in Latvian. 
J. Tonisson's Strange Support 
In 1931 E. Virgo probably remained in his place 
only thanks to the support of Foreign Minister Jaan Tõ­
nisson. There was something in their mutual relations 
that joined these two men. This "something" might have 
gone back to the days of tha Foreign Mission or the 
time when Virgo worked as the embassy's secretary in 
Stockholm. Karl Menning in Berlin was convinced that 
"The chef' (J. Tõnisson) often defends jackstraws, even 
harmful men". 
He wrote to Tallinn: " Not much reaches my ears, 
but even this is enough to get a picture how bad Virgo's 
reputation is not only at the ministry but even wider, so 
that it is already openly discussed how to displace him. 
But the chef has tied himself to him so that Virgo's 
decline would threaten the chef as well. . . I thought 
Virgo had learned something from his past, that he knew 
his borders. Unfortunately it seems to be upside down".9 
Looking for a Successor 
In the meantime Virgo tried to offer his post to Fr. 
Akel who had gone to Stockholm after him, hoping for 
an exchange. He even exalted his role — " As you 
know the embassy in Riga is among the most important 
ones for us, and it isn't all the same who will come 
here as my successor". 
E. Virgo was of the opinion that in Riga the am­
bassador need not waste time to minor problems like in 
Stockholm where correspondence was big and the staff 
small. "In Riga the ambassador has to deal with the 
most important political and economic questions only and 
to keep good personal contacts with local circles of inf­
luence" , he asserted to F. Akel in April 1931. Howe­
ver, there was one precondition that E. Virgo considered 
necessary in Riga — the ambassador had to be "free of 
servilism to Latvians". 
Finally, taking advance of friendly relations with J. 
Tõnisson, he became director of the department of fo­
reign trade at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It had 
also been discussed to send him to Yugoslavia as a ge­
neral consul and in July 1932 even Beograd's agreement 
was asked for this purpose. At the ministry he could sa­
tisfy his wanderlust that also caused reproaches on bu­
siness trips. E. Virgo died in 1938 at his place of work. 
Interregnum 
After Virgo's departure a period of about 1. 5 years 
followed when Estonia did not have an ambassador in 
Riga at all. It was confirmed later that the post was left 
vacant because of retrenchment as economic crisis was 
threatening. 
In fact, the situation was more complicated. At first 
1st secretary Jaan Mölder had to fulfil tha ambassador's 
duties. J. Mölder who had studied engineering in Rus­
sia at the beginning of the 20th century reached to the 
counsellor's title at the Moscow embassy in 1922 and 
was acting general consul in Petrograd in 1924. From 
1926 J. Mölder became secretary of the Riga embassy. 
According to one variant he had to become the new am­
bassador as well. J. Tõnisson who was known to be abs­
tainer was against his candidacy. He argued that "because 
of some personal characteristics (the problem of tempe­
rance) Mölder was more suitable as a counsellor." 
F. Akel who was very obstinate, Karl Kornel and 
Jaan Lattik, pastor and member of the parliament who 
understood Latvian, were also under consideration. At 
the turn of the years 1919-20 K. Kornel had caused a 
small scandal in Riga. Then an attempt was made to 
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name him ambassador, but at the presentation of the cre­
dentials a dispute arose between him and the Latvian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. So, his career only lasted 
for a few hours on New Year's Eve. 
On June 3, 1932 the government decided to ask 
for agreement to J. Lattik. But then an unexpected obs­
tacle became evident at the meeting of the Foreign Com­
mission on June 8, 1932. Both social democrats and 
representatives of the right-wing Farmers'Party were 
against J. Lattik's candidacy. To escape their attack, J. 
Tõnisson used white lie that asking for the agreement 
had not reached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 
the government. 
Actually the Foreign Commission had been ignored 
and the agreement came. However, J. Lattik did not go 
to Riga as his main support — J. Teemant's cabinet and 
foreign minister J. Tõnisson resigned. The post remained 
vacant. The question of J. Lattik was once again discus­
sed in the Foreign Commission in February 1933. It din't 
show mercy to him then either. General J. Soots (right-
winger) expressed the opinion that J. Lattik did not know 
anything of military or economic questions that were es­
pecially important in Riga. M. Martna (left-winger) ad­
ded that Lattik lacked knowledge in diplomacy and that 
in his age learning new things might be difficult. In 
June 1933 foreign minister A. Piip raised the issue once 
again, but without results. 
J. Mölder felt himself quite firmly in Riga. He even 
made a proposal to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 
send a counsellor to Riga, although he himself was for­
mally only the 1st secretary who substituted the ambas­
sador. He suggested: "Besides the ambassador there should 
be another person at the embassy who could, relying on 
his experience, take contact with Latvian economic circ­
les and other diplomatic representations". He, of course, 
hoped that he himself would be made the ambassador 
if such a man came to Riga. 
A Phonecall 
Finally Julius Seljamaa who had become assistant 
of the foreign minister took care of the problem. He 
made a call to his colleague in Riga Wilhelm Munters. 
Seljamaa informed him that the Estonin government wan­
ted to send J. Lattik to be ambassador and asked, whet­
her the Latvians were still ready to accept him or should 
the Estonians ask for agreement the second time. Mun­
ters answered: "We haven't had such an occasion that 
an agreement has been unused for about a year, But, 
having consulted with respective persons, including Mr. 
President, I can announce to you that we don't want to 
cause any complications to Estonia and if you would 
ask the question whether a new agreement was necessa­
ry, we would answer no". 
J. Seljamaa did not understand such a keen answer 
at first and asked for W. Munters' personal opinion. But 
he only repeated his statement and put the phone off. 
As a good expert of international law and diplomatic 
practice Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Piip asserted that 
this was actually negative evading. J. Lattik himself also 
agreed with this, and said: "I won't go to Riga after 
such an agreement". He also supposed that so his long­
time wish would come true. Namely during his visit to 
Warsaw with Strandman he had been told that he was 
welcome in Poland as an ambassador. However, finally 
he had to content himself with a compromise — soon 
he became the ambassador in Kaunas. 
Final Struggle for the Ambassador's Title 
Now ambassadors F. Akel in Stockholm and K. 
Menning in Berlin fell under pressure. On October 17, 
1933 Akel wrote to J. Seljamaa that he understood the 
situation - " The present Head of the State (J. Tonisson's 
government 18. 05. — 21. 10. 1933) doesn't agree to 
remove Menning from Berlin". Akel needed a more pro­
fitable job to nourish his family of 7 members and would 
have preferred Berlin instead of Riga, but was ready to 
agree. He understood that the appointment of ambassa­
dors did not so much depend on the Minister of Fo­
reign Affairs, but on parties. 
But the K. Päts became Head of the State, whose 
enmity against K. Menning was generally known. Then 
happened what K. Menning had been afraid of for many 
years already. On October 29, 1933 J. Seljamaa warned 
him that the question would be solved before the 15th 
anniversary of the Republic of Latvia. K. Menning comp­
lained that he coul not speak Latvian and that he lac­
ked acquaintances in Riga, but at the same time realized 
- "The post in Riga will probably save me". J. Selja­
maa presented a longer explanation why the decision 
could not be postponed. First, the place had been va­
cant for a too long time and the Latvians "have remin­
ded this to us for a number of times". Secondly, when 
J. Seljamaa became the Foreign Minister, he had promi­
sed to fill in the ambassador's post in Riga quickly. 
Thirdly, it had to be taken into account that there was 
a new regime in Germany, but Menning had contacts 
with the circles mainly oppositional to Hitler. So, a birth­
day present was made to Latvia — on November 18, 
1933 K. Menning was named the Estonian ambassador 
in Riga. He himself arrived there only in January 1934. 
Still, upon his arrival in Riga Menning had told his sub­
jects: "I have done my work, now you, younger peop­
le, can continue". 
J. Mölder felt insulted after such a solution. He 
was made a counsellor at Berlin for some months, then 
brought back to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1936 
he decided to remind the skills he had learned in his 
youth and became director of the "Dvigatel" factory. 
On E. Virgo's initiative a certain "memorial badge 
of foreign service" was founded for the 11th anniversa­
ry of the ministry in 1936. This was for official use 
only and had three ranks: silver badge tor those leaving 
the foreign service, bronze badge for those who were 
transferred to embassies from the ministry, and iron bad­
ge for persons who had worked for over 15 years. Fi­
nally only silver and bronze badges were taken into use, 
whereas the latter could be of 2 different tones. The sil­
ver badge was presented only once — to J. Mölder on 
November 11, 1936. 
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Time and K. Päts are Merciless 
К. Menning reconciled himself to Riga and tried 
to live a quiet life until resignation. J. Laidoner's speec­
hes and especially O. Loorits's activities among Livo-
nians irritated the Latvians. A fatal moment for K. 
Menning arrived in August 1937. His former rival, now 
Minister of Foreign Affairs F. Akel wrote to the ambas­
sador: "This is not pleasant for me, but in the interests 
of the mission I am obliged to inform you of the fol­
lowing: after several discussions with the Head of the 
State (K. Päts) it was decided that our embassy in Riga 
urgently needs a younger, i. e. a more energetic leader. 
As for its importance the Riga embassy stands in the 
forefront and under the present circumstances needs great 
initiative and efforts your delicate health wouldn't al­
low."10 From October 1, 1937 K. Menning formally wor­
ked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tallinn and 
was assigned the salary of Assistant Minister, but in tact 
he was allowed to stay in Tartu at once. His final re­
signation was registered in May 1939 — " in connec­
tion with his 65 years of age". 
Additional Remarks on H. Rebane 
The new ambassador was 8 years younger than K. 
Menning. But this was hardly of any real significance. 
The Riga embassy evidently was a "life buoy" for him 
as well. For several reasons H. Rebane was forced to 
leave Helsinki. At first it was planned that he would 
stay at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but then he found 
an influential patron. F. Akel confessed to the Finnish 
ambassador that he himself would not have sent Reba­
ne to Riga if the decision had been his. 
According to the same source he was not very 
eagerly welcomed in Riga either. The agreement was de­
layed for 16 years. Differently from the present day this 
was considered to be a too long time. Latvian ambas­
sador in Estonia commented: "We have a reason to hur­
ry this time". In his memoirs H. Rebane does not speak 
much of his Riga period, although he spent almost 3 
years there. He only eagerly criticized his follower wine-
loving Aleksander Penning. 
Considering the Estonian ambassadors who worked 
at the post in Riga, it is no wonder that Estonian-Lat­
vian relationship was characterized as an alliance wit­
hout allies. Riga seemed to be just a step towards a 
future career. However, in some cases it occurred the 
beginning of decline. There were few persons at the em­
bassy who sincerely wished to intensify the relations be­
tween the two states and were also ready to learn the 
language. Still, such persons could not change much the 
general disdainful attitude of the Estonians to their sout­
hern neighbours. There were no such men at the Esto­
nian Ministry of Foreign Affairs either. 
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On Mass Repressions in 
Estonia after World War II 
1. The studying of 1949 deportations in Estonia 
Before the 2nd half of the 1980s Soviet mass rep­
ressions were a closely guarded state secret. Writing about 
it was inconceivable, scientific research on this topic 
would probably have been qualified as anti-Soviet acti­
vity. However, since people still remembered the depor­
tations and several victims who had survived still lived 
among us, the truth could not be completely suppressed 
either. So, deportations were mentioned in party history 
studies as an episode in post-war "class-struggle", and 
wereregarded as justification for breaking down the in 
resistance of the kulaks to collective farms. 
The history of deportations in Estonia is first of all 
associated with two large-scale deportations. The first of 
them took place in June 1941. Since this event has been 
studied thoroughly, we shall not deal with it in the pre­
sent study. Another mass deportation took place in March 
1949 and is one of the culminations of postwar mass 
repressions. 
Under the circumstances of Gorbatchev's "glasnost", 
the year 1987 witnessed a breakthrough in treating the 
deportations. Then Heino Kiik's novel "Maria in Sibe­
ria" was published in Estonian literary journal "Looming" 
("Creation").1 The novel described the life of a depor­
ted Estonian woman in Siberia in mild colours and wit­
hout bitter words. In November 1987 (still under the 
conditions of Soviet censorship!) the first historical stu­
dies were published. The first of them was Evald Laasi's 
article "Filling in Some Gaps" published in the cultural 
and literary weekly "Sirp ja Vasar" ("Sickle and Ham­
mer"). On December 15, 1987 the article "Mistakes or 
Crimes" by Herbert Lindmäe,3 Docent of Tartu Univer­
sity, followed, which showed that deportations were cri­
mes even according to Soviet legislation of those times. 
A heated discussion followed which in many respects 
was influenced by the spirit of those days and emotions, 
but it also brought about the studying of archive mate­
rials available and the presentation of several major re­
sults of research.4 
There was much discussion about the number of 
the deported. This ranged from 20,702 (data presented 
by the KGB) to ca 60,000 presented in Western publi­
cations." 
Another major problems were finding out the per­
sons who were guilty of the deportations and estimating 
the personal guilt of local communists. 
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All this happened at the time when it was very 
difficult gain access to the archives of the Estonian Com­
munist Party (ECP), the access to sources was selective 
and using the archives of the KGB was inconceivable. 
The research was partly based on second- and third- rate 
information. At the same time a professional and most­
ly critical use was made of personal memories. 
2. Sources 
Today the passionate discussions on studying the 
history of mass repressions have weakened and it is not 
an acute topic in mass media either. The first results 
have been made public. Besides, several memoirs have 
been published and respective Western literature has be­
come more available. Scientists can use the materials 
kept in the archives of the ECP, Ministry of Internal Af­
fairs and the KGB. It is probably more correct to say 
that the preserved part of the archives is usable as, un­
der Soviet occupation, these archives suffered from se­
veral "cleanings". A great deal of most important sources 
are in Russia. 
2.1. Archaival materials 
The primary source material consists of the perso­
nal records of the repressed persons and preliminary lists 
based on those records kept in the archives of the Mi­
nistry of Internal Affairs. That contains several hundred 
lists in Russian, and, for example, people from the dist­
rict of Tartu were included in dozens of different lists. 
The amount of these sources is increasing. Recently the 
materials of this part of the KGB archives that remai­
ned in Estonia were added. 
The materials of the archives of the ECP indicate 
that the preparatory work and carrying out of deporta­
tions was kept strictly secret and no written evidence 
could remain. The documents of party institutions could 
not contain any hints about their role in the deporta­
tions. Still, there remained traces, and they are quite nu­
merous. Extensive correspondence reflects the mechanism 
of drawing up the lists of kulaks. There is also some 
data on the deletion of some names from the lists. Bu­
reau decisions and discussions of personal matters also 
contain some information. At the beginning of April 1949 
many people were punished for not being active enough 
in the deportation. "When it was necessary to gather 
communists together to accomplish a special task (my 
underlining — A.R.), no-one turned up. Communist Vält-
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sev got drunk and actually hindered the fulfilment of an 
important political task." 
Those archival records that were not abstracted by 
chance only are especially valuable. Lembit Raid has 
found the notes in a mixture of Estonian and Russian 
that belonged to the then first secretary Nikolai Karo-
tamm dating from the last days of 1948 and the begin­
ning of 1949. It probably has to do with abstracts of a 
paper read to the "inner circle" where he presented a 
detailed plan of carrying out the deportations. 
Archives of courts and prosecutor's offices. The 
process of rehabilitation of the victims of mass repres­
sions started already during the so-called Khrushtshev's 
thaw. Rehabilitation was within the competency of the 
Supreme Court of the ESSR. The Prosecutor's Office of 
the ESSR had to deal with more complicated cases. In 
the course of this process extensive data were collected 
on the rehabilitated persons (incl. personal records or 
extracts from personal records drawn up in judicial ins­
titutions and prisons). 
The archives of the Registry Office of the Repub­
lic of Estonia are is a state archive without a reading 
room for researchers. Here the documents of population 
registration of this century (there are some earlier mate­
rials as well) and very well systematized documents of 
personal status (births, marriages, deaths) since 1926 are 
kept. 
It is an invaluable source material for correcting 
the mistakes in the data on repressions and for identifi­
cations. The archives also provide reliable information 
on the victims of mass repressions. This is the data on 
the so-called special deaths which have not been sub­
jected to scientific analysis yet (see below). 
Archival documents of parish and district administ­
ration since 1944 are kept in town and district archives. 
Intermediate-level administration in districts (later regions) 
consisted of the Executive Committees of the Soviets of 
Workers' Deputies. The EC of S WD were the local ins­
titutions of self-government in towns, small towns and 
parishes (later villages). The archival sources of finan­
cial departments of district ECs are more interesting as 
they contain documents connected with taxation and re­
gistration of population. 
When working with these documents one should 
take a source critical approach because a part of the ac­
counts has been written at random, without using any 
original data (comparison of the population accounts for 
two consecutive years reveals that 6-9 year-old children 
were born etc.). 
There are fewer materials directly connected with 
repressions. Materials of repatriation commissions (a part 
of the repatriated also occur in the lists of the repres­
sed) are of interest. It should be possible to use the hou­
sehold books of 1948 in future research. They are actually 
taxation documents where all the people who belonged 
to the household, the size of land, number of cattle and 
other data are fixed. 
2.2 Museum materials 
To some extent materials reflecting mass repressions 
can be found in museums. Here we would only men­
tion the so-called Karotamm's list of 1948 which is pre­
served at the Museum of Literature in Tartu. In the 
course of Soviet reorganizations it was tried to destroy 
every possible continuity with the "bourgeois period", the 
former administrative-territorial division was disarranged 
and adapted to the models of "elder brother-republics". 
It is a difficult task to identify places. At the end of 
1948, right before the deportation, a precise administra­
tive-territorial description of Estonia at that moment was 
made on N. Karotamm's demand. These lists are of great 
help when lists of the victims of repressions are com­
piled and places of residence are identified. 
2.3 Oral data 
Already in the late 1980s the Estonian Heritage So­
ciety and the Society of the repressed "Memento" star­
ted to collect memories of the victims of repressions. 
The study of the 1941 deportations that had the list of 
victims published by V.Salo as its basis, was especially 
fruitful.8 For our research we have sent an extensive 
questionnaire to people deported from Tartu and the dist­
rict of Tartu. We have received 192 answers to 547 ques­
tionnaires. But the results of this work will be subject 
to an independent treatment. Oral data help to till in the 
gaps in written documents, to correct the mistakes and 
to estimate the degree of reliability of the documents. 
As can be seen the description above, the data ref­
lecting mass repressions are incomplete and scattered in 
many different depositories. Due to this it is absolutely 
necessary to compose a special data base. 
3. Data Base of Special Deaths 
Mass arrests started immediately after Estonia was 
again occupied by the Red Army. Altogether ca 10,000 
men were arrested and sent to hard-labour camps at the 
end of 1944 and in 1945. More than a half of them 
died in the first or second year at camps. But the ar­
rests continued in the following years as well. A new 
wave came in 1950-1951. About 25,000 people were 
sent to hard-labour camps in 1944-1953. About 11,000 
of them, mostly men in the prime of life, died of over­
work and unendurable living conditions. 
There existed a so-called double registration system 
in Soviet population statistics. Physicians knew that the­
re were certain diseases that were not allowed to be 
diagnosed at all, or in case of which a maximum num­
ber of diagnoses was prescribed (this could not be hig­
her than in developed Western countries). Suicides, people 
killed in fire and other casualties that, according to the 
authorities, might have endangered the reputation of the 
Soviet power were subject to secrecy. As for the vic­
tims of mass repressions the double registration functio­
ned as well. According to statistics all the arrested persons 
who were sent to concentration camps in Siberia still 
continued to live in Estonia. Official data do not reflect 
any large-scale resettlement to the East. In order balan­
ce the data a system of extradition existed as well — 
if a person died or was killed at the concentration camp, 
a secret certificate was sent to the registry office of his 
former residence and the death certificate was drawn up 
there. 
The program dBase III has been applied for ente­
ring the data. In the course of entering the material was 
arranged in order and a number of specifications were 
made. At the present moment the data base contains in­
formation about 9,861 persons, incl. ca 150 doubles that 
have to be unified. There are ca 350 women in the list. 
The following indicators are entered into the computer: 
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number, time and place of drawing up the act; family 
name, first name and father's name of the dead person; 
date and place of his birth; place of arrest; time, cause 
and place of death (see Fig. 1). The data are not comp­
lete - there are relatively more gaps in dates of birth 
and places of arrest. Some of the data available are more 
detailed than other — in some cases the parish, in ot­
her cases only the district is known. The same applies 
to the place of arrest. Only 29 per cent of death certi­
ficates present data about prison camps and the degree 
of accurary varies. Often only the oblast where the pri­
son camp was located, is mentioned. There is no infor­
mation about the causes of death in 15 per cent of the 
cases studied. 
There are very many mistakes in the spelling of 
names — the documents of Soviet repressive institutions 
were written in Russian and the Russian alphabet is not 
adequate to transcribe Estonian names. There also much 
inaccuracy in age data. 
Fortunately it is possible to check and correct a 
major part of the data. Before publication the orthograp­
hy of names, the places and dates of birth must be chec­
ked with the general files of the archives of the Registry 
Office. Last year we had to stop doing this work as the 
archives of the Registry Office were overloaded with 
work.9 
3.1 Representativeness of the data base 
The data base is not complete. The information on 
special deaths was not forwarded regularly to registry 
offices, but rather as campaigns. Until 1989 death cer­
tificates of only such persons were registered into who­
se death an inquest had been held. In a number of cases 
it was done years later. The following table presents the 
data the death certificates of persons who died on the 
registration dates of in Soviet prison camps in 1942. 
The dynamics of the number of death certificates 
is an original and quite illustrative barometer of politi­
cal climate. The first acts were drawn up in 1947-49. 
In 1949-55 very few acts were registered. The reason 
for that is clear — the families of the arrested persons 
were automatically included in the lists of the 1949 de­
portation and were too sent to Siberia; those who esca­
ped by chance were frightened contact repressive 
institutions of to occupation authorities on their own ini­
tiative. After Stalin's death and simultaneously with the 
first signs of "thaw" the number of new acts increased. 
Even more certificates were applied for in 1957 after 
many people were released from prison camps and the 
deported returned. In 1967-88 very few death certifica­
tes were issued. The mass registration of special death 
acts started only in 1989 (all the 781 acts marked in 
the table) when the respective permission had been gi­
ven by Moscow. State security institutions revised their 
archives and sent the data on persons who perished at 
prison camps to registry offices that have been issuing 
certificates of special deaths to this day. 
Occasional checking has shown that the data base 
enables to fill in numerous gaps in the history of So­
viet mass repressions. For example, in Voldemar Finn's 
book on red terror in the district of Läänemaa we can 
read about the political police assistant August Naglas 
who disappeared in August 1940.10 The data base gives 
quite clear evidence of Naglas' disappearance — he died 
in the prison camp of Sosva on September 28, 1941. 
Table 1 
Death certificates of persons who died in So­
viet prison camps in 1942 
Years Death certificates 
1945-49 81 
1950-54 20 
1955-59 207 
1960-64 140 
1965-69 55 
1970-74 16 
1975-79 8 
1980-84 6 
1985-89 781 
Another missing person, instructor of the Defence Lea­
gue of Läänemaa, counter-espionage officer Ferdinand 
Laurmaa died of heart paralysis on January 6, 1941. The 
cause of death seems suspicious and may stand for shoo­
ting. 
3.2 Reliability of data base 
In a number of cases there are many different ent­
ries in archival records about persons who perished in 
prison camps. For example, two acts have been drawn 
up for Eduard Metstak. The act issued in 1947 in Haap­
salu gives heart disease as the cause of death, but the 
act of 1989 indicates of shooting. Karl Erdman died on 
October 10, 1942. According to the first act he died of 
heart paralysis, the other act indicates shooting. There 
are two different acts for Admiral Pitka's" youngest son 
Stanley. The act of 1962 points out that he died of typ­
hus. According to the act of 1989 he was shot on Sep­
tember 1, 1942. On the same day Oliver-Eduard Pitka 
was shot as well. All the three brothers were killed in 
Solikamsk. These repeated entries are grounds for sour­
ce criticism (we simply do not have better original data 
at this moment). It has become evident that the infor­
mation about causes of death is the least reliable. This 
contains numerous deliberate falsifications as well as mis­
takes caused by carelessness or lack of qualification. In 
his opinion several "heart troubles" were unofficial sy­
nonyms of shooting. The examples presented ought to 
prove this opinion. A great part of acts registered in 
1989 present data about people who had been included 
in the files already earlier. In general the acts of 1989-
90 should be more precise and earlier falsifications have 
been removed. 
3.3 Causes of death 
The death rate of Estonians in Soviet prison camps 
was the highest from November 1941 to September 1942. 
Another great wave of mortality occurred from Decem­
ber 1946 to March 1948. The statistics of death causes 
indicates that tbc was the most dangerous disease and 
the cause of 22 per cent of deaths. Thirty-two per cent 
died of lung diseases, 20 per cent of heart diseases. The 
years 1946-48 were most exhausting. Most of the deaths 
caused by undernourishment were in 1948. The largest 
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number of suicides were committed in 1949. The cases 
of decrepitude mainly occur in 1947. It is clear that the 
statistics of death causes can be used as a very appro­
ximate background material. The list of different death 
causes is long. But even if there were no deliberate fal­
sifications, it is not probable that the qualification of 
medical staff at prison camps and means of diagnostics 
available could have always provided the exact diagno­
sis. It certainly would be interesting to hear doctors' opi­
nion of such lists. 
On the basis of the material used the greatest num­
ber of Estonians, ca 20 per cent, perished in the camp 
of Sosva. This was the death camp where most of the 
shootings took place. That's why this place is called the 
Katyn of Estonians. Many Estonians perished in Soli­
kamsk (13 per cent), in Lesnoy near Sosva (8.5 per 
cent), Irkutsk, Taishet etc. Often only the oblast where 
the prison camp was situated, is mentioned. The grea­
test number of Estonians perished in the prison camps 
of the oblast of Sverdlovsk. Some of them may actual­
ly belong to the long list of the victims of the Sosva 
camp. 
The data about persons who were shot is not comp­
lete. In many cases this cause of death has been hidden 
behind other causes. The data on about shootings are 
available from February 1941 to September 1954. In Ap­
ril 1942 prisoners were shot on a mass scale: on April 
10, 13, 20, 21. The bloodiest day for prisoners from Es­
tonia was April 24. The shootings continued in May. 
Most of them took place in Sosva and the oblast of 
Sverdlovsk. In 1942, 68 per cent of the total number of 
Estonian prisoners who were killed, were shot. 
The special deaths in 1957, 1959 and 1960 in case 
of which shooting or death from gun wounds are indi­
cated as causes, need additional checking. It is probable 
that these persons were not repressed ones. 
"Gun wounds" as a cause of death usually stands 
in case of "forest brothers" or civil persons who were 
killed in the armed conflicts. For example, on July 6, 
1945 four women — Ida-Helene, Merlanda and Valve 
Koitla and Miina Vender died of gun wounds in the pa­
rish of Undla. They were victims of a raid organized to 
capture "forest brothers" in the village of Udriku-Män-
niku, parish of Undla, district of Viru. A total of 14 
people were killed. The act about the four women men­
tioned above was registered in Rakvere in 1990. The 
two women and four men who died of gun wounds on 
October 27, 1949 were victims of a raid in Veriora, dist­
rict of Võru.12 On this day two women and four men 
died of gun wounds. The person who died of gun wounds 
on April 24, 1942 in the camp of Sosva is probably a 
victim of shooting. 
4. Data base of the mass deportation of 1949 
4.1 Existent data 
On the basis of the data mentioned we have crea­
ted a special computer data base. We used programme 
dBase III. All the inserted data are statistically compa­
rable and can be subject to complex analysis. It is con­
venient to use the data base — it is possible to make 
requests according to any characteristic. Creating the data 
base was not a merely mechanical work. Initial data 
about the deported persons are in Russian and contain 
a lot of inaccurate information. The database contains 
the following data about every person included in the 
list of deportations: 
1. Category of record. In the official documents of 
soviet authorities the deported were divided into "kulaks" 
(K) and "nationalists" (N). There was also a third cate­
gory of records — R. These are the records of persons 
rehabilitated before 1988. 
2. Number of record. One record was drawn up 
for all members of one family. So it is possible to re­
store families according to the number of the record. 
The same number goes for the person's record in the 
archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
3.-5. Family name, first name and patronymic. Es­
tonians do not use father's name, this is a Russian cus­
tom. But as it was indicated in the lists, it was practical 
to include it in the data base as well as it helps to iden­
tify persons and family connections. 
6. Sex. 7. Date of birth. 8. Residence at the mo­
ment of deportation. 9. Document of deportation. This 
characteristic gives the exact reference which institution 
has made the decision of deportation. 10. Date of deci­
sion. 11. Date of deportation.12. Note about escaping 
from the deportation. 13. Destination of deportation. 14. 
Note about death. 15. Date of release from Siberia.16. 
Specifications about changes in Siberia (transferring, ar­
rest etc). 17. Additional remarks. 
4.2 Preliminary results 
4.2..1 Decision makers 
The analysis of the data base allows to draw se­
veral conclusions. We shall start with the document ot 
deportation (9). The plan of the deportations was drawn 
up according to the rich experience of the Soviet Union. 
H.Ligi argued that the decree of the All-Union Commu­
nist (bolshevik) Party of 30.01.1939 served as a direct 
example. The proposals of local functionaries to confine 
themselves to compulsory resettlement within Estonia met 
Moscow's disapproval. On January 29, 1949 the Coun­
cil of Ministers of the Soviet Union adopted a decision 
to carry out the great deportation. 
The data base available presents an incomplete pic­
ture of the organizers of the deportations as the role of 
the Communist Party is not reflected here at all. Howe­
ver, some documents that have been found in the arc­
hives of the ECP clearly show the leading role of the 
ECP in organizing the repressions and an intention to 
take minimal responsibility. 
The first secretary of the Central Committee of the 
ECP N.Karotamm wrote: "This deportation must be pre­
pared carefully and it must be carried out before the 
spring sowing of 1949. It is very important to carry out 
this action simultaneously in the Estonian, Latvian and 
Lithuanian SSR" 
The abstracts of his paper meant for a small circ­
le of activists, that L.Raid found from the archives of 
the ECP is a vivid document: "No statements in news­
papers or radio. No decisions, no documents. No phone 
calls. Reports on reactions must be made in absolute 
secrecy through special channels./.../ There must not be 
any unnecessary people at meetings in parishes... Peop­
le must be sent to the operation immediately from the 
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room. The certificate of deportation must not be given 
to the deported persons. It must be read out to the ku­
lak or members of the bandit's family without taking 
any signature. The representative of the Soviet institu­
tion must read out the certificate."13 Two institutions 
dealt with the practical drawing up of the lists of de­
portations: 
1. The so-called Soviet apparatus (local executive 
committees) compiled the lists of kulaks. According to 
the materials of the archives of the ECP, the lists were 
already compiled in the autumn of 1948. The "list of 
kulak households" of the Tartu district was confirmed on 
October 21.14 Comparing this list with the list of depor­
tations, several differences can be observed. Many peop­
le were added later, but several were also excluded from 
the list of kulaks. All district lists were sent to Tallinn 
and on March 14, 1949 the then chairman of the Coun­
cil of Ministers Arnold Veimer signed the documents. In 
records they were denoted by "K" ("kulak"), 
2. Another list was drawn up by institutions of sta­
te security. Family members of the arrested persons were 
included in the list. The first lists were probably made 
in early February 1949. But the main part of the lists 
was drawn up between February 27 and March 14. Peop­
le were added to the lists until March 27, i.e. until the 
3rd day of the deportation. The decisions made by lo­
cal security institutions are reflected only in the records 
of these people who escaped from the deportation. Re­
cords of persons who were deported according to the 
lists and "official" decisions were made already after the 
deportation by "special counsils". This was probably done 
in Moscow and not at the destinations of deportations, 
because the dates of the decisions coincide with the ini­
tial lists but not with the places of exile in Siberia. Most 
of the decisions were officially registered later, in July 
and October 1949. The last decision was made on Christ­
mas Eve 1952, more than three and a half years after 
the actual deportation. Ca29,000 people were included 
in the lists of deportations. 
4.2.2 Kulaks and nationalists (category 1) 
The lists of nationalists predominate (сабО per cent), 
especially in Saaremaa and Hiiumaa (75-80 per cent). In 
the district of Viljandi it was the other way round — 
over 60 per cent of the deported were kulaks. In the 
districts of Võru and Valga the number of kulaks was 
a little above 50 per cent. 
4.2.3. Regional differences of deportations (catego­
ries 8,12) 
The southern part of the district of Pärnu suffered 
most. Four parishes of this region are among the first 
ten parishes that suffered most in the course of repres­
sions. The parish of Tali suffered the greatest losses — 
18.9 per cent of the population was included in the lists; 
14.5 per cent was deported (in 1941 some Soviet acti­
vists were killed in the parish). More than 6 per cent 
of the inhabitants were deported from the parishes of 
Saarde, Tõstamaa, Laiksaare and Tihemetsa (See map p 
80). 
The percentage of persons escaped who succeeded 
in escaping was the highest in the districts of Võru (35 
per cent of those included in the lists), Viljandi (31.8 
per cent) and Läänemaa (30 per cent). The number of 
those who escaped was the smallest in Hiiumaa (6 per 
cent), the district of Valga (18 per cent) and Saaremaa 
(19 per cent). There were also such parishes where the 
percentage of the deported was below 1 per cent. Among 
them were the islands of Muhu and Kihnu. 
4.2.4. Time of deportation (category 11) 
The thorny path of thousands of Estonians to Si­
beria (or, like it is called in Estonia, to the "cold count­
ry") started on the eve of March 25th 1949 when 75 
per cent of those who were to be deported were arres­
ted. On March 26-28th a much smaller number of peop­
le were caught. Some peasants who escaped came out 
of their hiding places themselves — cattle had to be 
fed. The last people were caught even on March 29. 
Why namely that period was chosen? Deportation was 
a manysided action. On the one hand, it was an act 
aimed at striking terror into the hearts of people in or­
der to strengthen the "new order". Besides, the deporta­
tions had an economic aspect. As the victims themselves 
supposed, this was something similar to slave trade. They 
say that already in the autumn of 1948 the authorities 
collected information at places in Siberia about how many 
additional workers were needed for spring fieldwork, and 
also promised to bring the necessary number of people 
on time. On the other hand, it had been planned to car­
ry out compulsory collectivization before spring sowing 
and it was clear that no-one would protest against it af­
ter deportations. The experience of Soviet repressive ins­
titutions might also have played a role. The experience 
of mass repressions among other nations (Kalmyks, Vol­
ga Germans, Crimean Tatars etc) had shown that in cool 
seasons epidemics did not spread so well. It was sen­
sible to take care of the workforce. 
Another factor might have been important at fixing 
the exact date. It was common practice to dedicate "la­
bour achievements" to great anniversaries (party congres­
ses, birthdays of leaders of the state). On March 25, 
1949 the leader of Soviet mass repressions Lavrenti Be-
ria celebrated his 50th birthday. The mass act of terror 
might have been planned as a jubilee present for him. 
Altogether 20,722 people — 4320 men (21 per cent), 
10,232 women (49 per cent) and 6170 children of up 
to 16 years of age were put into wagons.15 
However, the people who were deported in March 
1949 were not the last among those included in the lists 
of deportations. Farmers who were convicted of not 
paying extremely high agricultural taxes and who had 
spent years in prison, were sent to Siberia to follow 
their families until 1956. In the district of Tartu the num­
ber of such men was 128, the last of them was depor­
ted on August 16, 1956. 
At the same time some people voluntarily shared 
the destiny of their relatives. Even until 1952 several 
people who had escaped from deportations (or who were 
not included in the lists) followed their families to Si­
beria. 
4.2.5 Location in Siberia 
The data base contains information on the disloca­
tion of the deported persons in Siberia. This data must 
be examined critically. Special trains went to the oblasts 
of Omsk, Novosibirsk, Irkutsk and the territory of Kras­
noyarsk. Minor groups were sent to the oblast of Ke­
merovo, Karaganda, Tomsk and Magadan, the territory 
of Habarovsk, Autonomous Republics of Komi and Yaku­
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Fig. 1 
Theoretical Position of Estonians Who Perished in Soviet Prisons and Hard-labour Camps until 
1949 in the Population Pyramid of 1949 
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tia. On the basis of oral information we know that the 
place of banishment marked in the list often only sig­
nifies the place where the certificate of release was re­
gistered. People from the district of Tartu were mostly 
deported to the oblasts of Omsk and Novosibirsk. 738 
people were deported to Tserlak, 733 to Zdvinsk, and 
542 to Kormilovka. There were also more people from 
the district of Tartu in Vengerovo, Kuibyshev and Se-
vernoye. Many people were dispersed to different pla­
ces. However, people of one community were usually 
together. For example, the deported from the parish of 
Alatskivi were together in Zdvinsk, from Kambja — in 
Kormilovka, the people of Kavastu — in Tserlak. Most 
people who came from Tartu were taken to Tsherlak as 
well. 
4.2.6 Death (category 14) 
More than one-tenth of the deported died within 7-
8 years of banishment. According to mortality statistics 
the hardest years were 1949, 1950, 1951. Later people 
already managed to get used to the new circumstances. 
More people died in April and September. 
4.2.7. Gender and age structure of the deported 
The data base enables to follow the gender and age 
structure (6,7) of the deported and the composition of 
families (2). Besides the families of 2-4 members that 
predominated, there were quite a lot of big families as 
well. For example, 11 members of one family were inc­
luded in the records K-2370. It still had to do with the 
families of two brothers who lived in different parishes, 
but were registered in the same records as they were 
related to the same "enemy of the people". The follo­
wing population pyramid (Fig. 2) shows the gender and 
age structure of people deported from the district of Tar­
tu. The picture gives clear evidence that this act of ter­
ror was first of all directed against women, children and 
elderly people. Twenty-nine per cent of the deported were 
children. The children who were born in 1942 suffered 
most. The percentage of men of working age was less 
than 12. The oldest deported person was 91-year-old 
Georgi Toots from the parish of Jõgeva. 
The question may arise why men were not depor­
ted. If we return to the data base of special deaths we 
get a simple answer — men had been arrested already 
earlier. By 1949 many of them had already died in pri­
sons and hard-labour camps (see Fig 1). To a large ex­
tent the families of namely these men were deported. 
Connecting the data of persons sent to prison camps and 
those deported, we can follow the fate of the whole fa­
mily. This is illustrated by the following examples. 
Four members of the Sooväli family from the pa­
rish of Nõo were included in the list of the 1949 de­
portation. They were considered to be guilty as two of 
their brothers — Aleksander and Jaan — were in pri­
son camps in Russia. The brothers died in 1952 and 
1955. Two members of the family escaped, but the ol­
dest member Ella Rosalie (b. 1889) was released from 
the region of Kormilovka only in 1956. 
On April 13, 1942 Karl Roots from the parish of 
Peipsiääre was shot in a prison camp in the oblast of 
Sverdlovsk. Although he was not alive any more in 1949, 
his family of 6 members was deported to the region of 
Kuibyshev. In 1952 two of them — Anna (b.1880) and 
Kaarel (b. 1869) died. 
The Krain family from Tallinn was deported to the 
region of Shira. Father Aleksander died in July 1949. 
His son Lembit died in prison camp as well (cause of 
death — heart paralysis). His wife and two daughters 
still managed to return. The fate of Jakob Niholm's fa­
mily from the village of Pedaspea, parish of Kolga, was 
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Fig. 2 
Gender and Age Structure of People Deported to Siberia from the District of Tartu in March 
1949 
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similar. J.Niholm died in prison camp in June 1945, his 
wife, daughter and three sons were deported in March 
1949 as family members of an arrested "enemy of the 
people". 
5. Conclusion 
The studying of mass repressions is a difficult task 
and at present it is in its initial phase only. Several im­
portant sources have been destroyed or taken to Russia. 
Finding secondary sources, connecting and analysing them 
is a very time-consuming task. But it is possible to draw 
a number of important conclusions even today. Arrests 
and deportations exerted a pernicions influence on the 
demographic situation. During the war the gender and 
age structure of Estonian population had changed great­
ly. As mostly men in the prime of life were arrested, 
the part of women in fertile age increased. Hopelessness 
and indifference spread among country people. This was 
reflected in falling birth rate, people leaving the count­
ryside, increasing number of suicides (especially after the 
1949 March deportation and compulsory collectivization 
which was directly connected with it). Besides all that 
this created favourable conditions for mass immigration 
and sharp changes in the national structure of Estonian 
population. 
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Estonian Archives -
Development up to the 
Present 
Peep Pillak 
Prehistory. There are data concerning Estonia and 
the Estonians in the Scandinavian sagas and the Russian 
chronicles of the second half of the first millennium AD. 
It is impossible to speak of written documents and arc­
hives in Estonia itself before the foreign conquests of 
the 13th century. 
The Danish and Teutonic eras. The oldest survi­
ving archival document in Estonian archives dates from 
1237 and concerns the papal legate Wilhelm of Mode-
na. The first archives were established by churches, mo­
nasteries, the King of Denmark's viceregents, Masters of 
the Teutonic Order, bishops, the nobility and town halls. 
Most of the documents concern legal matters or proper­
ty ownership. Few have survived to the present day, due 
to frequent wars and fires. Estonian historical sources 
have found their way into German, Swedish, Danish, Po­
lish, Latvian, Russian and Vatican repositories. 
The Swedish era. The development of Estonian 
archives was facilitated when Estonia came under Swe­
dish jurisdiction, particularly after the founding of the 
Riksarkivet (National Archives) in 1618. A systematic 
bureaucracy developed, conducting its affairs on the ba­
sis of documentation. Central archives were established 
at the residences of the Governor-Generals in Tallinn and 
Riga. Parish registers were maintained more consistently 
than had been the case previously. Historical documents 
were used more and more as sources for research. Ne­
vertheless, a reliable archival system did not develop in 
Estonia; much depended on the good intentions of the 
officials. Subsequently, much archival material was dest­
royed during the Great Northern War. Documents were 
also evacuated to Sweden and to this day there is a lar­
ge "Livonica" collection in the Swedish National Archi­
ves. 
The Russian era. Estonia's subordination to Rus­
sia was accompanied by a step backwards in the main­
tenance of archives, as the conduct of state business and 
the preservation of official documents were of a low 
standard in Russia. Many valuable historical documents 
were consigned to destruction, sold to paper factories or 
used for packing. The archives of the guilds, towns, emi­
nent families and large estates were better cared for. 
From the 19th century onwards more attention was paid 
to the preservation of the documents. Societies of Bal­
tic Germans played a significant role in process, espe­
cially the Estonian Learned Society and the Estonian Li­
terary Association. The academic publication of archival 
documents was initiated (Friedrich von Bunge, Carl Schir­
ren, Eduard Pabst, Carl Russwurm). The first scientifi­
cally organized archives were the Tallinn City Archives, 
established in 1883. A catalogue appeared in 1896. The 
Pärnu City Archives were established in 1893 and the 
Tartu City Archives in 1900. 
The Estonian National Awakening provided the im­
petus for the collection of documents of national signi­
ficance. Notable work in this area was done by the 
Society of Estonian Literati and especially by the Asso­
ciation of Estonian Students; and later by the Estonian 
National Museum and the Estonian Literary Society. 
The First World War and the subsequent revolutio­
nary events caused great damage to Estonia's archives: 
documents were destroyed, collections were split up and 
scattered all over Russia during evacuation and were lost. 
The Estonian Republic. On the basis of the pea­
ce treaty of February 2nd 1920 between Soviet Russia 
and Estonian Republic that concluded the War of Inde­
pendence, all archival material that had been taken out 
of Estonia was to be returned. On March 3rd 1920 an 
Archives Commission was formed, led by Finnish pro­
fessor Arno Rafael Cederberg, which began the task of 
organizing and directing Estonia's state archival system. 
In November 1921, the Commission became the Archi­
ves Council, attached to the State Chancellery. On Ap­
ril 1st 1921 the State Archives were established in Tallinn 
for the collection and organization of documents from 
state institutions, and on May 16th 1921, the Central 
State Archives were established in Tartu for the preser­
vation of historical documents. In 1922, the Narva City 
Archives were created, and in 1926 the archives of the 
Registry of Birth, Marriages and Death were set up at 
the Ministry of Justice and Interior. Archives of the War 
of Independence were established by the Committee for 
the History of the War of Independence in 1926. Many 
of the archives of societies and associations continued 
to function, as did those of private organizations, and 
new archives were established. In 1929, the Estonian 
Cultural Archives were established in Tartu as a reposi­
tory for personal archives. Local government archives 
were created. An Archive Act for the general regulation 
of archives became law decree of the Head of State on 
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June 12th 1935. Maintenance of archives was directed 
by the notable historians Paul Johansen, Otto Liiv, Ar­
nold Soom, Erik Tender, Rudolf Kenkmaa and others. 
Close contacts were established with neighbouring count­
ries. In 1939, the Association of Estonian Archivists was 
founded. In a short time, Estonian archives had emer­
ged from chaos and could be reckoned with by Euro­
pean standards. 
Under foreign occupation. This natural develop­
ment was interrupted by the occupation of Estonia by 
the Soviet Union in 1940. The archival systems that had 
previously emerged were forced into foreign framework. 
Following the Soviet example, the NKVD took Estonia's 
archives. On September 4th, all archival material gene­
rated and stored in Estonia was declared to be proper­
ty of the state and deemed to be part of the general 
Soviet state archival collection. 
The Second World War once again brought the wi­
despread destruction and dispersion of archival material. 
The Tallinn, Tartu and Narva archives suffered particu­
larly severely. In 1944, the Germans evacuated a huge 
amount of material from Estonia,including the document 
from 1237, Estonia's oldest, which was located in the 
Bundesarchives (Federal Archives) in Koblenz in West 
Germany up to the autumn 1991 when they were retur­
ned to Estonia. After Estonia fell into Soviet hands again, 
the re- moulding of Estonia's archives according to the 
Stalinist-Soviet patter continued. A sweeping centraliza­
tion was put into effect, and the maintenance of archi­
ves was severely restricted and they lost their function 
as scientific and cultural institutions. There were absolu­
tely no contacts with foreign countries, the professional 
standards of archivists declined any many valuable do­
cuments were destroyed. 
In the 1960s, during the so-called "thaw", archives 
were placed under the jurisdiction of the Council of Mi­
nisters. Archives became more accessible and archival 
materials were published once more. Unfortunately, the 
reorganization was abandoned. In the period of "stagna­
tion" that followed the rigidly centralized subordination 
of Estonia's archives to Moscow continued and direct 
contacts with foreign countries were prohibited. Secrecy 
and regulatory restrictions made the work of researchers, 
especially foreign researchers, difficult. Large amounts of 
archival material were outside the system of state archi­
ves. The archives of the Estonian Communist Party were 
to all intents and purposes inaccessible to researchers, as 
were those of the ministries of the state security (KGB), 
the interior and defence, and other institutions of the So­
viet regime. For decades, the soviet authorities conside­
red the problems associated with archives to be secondary 
in nature, which resulted in the catastrophic material and 
technical backwardness of Estonia's archives. 
Since the middle of the 1980s, positive changes 
have been taking place in the maintenance of archives, 
most of hitherto prohibited material in the Estonian arc­
hives has been made available to researchers, including 
those from abroad. The material has been published and 
displayed in exhibitions. Direct contacts with other count­
ries are being established, primarily with the archives of 
neighbouring countries. The Association of Estonian Arc­
hivists began to function again in 1989. A new Archi­
ves Law is being prepared, which will act the basis for 
the development of independent Estonian archives. 
Estonia's system of state archives is directed by the 
Archives Department (Arhiiviamet, Maneezhi 4, EE-
0100 Tallinn). There are four so called central state arc­
hives. 
The Estonian History Archives (Eesti Ajalooarhiiv, 
J. Liivi 4, EE-2400 Tartu), which succeeded the Central 
State Archives, have 1,887,677 items dating from 1240-
1917 (including a few items from 1917-1944 and some 
post-war items) in 3198 collections (archive groups). The 
library has 103,322 volumes. 
The Estonian Film Archives (Eesti Filmiarhiiv, Ma­
neezhi 2, EE-0100 Tallinn) founded in 1971 have 14,364 
films and film-clips (the oldest dating from 1913), 237,678 
photographs (the oldest from 1878) and 5,237 audio re­
cordings (the oldest from 1905), 131 videos and 442 
photo albums. 
The Estonian State Archives (Eesti Riigiarhiiv, Ma­
neezhi 4, EE- 0100 Tallinn) have 2,407,487 items, da­
ting from 1917 onwards, in 4,096 collections. The library 
has 76,100 books. 
Filial of the Estonian State Archives, (Eesti Rii­
giarhiivi Filiaal, Tõnismägi 16, EE-0106 Tallinn) ear­
lier archives of the Estonian Communist Party, have 
535,576 items, dating from 1894 onwards, in 3,921 
collection about the activity of Estonian Communist 
Party, KGB and Ministry of Internal Affairs of the 
Estonian SSR. 
The Estonian Technical Archives was liquidated 
on January 1, 1994. The collections with 89,145 items 
will be divided between the Estonian State Archives, Tal­
linn City Archives and Estonian History Archives. 
There are 5 city archives and 12 regional archives 
within the state system, where approximately one and a 
half million items of local importance are preserved, 
mostly postwar documents. The oldest and biggest mu­
nicipal archives is Tallinn City Archives. 
The Tallinn City Archives (Tallinna Linnaarhiiv, 
Tolli 4/8, EE- 0001 Tallinn) have 290,148 items connec­
ted with the history of Tallinn and its surroundings, da­
ting bach as far as the 13th century, in 998 collection, 
including fragments of Estonia's oldest printed book, da­
ting from 1535. The library has 15,940 volumes. 
In addition to the state archives, in their collection 
there is a lot of archival materials in the libraries and 
museums. 
Estonian archives abroad have been established on 
private initiative in countries with sizable Estonian emig­
re communities. The oldest and biggest of these, The 
Estonian Archives in Australia (Eesti Arhiiv Austraa­
lias, Water Street, Lidcombe, NSW 2141), were estab­
lished in 1952. The archives have most of the nearly 
3,000 Estonian books that have been published outside 
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Estonia since 1945. They also have periodicals, and ma­
terial in languages other than Estonian that have either 
been written by Estonians or are about Estonia. Docu­
ments, photographs, ex libris, recordings etc pertaining 
to Estonian organizations, institutions and individuals are 
also preserved there. 
The Estonian Archives in the USA (Eesti Arhiiv 
Ameerika Ühendriikides, 607 East 7th Street, Lakewood, 
NJ, 08701) were founded in 1969. Besides documents, 
the archives have books, periodicals, photographs, films, 
medals and awards, a collection of art etc. 
There are two Estonian archives in Toronto, Cana­
da. The Estonian Central Archives (Eesti Keskarhiiv, 
Estonian House, 958 Broadview Avenue) consists of the 
personal archives of Estonians abroad and other docu­
ments. Besides personal archives, the archives of the 
Tartu Institute (Tartu Instituut, 310 Bloor Street West, 
M5S 1W4) have a library, records, works of art, pho­
tographs, and recordings of personals memoirs. Work is 
done on microfilming and bibliography. 
The Baltic Archives (Balti Arhiiv) in Sweden are 
located in Stockholm's Estonian House (Wallingatan 32, 
S-lll 24). Some material has also been deposited in 
Sweden's National Archives. Material pertaining to outs­
tanding community activists and cultural figures, as well 
as exile organizations, is preserved. There is also a pho­
to-collection and a library. 
Many Estonians abroad have received recognition 
as outstanding archivists. The best-known are Arnold 
Soom, Evald Blumfeit and Jakob Koit of the Swedish 
State Archives and Vello Helk of the Danish State Arc­
hives. 
Estonian Administrative Division in 1939 
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Districts: 1. Läänemaa. 2. Harjumaa. 3. Järvamaa. 4. Virumaa. 5. Saaremaa. 6. Pärnumaa. 7. Viljandimaa. 
8. Tartumaa. 9. Valgamaa. 10. Võrumaa. 11. Petserimaa. 
